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
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

THE CATHEDRAL ABOVE THE DEVASTATED HOUSES OF RHEIMS

THE WINNING OF THE WAR

A SEQUEL TO "PAN-GERMANISM"

BY
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WITH MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS

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C-S

TO THOSE MEMBERS
OF A NOBLE PROFESSION
WHOSE SKILL AND DEVOTION
SAVED THE LIFE OF ONE MOST DEAR TO ME
GEORGE CANBY ROBINSON
GEORGE MARVINE TUTTLE
WILLIAM EMIL SAUER
CARL EBERBACH

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PREFACE

THIS is an optimistic book for pessimistic people. At the moment when the American army is about to enter the trenches, a very general feeling of despondency and a fear of actual defeat has spread through the Allied world. I believe that this is not difficult to explain, but impossible to justify. I have sought, therefore, by an analysis of the situation to show the true basis of apprehension, the valid reasons in the past conduct of the war for the present pessimism, and in the last section of the book the dim outlines, already distinguishable, of the victory the Allies will beyond doubt win. The true difficulty which most people now experience is the definite realization that certain conceptions about the method of winning the war and the character of victory have become during the last year impossible of realization. I am prepared to go so far as to maintain that they never were founded in reason or expediency, but upon a misconception of the European and international situation the falsity of which the progress of the war has so clearly demonstrated.

I feel that the postponement of Allied victory has been due partially to the belief that the

war would be won in time by non-military forces, like economic exhaustion or a democratic revolt in Germany. But it has primarily been due to the fact that the Allied strategy of victory has been formulated to defeat the old Pan-Germanism, which was abandoned in the second year of the war, and has yet to reckon adequately with the newer and more brutal scheme which has taken its place. I feel that the Germans have dealt with the Russian Revolution as a fact, while the Allies, in the main, have treated it as a hope deferred. The former accordingly reconstructed their own policy to utilize the Revolution; the Allies have clung to their original strategy in the expectation that the co-operation of Russia might be again secured. The new Pan-Germanism and the Russian Revolution have altered, to my thinking, the international equation for every country in the world and have transformed the problems of victory and of a permanent settlement. Much of my space is devoted, therefore, to a statement of the new Pan-Germanism, an analysis of its influence and of the Russian Revolution upon German and Allied objectives, upon the political and military situation, and upon the direct issue of the winning of the war.

I hold that by the old European formulas the Allies cannot win, but I maintain that in the light of the new formulas, by which the world is now and henceforth will be controlled, the Allies have already won a victory of a scope and finality unparalleled in past wars. To

understand this transformation of Europe and of the world by the war itself and its effect upon our past notions and policies, is our first step toward the winning of the war.

Victory indeed is to my thinking not really at stake. I see a new Europe in which the Central Empires have unfortunately increased their power and influence, solely because of the collapse of Russia. I also see a new world, truly international, controlled beyond peradventure by what I think may be best described as the Atlantic Powers, an intra-continental, literally international combination of states, already possessed of the supremacy of the seas, of the bulk of the economic resources of the globe, of the willing allegiance of Africa and India, and which exemplify in their institutions the ideals of democracy, liberty, and law. And the new world will dominate the new Europe. We have only to understand the war to be optimistic about the future. Europe as we thought it was, the war has proved never did exist; Europe as the Allies first believed it would become is now impossible; but there is a new Europe and there is a new world, created by the war itself, and which, if not exactly what we meant to make them, will certainly serve the cause of democracy and of civilization more dependably, more conclusively, and more permanently than our first notions about the winning of the war. Let us not reject the gifts the gods provide because they are not the expected answers to our prayers.

BOOK I

THE GERMAN MENACE

THE WINNING OF THE WAR

I

THE NEW PAN-GERMANISM

THERE is a new Europe and a new world, created by the war, and a new Pan-Germanism intent on the domination of both. It was born of the war, suckled in the fear of defeat, nourished in the expectation of dominion. Like the old, it is the product of Machiavellian craft and of Teutonic ruthlessness; it sees nothing too great for its aspiration, nothing too mean to be utilized for victory. It believes its ambition so lofty as to consecrate the baseness of its methods. From the slime and muck of merciless warfare it aims to build a new Kultur, dazzling in its purity and splendor, surpassing the glories of Athens and the achievements of the Renaissance. Out of the eater will come forth meat and out of the strong will come forth sweetness. For ingenuity, for intuitive grasp of European issues, and for downright villainy, it surpasses the original dreams of Mittel-Europa by as much as the latter transcended the victory over France in 1870

and the creation of the Empire. Its menace lies in its method of fighting the war and renders the continuation of the conflict as serious a problem to meet as defeat itself. It portends no longer the conquest of Belgium, but its annihilation; it expects not merely the defeat of France, but the destruction of her economic and political strength for a generation, if not for all time. It will exact the utmost farthing and the last fraction of its pound of flesh during the war and after its conclusion. It sees in the war itself the golden opportunity for conquest, in its continuation the certainty of eventual victory, and in the manner of its prosecution the assurance of the destruction of its enemies. If the old Pan-Germanism entered the war stained with the disgrace of aggression, the new will end it branded with the infamy of the strategy of defeat, compared with which the original sin against Belgium, the sinking of the *Lusitania*, and unrestricted submarine warfare appear like acts of a mild and beneficent neutrality.

This new Pan-Germanism, the strategy of the Allies did not at first adequately meet. Indeed, the postponement of Allied victory was due fundamentally, though not primarily, to their unwillingness to transform their own offensive and defensive measures, probably certain of success against the older Pan-Germanism, in order to meet a new German strategy of victory and defeat, the existence of which was by no means as well demonstrated. To-day the reality of the new Pan-Germanism is no longer to be denied.

The old Europe was destroyed by the Russian Revolution and from its ashes the Pan-Germanic Confederation rose—a European and international fact, unassailable to armies and impermeable to diplomacy. At once the strategic equation in Europe and in the world was transformed. Some Allied objectives became impossible of achievement, others undesirable, others inexpedient. The effect of this single event upon the policies of both belligerent coalitions, upon the manner of conducting the war, upon its strategy, upon the character of the subsequent reorganization of Europe, was instantly impossible to exaggerate or to ignore. In it, the new Pan-Germanism found an ally and a friend; from it, the Allies continued to hope, might come a reorganization of Russia which would make unnecessary the thorough reconstruction of their objectives and the methods for attaining them which the final collapse of Russia would make imperative. The Germans continued the war upon the assumption that the old Russia was dead and the new Russia theirs. The Allies fought the campaigns of 1917 upon the belief that somehow the lame might be made to leap, the blind to see, and the dead brought to life. They were reluctant to conclude that no military victories could restore the old Russia or insure the strength and dependability of the new. Still less were they willing to admit that the Revolution had cemented, strengthened, and perpetuated the Pan-Germanic Confederation, already a fact as the result of the German victories in eastern Europe,

and had consequently rendered inexpedient the reconstruction of Europe they had undertaken in 1914.

But in time the conviction grew that Russia was not only lost to the Allies, but all too probably won by the Germans—a Russia, to be sure, broken in strength, lacking administrative coherence, and almost certainly condemned to half a century of civil turmoil and disorder, but none the less an economic ally of the first consequence and a political and diplomatic asset of no little potential value. The Germans had by no means gained all that the Allies had lost, but they had won enough to render problematical indeed the victory the Allies had set their hearts upon winning. Men began to be dimly conscious that the old victory could no longer be won by armies, that the new Pan-Germanism could not be destroyed by a strategy aimed at the defeat of the old. For the first time since the battle of the Marne the possibility of defeat gripped Allied hearts and minds with conviction. To many the mere thought that victory was not a mathematical and logical certainty seemed almost equivalent to the announcement that the war was lost. The Allied world had been drunk with optimism, careless with confidence. Because victory seemed certain men had believed it inevitable; because the first German strategy of victory had been defeated men assumed the problem solved and only its execution left to accomplish. When they saw themselves wrong in certain assumptions they had no reason to make, they cried out in an

agony of apprehension that all was lost. But nothing worse was lost than a degree of self-confidence the Allies ought never to have entertained, a type of optimism the situation never warranted, an intellectual conception about the war and about the way it should be won which was created in its first year and which had since dominated public opinion in Europe and America. Unquestionably the new anxiety and depression had its roots in the inability of the majority to provide any satisfactory substitute.

The Allies did not at first understand the war because they saw it in the light of the old diplomacy and the old traditions, in the light, too, of the old Pan-Germanism, as a European and not an international fact. To them it was necessarily a struggle of European powers, fought on European soil, for continental aims and ends. It was a subjective rather than an objective fact. Nothing was more natural nor perhaps more regrettable than the almost hypnotic effect of the West Front upon the statesmen and people of France and Great Britain. They saw the war as the military operations conducted by their husbands, sons, and brothers for the achievement of the objectives nearest to their own hearts. They could not view it with detachment and impartiality, or study the campaigns in Poland or Serbia with the same intensity as the shifts of position along the trench line in France. What mattered the victories of Hindenburg in Poland, so long as the Germans were held at Verdun? What mattered campaigns in Ru-

mania, so long as the war could not end until France had been reconquered and Alsace-Lorraine occupied? Nor could they conceive that the battle for France might more expediently be fought in the east. Two parties, sharply aligned, appeared in the General Staffs, the Westerners and the Easterners, those who insisted upon fighting the war in France and those who believed a more conclusive victory more cheaply to be had elsewhere. The political authorities decided for the west and the people accepted the decision without being fully conscious of all it involved. The result was a failure to see the war as a whole, a tendency to study it in detail rather than in perspective, to attach a value to the offensive in France far greater than the Germans came to assign to the defense, to forget that the war might be lost in the east, and that it could be won in France only on the basis of assumptions and calculations by no means mathematically certain or dependable. The British, French, and American people saw the war out of focus, and ignored the interrelations and correlations of its parts. They did not realize that the Allied victories of consequence were not being won in France, nor that the Allied defeats of moment had not been suffered there.

The progress of the war they did not grasp because they looked at it through the spectacles of an unquenchable optimism which refused to see the darker aspects of the problem, the lions in the path before the castle. Time was when the battle of the Marne was still gloriously new,

when men congratulated one another on the disappearance of the German menace. It is to-day greater than ever, not because the Allies have not made progress toward victory, but because the scope of German ambition is greater than before. Optimism led the Allied people in general to accept a picture of the Germans cowering in the trenches, chained to the guns, driven to the assault with whips, rioting for food, making fertilizer out of the bodies of their own dead—a nation easily to be beaten, a strategic problem which could have no terrors for a sane man. Optimism also concealed the indirect results of the otherwise brilliant diplomacy of the Allies upon the military campaign. There lay the root of the defeat in Italy. It also led men to believe that time would work on the side of the Allies and against the Germans, that a long war would be inevitably to the advantage of the former. They have been slow to wake to the fact that time was not working invariably in the Allies' favor and that it might not be to their advantage to prolong the war indefinitely.

Victory was postponed because the defense of the Allies was not calculated to meet the offense of the Germans. For the latter the war has been a long series of diplomatic, political, and economic defeats; for the Allies it has been thus far a military failure, a term, by the way, which it is highly essential to analyze and understand, for it means merely that the Allied objectives are not as yet attained. A true victory for either side must comprise results of both natures. Ger-

many may win the war and lose it. The Allies may lose the war and win it, because it is fought not primarily for military results, but for its effect upon the reorganization of Europe when the war is over. They have merely to understand the war to see that they have already won security, safety, and significant objectives far more important than those sketched in the first speeches of their statesmen. The war was from the outset an international fact, fought by European and non-European armies on the plains of France and Poland and in the mountains of the Balkans. There east met west and the struggle began for the maintenance of the old domination of the world by Europe. There could be but one result: the war destroyed the old Europe and emancipated the world. For the first time the independence of America, Asia, and Africa became a fact and no longer an aspiration. No Pan-Germanic victory in central and eastern Europe can restore the domination of the world by the old European conference of the Six Powers. No Allied defeat can alter the vital fact that if France, Great Britain, and Italy may lose a portion of their old heritage in Europe, they have already won a commanding international position as the European members of the alliance of the Atlantic Powers.

The Allies have yet to confess to themselves that the war has solved their problems and has already created for the future an invulnerable defense. Forces older than armies and thrice as potent have worked on their behalf and victory

stands ready to their hands, needing merely to be comprehended, organized, and utilized, to be infallible and final. If the war has destroyed old forces in Europe and created a new Central Europe, it has already by its operation created an essential and adequate counterpoise in the alliance of the Atlantic Powers. The new land power, unhappily a fact, finds itself face to face with a new sea power, only too happily as real, and more powerful, more firmly ensconced in an international position stronger than that of the Central Empires. The war is already won. France, Belgium, Italy, Great Britain, are already safe, even though the measures originally intended to insure their future are now inexpedient and perhaps impossible.

Nothing is more essential than that the war should be continued not merely in the light of its origin, but in view of the effect of its progress upon its original objectives and upon the essential reconstruction of Europe when peace shall be restored. What remains to be done, the expenditure of blood, time, and energy necessary to accomplish it, will depend partly upon what has already been done, but chiefly on what we find it desirable or imperative to achieve. For the American people, an analysis of the new Pan-Germanism, of the reasons for the postponement of Allied victory, and of the character of the new Allied objectives, is of paramount importance. They must pay the price of victory and they must calculate its cost with accuracy if their effort is not to fall short of the intended effect. The

gravity of the crisis will in no way shake their determination. It will steel their hearts, rouse their courage, deepen their convictions in the necessity of victory. Only one thing can cause an Allied defeat—a failure of conviction on the part of the British, French, and American people of the greatness of the cause of democracy, of the splendor of the moral crusade upon which they have enlisted, of the necessity of victory to make safe the world for posterity.

II

THE ORIGINAL GERMAN STRATEGY OF VICTORY

THE most superficial study of the German strategy of victory must begin with Germany's fundamental strategic position on the great plain sloping from the Jura, the Alps, and the Carpathians to the Atlantic, the North Sea, and the Baltic. There no great mountain barriers delimit political areas or prevent military movements. Germany holds a central position without well-demarcated frontiers between her, Belgium, Holland, and France on the west, nor yet between her and Poland on the east. No position could well be more difficult to defend, because a simultaneous attack is possible upon two very vulnerable frontiers. This strategic difficulty has been more than doubled by the fact that both frontiers were occupied by two powerful states, the one administratively as capable as any in Europe, but with a man power less considerable than that of Germany and with economic resources somewhat inferior; the other of vast potential man power, of incalculable resources, but with an administrative and military organization unduly weak. This fact of the

central position has determined for over a century the character and type of German political, administrative, and military organization.

She has been long awake to the fact that the swelling numbers and potential economic resources of her possible enemies can never be permanently met by brute force, but long study has made her more and more confident that she could safely rely for defense upon the doctrine of relativity: a sufficiently mobile army of exactly the right ratio of strength to its enemies could utilize the central position for a defensive more than adequate to offset an enormous superiority in numbers. The same army might fight on both fronts, the railways easily transporting it from one to the other. Each section would always be in contact with others, whereas their opponents would invariably be unable to campaign together because separated by Germany herself. But it was idle to suppose that the strategic problem of a war on two fronts could be solved by an army organization or by an administrative and economic fabric extemporized after the crisis had risen. The necessary key to any defensive war would be the adequacy of previous preparation; that alone would determine the issue.

Security, however, could never result from purely defensive dispositions. It must become impossible for enemies to challenge German security, to undertake war against her with any prospect of success. For half a century the German diplomatic and political tradition has demanded an international independence so def-

initely sustained by strategic and military advantages that no foreign nation could possibly possess adequate power to disturb or threaten it. The Germans have been entirely conscious that this would necessarily involve the acquisition of territory not theirs. The German military tradition for half a century has held that Germany could expect to win this adequate defensive position in Europe only through an offensive war. Literal international independence, then—and could any German demand less?—would involve conquest; national security—and could any German deny its necessity?—must be founded in aggression.

Both would necessitate aid; both could succeed only if the Germanic race in Europe could be welded into one great political, administrative, and economic entity, with control of natural strategic defenses, with possession of approaches to the great international waterways, and of a merchant marine and fleet adequate to carry and protect the volume of trade which this new and powerful state would send throughout the world. Austria and Germany must therefore stand shoulder to shoulder, united by bonds of language, blood, tradition, loyalty to Deutschtum, too strong to be sundered; bound together by obvious necessities of defense, by definite mutual interests obtainable only by concerted action. With them must be aligned Hungary, the Balkan states, Turkey, and Persia.

Thus from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf would stretch a Central Europe whose strategic

position, military organization, administrative efficiency, and economic potentiality would render it forever safe from the aggressive jealousy of the older sea power and of those "partners in iniquity," Russia and France. So great an entity would wield the necessary political and military force to take and retain the natural outlets of its trade—Belgium, Denmark, the Adriatic, Constantinople, the Persian Gulf. Its broad fields and complex industrial fabric would sustain in continued prosperity and comfort an ever-increasing population, which would be able to remain at home and thus meet for years to come the menace of Russian growth in population and economic strength. Within itself—in undeveloped Hungary, in the Tyrol, in the Balkans—would lie markets more valuable far than the fabled islands of the seas and the much-vaunted Morocco and Algiers. Within its control would be the greatest economic opportunity of the ages, the systematic exploitation of the garden spot of antiquity, the seat of empires in those remote days when Pharaohs and prophets walked the earth. The German and Austrian armies, the German and Austrian fleets and merchant marines, the German industrial and financial fabric, the fields of Hungary, Rumania, Mesopotamia, the metals of the Alps and the Carpathians, would be the secure foundation of an empire exceeding the visions of the Cæsars, the dreams of Charlemagne and of Charles V. Thus would prosperity and security be assured for remote posterity. Thus would Deutschtum

and Kultur guide the faltering steps of European and Asiatic civilization.

The Germans, however, had become clearly conscious that the creation of such an invulnerable defense involved something far more complex than a victorious sweep across France to the gates of Paris, more even than a complete victory on land and sea over their enemies. It involved the creation of a confederation of states which must become the controlling factor in international politics. It involved, in the next place, the ability of this confederation to win a victory over one or all of its enemies and to extend its authority and dominion into Asia and Africa. It further assumed the feasibility of maintaining control and of preserving its newly won supremacy intact from the subsequent assaults of internal as well as external foes. Nor has the most ardent champion of Deutschtum, however conservative his Pan-Germanic frenzy, dreamed that this new confederation could be created without war with the "vandals and vampires" already in control of the world's highways and market areas. As to the expediency of beginning the war at one date rather than another, debate has raged in Germany and Austria. As to its necessity, there has long been unanimity. Its character, too, would depend necessarily upon the strategic positions already held by the Central Empires, would be further determined by those necessarily to be acquired during the war or at the peace, and would also be conditioned upon the degree of effective resistance to be ex-

pected from possible opponents. The strategic problem, the German High Command long ago determined, was neither constant nor fixed. Victory might conceivably fail to win the great objective, while, on the other hand, a war properly conducted from a military point of view might result in vast gains, even though an eventual military defeat at the hands of superior numbers might be suffered. Never should the objective of the war be forgotten while fighting it, but never, on the other hand, should mere diplomatic and political considerations be allowed to alter the essential character of military campaigns.

For such an offensive war against France and Russia, the strategic positions already held by the Central Empires and their allies were of the greatest potency. They held in Alsace-Lorraine the important approaches on Paris from the east and flanked any French assault upon Germany through Belgium on the north or through Switzerland on the south. Moreover, the approaches to both Switzerland and Belgium were in German hands. She stood on the frontiers of both, while the French and English armies had long distances to go. The defensive position in the west was invulnerable. The offensive position held forth every expectation of speedy victory, for the superior mobility and the swifter mobilization of the German army would render these strategic factors doubly potent.

In the east, the German High Command saw regretfully that the truly vital factor, Warsaw,

was in Russian hands, but they knew that East Prussia and Cracow effectively flanked its approaches and tended to rob an assault upon Berlin of real danger unless delivered with the full strength of the Russian army. South of Cracow, the Carpathians and the Balkans themselves prevented any effective attack on the rear. Bulgaria would neutralize Serbia; Rumania was already bound to the Central Powers by secret treaty; the Turk's position at Constantinople and Adrianople was immensely strong and had been thoroughly tested during the recent Balkan wars. If Italy should remain true to the Triple Alliance, she would then be able to assail France in the rear or dispose promptly of Serbia. If she remained neutral, the rear would still be safe. If she became hostile, the great offensive positions in the Trentino, on the Isonzo and the Carso were in Austrian hands. Furthermore, the administrative and military inefficiency of the Italians, Serbians, and Rumanians could be counted upon to deprive of real power any campaigns which the diplomacy of France and Great Britain might induce them to make.

The essential strategic problems lay in the north on both fronts, neither of which singly was dangerous, but the combination of which was alarming. At all odds simultaneous attacks in force on both fronts must be prevented. If possible, measures should be taken to prevent any attack from being delivered on either front in effective force. The whole strategy of victory would necessarily be conditioned by these two

considerations and all analyses led to the same conclusion: Germany and Austria must never wait to be attacked; they must take the offensive and take it at an unexpected moment. The element of surprise, the element of time, would be decisive for defense and offense alike; both involved the taking of the initiative by Germany. A prompt offensive on one front should crush one antagonist before the other could appear in strength and would render the final victory over the latter conclusive. The slow mobilization of the Russian army dictated a first and definitive blow at France which should either crush the French army outright or, at the least, throw it upon the defensive far within French territory and in as disadvantageous a position as possible. Both must be attempted; both might succeed; both could not fail.

Inasmuch, however, as the essence of the blow was to be its surprise and its rapidity, it must be delivered through Belgium, for, while the positions in Alsace-Lorraine were stronger, the French defensive work had there been more capable, the distance to Paris was somewhat greater, and the possibilities of surprise infinitely less. The advance from Belgium might outflank and crush the entire French army, might succeed in carrying Paris in the first great rush; but two other considerations of greater significance determined German strategy. The French in Alsace-Lorraine were already in possession of their defenses; their true frontier in Belgium, on the other hand, they could occupy only by a breach of neutrality

and only at the cost of much time. The Belgian drive would almost infallibly place the French upon the defensive far within their own lines and at a distinct disadvantage. Germany would at once come into possession of the Belgian industrial centers; the whole Belgian population would become potential workers and would be added to Germany's economic assets. The French iron and coal areas, the great French industrial centers in the northern provinces, the rich agricultural district of northern France, would furthermore be brought within the German lines. Thus the French would find themselves facing a great economic problem at the outset whose solution might present such difficulties as to cripple their first defense and lead to irretrievable disaster. At the best they must take time to organize an adequate defense and would certainly find an offensive difficult for many months.

For Germany the advantages of campaigning in the west were no less conclusive than the disadvantages imposed upon the French. The Westphalian coal-fields, upon which the German army must necessarily depend, the great iron-mines in the province of Lorraine and along the French Meuse Valley, had already located next to the battle-field the vast factories created by Germany during half a century expressly to wage this war. Transportation difficulties would literally be minimized. The haul to the army for the railroads was the shortest possible, while the Rhine and the interlocking system of canals to

the Westphalian coal-fields made adequate water transportation simple and cheap. The operation of maintenance might be completed in a literal minimum of time, while the location made possible the maximum of preparation in advance for the Germans and the minimum for the French.

Once the French had been beaten or forced upon the defensive, the Germans might then shift to the east front the great bulk of the troops to deal with Russia, the true enemy, the dangerous enemy, of whom they must make short, prompt, and conclusive work. The destruction of the Russian army must be their object, not the conquest of territory. True, it would be to Germany's advantage to occupy Warsaw and its strategic approaches, but the great campaigns of Napoleon against Moscow, the Crimean War, and the valiant work of General Winter must be remembered. It would be impossible to hold Russian territory during the war without an immense sacrifice of transportation facilities and the chances of retaining that territory permanently after the treaty of peace were exceedingly slight. Nor would such territorial gains be of value, for the war was not to be fought with any idea of adding to German territory in the east. Gains in the south and southeast in the Balkans, along the Adriatic, in the Danube Valley, in Asia Minor, were essential, but were either already in the hands of the Central Empires or their allies or could easily be occupied once interference from France and Russia was forestalled. The war was to be fought

in the north, in France and Poland, not because territory was desired of either, but to extort their consent to the formal organization of the Pan-Germanic Confederation — Mittel-Europa. Victory in the north would make campaigns elsewhere superfluous. The original German strategy of victory certainly contemplated no serious warfare in the south and southeast.

At its best, the strategic problem was absurdly easy: the French ought to be thrown at once upon the defensive, Russia easily annihilated, and the French then promptly brought to terms. At its worst, victory was by no means difficult to predict. The first rush through Belgium, indeed, might be expected to bring Great Britain into the war. Whatever delusions on this point were entertained by civilians in Germany or even by the diplomatic corps, the High Command of the army certainly made its dispositions with the full expectation of prompt British assistance. The economic disadvantages they realized would be serious but not insurmountable. Undoubtedly a blockade of Germany by the British fleet might be instantly expected, but would be offset by the blockade of Russia, which would be as instantly created by the German fleet at Kiel and by the possession of Constantinople by the Turk. Such loss of access to the great neutral markets of the world might be serious, and it was doubly unfortunate that no adequate supplies of materials usually imported could be collected in advance without giving practical notice of the intention to declare war and thus losing the ele-

ment of surprise, if not the power of choosing the moment for the first aggressive assault. These were advantages by no means to be risked at a price which might never need to be paid.

The Germans found it difficult to believe that the British blockade could be truly effective. Not only must the sea be closed, but the land frontiers as well. Not only must the British Government issue edicts and send out cruisers to capture the German merchant marine, but they must control their own country and prevent "the celebrated British selfishness and venality" from supplying the Germans, as it had Napoleon's Continental Empire at the time when the English blockade broke down of its own weight. Surely supplies would come through Holland, Scandinavia, Greece, and Italy, if Italy should remain neutral. Great Britain could close the neutral countries to Germany only by shutting off their imports altogether, and the measures which would enforce this ruling would most probably drive the neutrals into German arms. One way or another supplies would arrive in sufficient quantities to solve the military problem. The results of British aid in the field were not expected to be conclusive. The troops actually under arms were too few, too poor in quality, to affect the military issue in the first months of the war, and it was thought hardly probable that the French could hold out until an adequate British army could be trained. There were even strong doubts of the ability of Great Britain to create an effective army, for the importance of artillery

work in the coming war was thoroughly appreciated by the Germans, and the great value of staff-officers and the difficulty of educating them in a hurry was even better understood. Thus the probable opposition on the West Front was thought not powerful enough to interfere with the prompt execution of German plans.

The lack of sustained power in the Russian assault in the east was believed inevitable. Russia possessed no adequate supply of officers, no industrial fabric able to support the war, and without both the German High Command could not predicate Russian success. The German fleet could insure the difficulty of shipment to Russia by France and Great Britain of the necessary munitions for a long war. The first Russian attack might be dangerous, but could be met and could hardly be repeated. In addition, the malcontents in France and England would weaken and delay the effective preparations for war; both English and French administrators might be expected to blunder; while the venality of the Russian officials was traditional. Was it not also probable that both the English and the French people would rebel against the stern discipline, both economic and military, needed to make resistance effective or prolonged?

Nevertheless, it was deemed highly essential that the diplomatic preparations for the war should limit the military objectives before the army as far as possible, and that in particular an issue should be chosen upon which to begin the war which would invite co-operation by

as few possible enemies as might be. Such considerations dictated a beginning of the war in the Balkans, because neither France nor Great Britain possessed there direct interests, and might therefore be greatly handicapped in presenting an issue to their representative bodies upon which they could induce them to vote a declaration of war. No doubt France was bound by treaty to Russia, but, if Great Britain should stand neutral, a sweeping victory was certain and the war would be short. It would then become possible to deal directly and effectively with Great Britain.

The Balkan issue, nevertheless, was precisely that upon which Italy had declared from the first that the Triple Alliance would not bind her. It was not thought that her entry into the war could greatly change the situation. The Italian army was weak, and the country possessed no coal, no iron, and no adequate industrial fabric. The Trentino and Isonzo fronts were immensely strong and an Italian offensive would be a burden rather than an asset to her allies. Her neutrality was far more desirable than her aid, which would similarly be a burden for the German economic fabric to bear. In no case could she be counted upon, for her long and vulnerable coast-line placed her at the mercy of the French and British fleets, a fact Bismarck had not perhaps reckoned with when she was admitted to the Triple Alliance, but one promptly appreciated after her adhesion was made public.

Of all issues, none was so simple to raise, nor

so desirable to open, as that of Serbia. The quarrels were of long standing; an issue suitable for war could be produced at any moment, and would possess the infinite advantage of uniting Austria-Hungary in the ardent prosecution of the war. Certainly the Serbian issue was the one in the Balkans of least significance to Russia, and that most agreeable to the Rumanians, the Bulgarians, and the Greeks. So far as the British and the French were concerned, it was the most desirable because of the least significance. Its strategic position was, moreover, of real importance to the Central Powers. It was the necessary road to Saloniki; its economic and political control would be an essential factor in the future creation of Mittel-Europa.

If no war should ensue, a great gain would have been won. If war did result, the issue would have been raised in the most advantageous way and the campaign begun at the point of minimum danger, the one easiest to defend, easiest to conquer, and whose value after conquest would be immense, for Belgrade and Nish would control the great continental road to Bulgaria and Constantinople, and in addition the entire navigation of the Danube. It was, so far as a European war was concerned, the only weak point in the entire southern line, the secure method of launching the one offensive against Austria which might be truly dangerous, a campaign north from Saloniki. The murder of the Archduke in June, 1914, otherwise unfortunate, produced, therefore, precisely the issue

needed for the great war, already decided upon at Berlin and Vienna certainly as early as the May preceding. The bulletins which went forth from the High Command to the German people during August spoke again and again the entire truth: the execution of the long-prearranged plans was proceeding day by day as had been expected. "*Deutschland Uber Alles!*" "The Day" had dawned! The strategy of victory had been successful. The task before the army was reduced to a minimum.

III

THE INVISIBLE ARMY

THE German strategy of victory never contemplated a war fought solely in the trenches. The war should be fought in the counting-house and in the factory, in the fields and on the high seas. The Invisible Army should weaken the force of the defense the German army and fleet must overcome, and its work would be, therefore, neither political nor diplomatic, but military; not a permissive, but an essential element in victory. By the side of every Allied general, by the side of every Allied statesman, should stand an invisible soldier of the German Empire. In every Allied and neutral counting-house, in every railroad and steamship office, should be an invisible servant of the German people. The weakness of Germany's foes would be one of her most powerful weapons; her greatest strength would lie in her knowledge of her adversaries and of their strength, of their chronic difficulties, and of those ailments which were capable of stimulation. Indeed, the work of the Invisible Army would be no less an essential element in the German strategy of victory than

that of the first army in the trenches and would be as indispensable to the final achievement as battles and campaigns. For victory itself would be no mere military achievement. It was expected that the Invisible Army would paralyze enemies and neutrals alike and lighten perhaps beyond estimation the task before the army in the field.

But the adequacy of German military organization would be a relative and not a positive fact. Her strategic location, the central position between France and Russia, compelled her to create an army whose size and efficiency must maintain a definite ratio with that of the armies of France, Russia, and Great Britain. Both these issues of size and efficiency were relative; both again were entirely dependent for adequacy upon the economic and administrative machinery behind them; neither could be extemporized in a moment; and both must therefore be the result of scientific calculation, based upon accurate and complete information about the military equipment and strategy of all possible enemies. This knowledge the Invisible Army must provide in advance and such knowledge it must continue to supply throughout the war. German campaigns and policies must be the result of scientific calculation or their success would be problematic and the issue of the war constantly in doubt. Victory itself would depend less on available forces ready at the declaration of war than upon the force Germany should eventually produce in its mathematical relation to the forces which other

nations might eventually draft. That ratio must be in no sense a matter of guesswork. Victory could be predicted only if it proceeded from knowledge.

The Invisible Army must also weaken the fighting strength of such armies as the enemy nations might maintain. They must secure knowledge beforehand of the plans of campaign; information about the personnel of the staff would, of course, always be valuable, and might, as in the Franco-Prussian War, prove on occasions decisive. The weak points in the French line would be known, the weak men in the French army, the strong men, those who could be bought or whose relatives could be influenced. But more reliance was placed on the ability of the Invisible Army to interfere with adequate economic preparations both in enemy countries and in those neutral states which might attempt to assist them. The syndicalist movement in France, the trade-union movement in Great Britain, could be utilized. Strikes might be arranged and thus the work of preparation delayed. Then the finished product itself might be destroyed, factories blown up with bombs, ships sunk by mines. Contracts could be signed with factories capable of war-work which would thus keep men out of government employment. Supplies of all raw materials, wherever they could be found, should be purchased and stored and thus kept out of the hands of Germany's enemies.

Political interference on a large scale would also be of value. French and Russian officials

were believed generally susceptible to purchase. The "muddling through," famous in England, could be easily assisted and prolonged. The pacifists in all countries could be urged to organize and espouse propaganda which could scarcely fail to hinder adequate preparation for the war. The extent of the pacifist movement in England, and in the United States in particular, might be considered one of Germany's assets. Conscientious objectors were sure to appear in all countries; the traditional hostility in England to anything resembling compulsory military service was very old. All should be utilized for Germany's advantage.

Nor was it to be forgotten that political disunion, disloyalty, actual revolt, would work powerfully in favor of Germany and weaken an army on the west or east front. The British Empire the Pan-Germanists had always declared a weak chain. The self-governing colonies had already exhibited tendencies toward independence. Could not the French in Canada be stimulated to undertake some movement which would interfere with the prosecution of the war? Could not the Boers in South Africa be urged to revolt? Could not some sort of a national revolution in favor of home rule in Ireland be created? Then there was Egypt, where a flourishing national movement already existed; there was India, where already were many anxious for political independence from Great Britain; Persia, whose national movement had just been crushed; to say nothing of the Finns and Poles, who had

been agitating for freedom from Russia for many generations. Was it not probable that the English and French colonial dominion in Africa could be upset or at least thrown into turmoil by a Holy War declared in the name of Pan-Islam? In the Pacific was Japan, a new nation, jealous of all European countries, and it was the German purpose to encourage its suspicions of Russia, Great Britain, and the United States. That the success of any of these movements would have definitive military results was more than probable. That they would at least delay adequate preparation was certain, and in a country like Great Britain, where so much was to be done, delays of any sort, kind, or description would be of the utmost significance.

But it was in the neutral states that the greatest achievements of the Invisible Army were thought possible. The neutrals must be carried in favor of Germany, if it were humanly possible. The importance of the continuance of indirect trade through Holland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden could scarcely be exaggerated if the English blockade became in the slightest degree effective. They would then be Germany's only possible access to the outside world. Through them and from them must come the supplies of raw materials, nickel, copper, wool, rubber, and medicines of which Germany did not possess an indigenous supply. Italy should become neutral; it was highly important that she should remain neutral and to this end every possible energy would be bent. If Great Britain

should enter the war and should at once undertake to blockade Germany, as was deemed practically certain by the High Command, it would involve, of course, interference with neutral trade, declarations regarding contraband and international law on the sea to which neutrals could scarcely fail to raise serious objections. These might be nursed, and result, as in previous decades, in concerted action by the neutrals against the sea power, which would in fact be action directly in Germany's favor.

The greatest of all neutral states, in position, in population, and in resources — the United States—must be kept pro-German in order that its great economic resources should not be placed at the disposal of the Allies. If it should insist upon the privilege generally allowed of the sale of munitions by private citizens to belligerent countries, the manufacture might be interfered with in a variety of ways and movements might be stimulated which would employ the munitions at home. Preparedness, for instance, was in the air and could easily be developed; suspicions of Japan could be excited; trouble with Mexico had been brewing for several years. An invasion of Mexico with any sort of force might occupy the military resources for years to come, because the Mexicans could be supplied from Germany, could be trained and led by German officers, and an effective resistance thus provided. Those in the United States who have been in the months past displeased with the President for his failure to act regarding

preparedness and Mexico, must remember that he knew what all of us did not, the extent of the German propaganda in this country. The Mexican troubles, the anti-Japanese crusade, the pacifist movement, were largely stimulated by German agents. At the best, no one could be sure that an outbreak was not their work and did not reflect public sentiment in the United States. It was long doubtful whether to further any movement in which the German agents showed interest would not be the surest way to defeat the fundamental interests and policies of this country. Upon this point the President's wisdom has been conspicuously vindicated.

Thus for the Germans the war was a question of ratios and exact calculations, a matter of relativity, capable of scientific demonstration from the information provided by the Invisible Army. None the less, the first campaigns were based upon calculations in which were a good deal of assumption and a minimum of science. They were forced to guess at the number of their adversaries. And they guessed wrong!

IV

DISAGREEABLE COMPLICATIONS

THE first six months of the war were not spent when the Germans realized that the original German strategy of victory could scarcely be expected to achieve a decision. At the end of the first year they realized that by it no decision at all could be won. The problem of victory was at its maximum, not at its minimum. All their former dispositions had become successively inapplicable to the situation. One after another disagreeable eventualities had occurred, none of them perhaps surprises to the leaders of the state, but many of them believed entirely unlikely. None of them were events which had not already been foreseen, although most were of a nature which it had been hoped it would never be necessary to provide for. Undoubtedly they complicated the situation immensely. Undoubtedly victory became, to say the least, problematic.

The heroic resistance of Liège and of the Belgian army in the first three days of the war gained precious days and hours for the French, unquestionably checked the first drive of the Ger-

mans, and robbed it of much of its initial velocity. The French army was beyond doubt saved from immediate disaster, even though at an immense price to the Belgian army, to the Belgian people, and to their splendid cities, fair towns, and villages. Then Great Britain, not deceived by the issue of Serbia into the belief that her interests were in no sense menaced, voted to enter the war, a vote which it had been believed in Berlin would occur, but which it had been earnestly hoped might be avoided. It meant certainly the addition to the resources of Germany's enemies of the sea power, of vast numbers of troops, of the international credit structure, and of vast economic resources. And there was furthermore to be remembered Great Britain's habit of sticking out long wars, her habit of being on the winning side when the war ended. Nor was the promptitude with which the British fleet swept the seas clear of German commerce and instituted a rigorous and effective blockade less disagreeable and surprising. The instant loyalty of the Empire, the immediate thronging to the recruiting-offices of Canadians and Australians, the offer of the entire resources of the colonies to the mother country for the duration of the war—this was indeed unexpected. On the other hand, Italy remained, as was thought probable, neutral. Denmark, Holland, and the Scandinavian countries, all of them vital to Germany as supply depots, as intermediaries for economic communication throughout the war, took the attitude expected of them. But even while the

German armies were rushing toward Paris, it was seen in Berlin that complications of the utmost seriousness had already arisen and that victory would certainly be no matter of six weeks or three months.

As the armies neared Paris and the Fabian strategy of Joffre drew the British and French armies back in a rapid and effective retreat—back, back, leaving Paris before the Germans—the latter began to realize that the French did not propose to meet them in battle and to risk defeat. Scarcely any single blow to the German strategy could have been more serious than this. If the war was to be short, the French must stand still and be beaten, for it was impossible that the Germans should pursue them through France. The right wing was already seriously extended. The landing of a British force in Belgium or on the French coast might easily outflank it. A retreat became necessary to those dispositions already made with the aid of the Invisible Army in the long years preceding.

But it took place with a haste and a precipitation which was not provided for in the German plans. The moment when the Germans themselves decided to retreat from before Paris, to draw in their dangerously extended lines and to protect the right wing, Joffre undertook an attack and the great battle of the Marne cost the Germans heavily in men, restored the morale of the French army, of the French and the British people, and, in particular, raised to a high pitch their expectations of a successful out-

come of the war and an early conclusion. The unexpected had happened. The dash upon Paris had failed. The French had won a victory. The original German strategy was already beaten. And now, in September, weeks before they had been expected, the Russians took the offensive in East Prussia in great force. It was not at all that these hostilities had not been reckoned with or that all had not been in a measure provided for, which shook German confidence. It had been earnestly believed that it would not be necessary to provide for so many of them.

Then came a blow almost greater than any suffered by the Germans throughout the war. The Imperial Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, speaking formally to the Reichstag at the very beginning of the war, at a time when every word counted both in Germany and in enemy and neutral countries, saw fit to make a fatal admission, to declare that the march through Belgium was a definite breach of a treaty obligation and involved a moral responsibility upon the German people to repair the damage done and to restore Belgian independence at the end of the war. This raised promptly and in an unexpected way the moral issue. Was the war right? Had the Germans themselves been the aggressors? Had they an adequate cause for the war? Fiercely and promptly was the battle fought in pamphlets, in speeches, in public assemblies throughout Europe and in the neutral countries. Everywhere outside of the Central Empires and the reach of their censorship, the moral issue was

squarely and promptly decided against Germany. The neutrals at once, almost without hesitation, decided that the invasion of Belgium was a shocking crime against the law of nations. The German admission of the aggressive assault on Belgium at once animated their foes with a consciousness of rectitude, led to the proclamation of the war as a great moral crusade, and, to the discouragement and annoyance of the German people, to prompt accusations of barbarism. It was a great victory for the Allies, an unforeseen victory, won with a promptitude and finality which surpassed all conceivable expectations. It was a blow to the German cause such as ten battles and campaigns could not have successfully dealt. It was a failure that could neither be retrieved nor offset. It promptly placed at the disposition of Germany's enemies the entire resources of most neutral countries.

Immediately the effects were apparent. Contracts were placed in the United States with private firms by all members of the Triple Entente for the manufacture of war munitions, shoes, clothing, supplies, all on a great scale, vast beyond any original contemplation. Practically, it meant the addition of the economic resources of the United States to those of the Allies to such an extent as their organization by private enterprise was possible. Nor was the wide campaign of the German Invisible Army to interfere nor the frantic endeavors of the German-Americans able to avail anything.

Meanwhile the war proceeded in France. It

developed speedily a proposition by no means new to the Germans and by no means pleasant: the vast superiority of the defense over the offense, the ability of a comparatively small army, poorly supplied, if we take the German army as standard, to defeat the efforts of an army immensely superior in artillery, in numbers, tactics, and officers. With comparative ease the French held the Germans at bay, nor did it seem possible to increase sufficiently the ratio of the offense to the defense to overcome the difficulty. The campaign in France was at a standstill; the crushing of the French army made no progress; the Russians were advancing through Prussia and Poland at a rapid pace. The first great campaign had decisively failed—the crushing of France before Russia could be ready. There was nothing for it but to admit the failure, return east, and beat the Russians as best possible.

Meanwhile, in the south, in the Mediterranean, and in the Pacific, affairs had gone badly for Germany. The Holy War which should rouse the whole of North Africa against the French and the British and make immensely difficult the prosecution of the war in Europe failed to materialize. Not many months had elapsed before the entire futility of the effort was clear. A great campaign against the Isthmus of Suez had also been prospected, which should at the least destroy the Suez Canal, if possible take possession of it, and thus cut communications between England, India, and Australia. The military and economic importance of success would have

been great and the moral effect would have been even more striking. But it failed.

Elaborate plans had been made for immediate revolts in South Africa and in India. The former was successfully begun and then promptly crushed, to the immense surprise of the authorities in Berlin, by none other than the Boers themselves. The revolt in India never started. The British Secret Service, which is almost as prompt as the Invisible Army, was on the trail of the attempt almost before it was begun, and prevented its successful launching by arresting prematurely all the leaders. Not only that, but the mere fact of the plan was successfully concealed from the Allied nations for many months and in its entirety has not yet been confessed. The danger in South Africa, at Suez, and in India was for some months very considerable, but it was successfully met.

In the Pacific, Japan at once joined the Allies. Arrangements were promptly perfected between the Japanese and the British for naval co-operation against German cruisers in the Pacific, and in all probability for the protection of India by the Japanese in case a great revolt should break out, or the Germans succeed, after a military victory in Europe, in reaching India by the land route through Russia or by the Persian Gulf. The economic strength of Japan was added to that of Russia and munitions and supplies began at once pouring over the Trans-Siberian into the Russian trenches. To add insult to injury, the Japanese proceeded to evict the Germans from

their one possession in China, their one foothold in the Far East, and to do it with a speed and with an ease which greatly multiplied the German sense of loss.

The victories of British diplomacy were surpassed by their vast and unexpected success in the creation of the great expeditionary force for service in France. Mobilization proceeded with unsuspected speed; the troops were of admirable quality; their training proceeded at an unprecedented rate; the manufacture of the necessary equipment and munitions also made strides utterly beyond German anticipation. Some of the strikes which had been bought and paid for did materialize. Trouble in Ireland did to some extent occur. But the elaborate interference with British preparations, which had been counted upon so definitely to assist Germany in the first years of the war, in case Great Britain did enter, failed to develop. British strength at its maximum would soon be on the West Front and it became apparent that the Russians and the French were not to be beaten before the British could arrive. The Germans still clung to the hope that the quality of the British army would be scarcely equal to the complicated operations of trench warfare, and that in particular the training of the artillery could scarcely be adequate to the elaborate co-operation imperative between infantry and artillery in anything resembling the attack which had become habitual.

But all of these expectations proved false. While some blundering did take place, while

some considerable difficulties were experienced through the lack of training and the failure of the British troops to understand the exact co-operation required of them, the results as a whole were marvelously adequate and of admirable quality. It was another astounding Allied victory, another defeat of German calculations of the very first importance. To the authorities in Berlin, shock after shock came with a disagreeable regularity which even the great campaigns of Hindenburg in Poland could not counterbalance. Victory they knew was complex and could not be won in Poland alone. The whole problem, indeed, had altered. Every unfavorable element was to be found in its greatest potency, and all the favorable elements turned out no better than had been calculated. Economic problems, strategic and military problems, appeared wherever a problem was possible. The whole logic of victory was altered; its strategy must be reconstructed.

As the years proceeded, difficulty after difficulty accumulated. The potency of the Allied diplomacy had been entirely miscalculated by Germany, the value and significance of the invasion of Belgium, the consequences of the great Allied victories upon the moral issue, had been entirely underestimated, if not misconstrued. Constantly the High Command must readjust the strategy of victory to changing circumstances. In 1915 Italy entered the war and a new extension of the line became inevitable. The ratio of the German army to its foes had to be revised

and new provisions made for equipment, munitions, and food. In 1916 Rumania entered the war and introduced further military complications, while in 1917 the greatest of all disasters occurred. The United States, the greatest country not already in the war, espoused the Allied cause firmly, seriously, and with consecration, and was immediately followed by a flock of neutral countries in South America, together with Arabia, Siam, and China. Allied diplomacy had arrayed against the Central Empires the entire world outside of the great iron ring drawn by their armies around the four belligerents and those neutral states completely in their power.

While it had been undoubtedly expected that the strategy of victory would meet with difficulties originally not foreseen, and while a great attempt had been made in Berlin to estimate the difficulties at the maximum and the advantages at the minimum, nevertheless it had been scarcely contemplated that the possible complications would be as numerous and the forces to be met as considerable. It can scarcely be doubted that if such had been known to be the truth, the High Command would not have undertaken the war at all. But the war had been begun and it was not now possible to stop it on any such considerations as these. Victory must be achieved in some fashion or a crushing defeat, with consequences literally incalculable to Germany and Austria, must be faced. It was indeed a very serious question whether or not victory could be predicated,

whether or not the war must be fought with the expectation of losing it, and must, therefore, be fought so as to lose as little as possible. Certainly the military problem was at its maximum. Certainly the aid which the armies might expect both from the navy and from the diplomats was at the minimum. The submarine possessed a potency not entirely understood, but it was believed to be exceedingly great. Yet upon it the military men were never willing to depend, nor could they understand the faith the naval authorities had in its ability to obtain a favorable decision.

The war, they saw, must be won in the field, but they had not expected to fight it unaided. Some assistance, to be sure, they had had, but they had never counted on the necessity of meeting the entire military, naval, and economic strength of the outside world, nor of fighting a war in which the ratio of strength between the offensive and the defensive would be so incalculably great. A new strategy of victory was absolutely essential, one which should envisage defeat as well as victory, which should be sufficiently elastic to provide for constant shifts of operations and for some unpleasant eventualities.

This change in the German strategy of victory is consequently of vast importance. The diplomatic and moral victory of the Allies has tended to conceal it. It has not been sufficiently admitted and emphasized by the speeches of Allied statesmen. Optimism undoubtedly has

its advantages, but also its dangers. While pessimism is at times disagreeable and for the moment depressing, the result upon military operations is invariably healthy, if the pessimism proceeds not from mere discouragement, but from a genuine analysis of the difficulties of the situation.

But these repeated defeats spread among the Germans something akin to a moral panic; something not far from desperation spread through the nation from the High Command down to the private soldier and the man on the factory bench. It was not that they gave up hope of victory; it was not that they did not feel that much could be saved even from defeat; but they realized from the indignation of the world at large and the determination of the Allies that the reckoning in defeat would be extensive, and that victory itself was more than ever imperative. Nothing short of it could render them safe from what they were pleased to term the vindictive hatred of their enemies. It is not easy otherwise to explain the acts of private soldiers and generals, or to understand some of the campaigns. Something not far from a livid fear spread through the German people, which we must not mistake for cowardice, lack of determination, or a willingness to accept peace on the Allies' terms, but which, on the contrary, has led them to feel that everything must be suffered, even death itself, rather than admit defeat. They expect victory, but they have made elaborate preparations for defeat. In our study

of the new German strategy of victory, we must never forget the essential importance of this new element. It is the work of men who have staked their all upon success, the work of those who cannot afford to fail.

V

THE GERMAN SOLUTION OF THE DEADLOCK IN FRANCE

THE strategic problem had been radically altered. The older strategy had predicated effective warfare on one front, and an ineffective campaign on the other. The disagreeable fact had to be met that effective warfare on both fronts, simultaneously and continuously, was to be expected. Moreover, it was trench warfare, in which the advantage lay decidedly with the defensive. The ratio of the contending armies had been entirely altered and invalidated all original calculations. Not only were the British putting an army into the field; they were training an enormously greater army than had been thought possible and one of unexpectedly good quality, a fact which the lapse of time was only too completely to demonstrate. The neutral countries were aiding the Allies and were one by one joining in the actual prosecution of the war.

A constant accession of economic and military power to the Allies was therefore to be necessarily provided for. The ratio of German forces to enemy forces was unexpectedly small and would

unquestionably grow smaller. Bloch had been right: the trench warfare had destroyed the old strategy and the old tactics. The creation in France of a line of trenches stretching from the sea to Belfort made maneuvering of the old type impossible. Only direct frontal assault remained, and the immense advantage of the defense over the offense was calculated by the German Staff at not less than six to one and in all probability greater. True, they had concluded that the infantry could penetrate the trench line at will, if properly supported by accurate barrages and the extensive use of high-explosive shells, but progress was slow and costly in the extreme of men and munitions.

The war could not thus be won. The new strategy could not be based upon the assumptions of the old. The element of time was not only important, but crucial, and might be decisive; the loss of numerical preponderance over Germany's actual foes in the field was becoming steadily a fact; the superior mobility of the German army had already been destroyed by the fixity of the trench line, while the accuracy of the German artillery fire gave steadily less advantage as that of the French and of the British improved. Time would, therefore, slowly but surely destroy the ratio between the German forces and those of her enemies, completely demolish the handicap of superior mobility, technical skill, and more elaborate organization from which so much had been expected. Only a military decision, too, within a reasonable time

could defeat the economic weapons of her foes, by which alone, they were already exultantly declaring, victory could be assured.

The deadlock must be solved without undue loss of time. Germany might prolong the war for some years, but she could not continue it indefinitely; still less could she fight it by a lavish expenditure of material and of men. Both were by no means unlimited, and the manufacture of munitions alone would require large amounts of raw materials of which she possessed no indigenous supplies whatever, and of which the supplies she had received through the neutral Scandinavian countries were speedily being reduced and likely at any moment to be cut off altogether. Substitutes, to be sure, might be found, but not probably of such adequacy as to counterbalance the overwhelming superiority of her foes both in men and in material resources.

Nor was it to be forgotten for a moment that the definite policy adopted by the British and French on the West Front was that of nibbling, of attrition, the killing of a sufficient number of Germans, the reducing little by little of the German superiority in trained men to a point where they would be unable longer to contest the issue. Certainly, the Germans must in no sense assist them in this work by a strategy of victory which would depend upon a lavish use of men and of material which Germany could not afford to lose. Such a victory would be the surest road to defeat—to a defeat which could not be retrieved, and which would possess for Germany none of

those compensating advantages which the German strategy of defeat itself proposed to achieve. The new plan of operations must first deal with this type of Allied offensive. The Staff must calculate to a nicety the strength of the army and prevent its wastage faster than a definite ratio, scientifically determined as safe, in view both of the defense in France and of the offensive necessarily to be prosecuted elsewhere. Each year for twenty years a new class of boys reaching military age would make available from 600,000 to 700,000 new troops and this would be the absolute maximum loss in effectives, killed, incurably maimed, and captured, the Germans could afford.

Experience had shown that, even with a vast expenditure of men and of material, it was not possible to conduct a drive along the coast and turn the trench line on the Allied left, cutting off the British from their base of supplies. The great attempt at Verdun to break the trench line had been a horrible, bloody failure. In both territory had been won; yet the High Command knew unquestionably that both were too costly to continue or to repeat. Not thus could the war be won.

Indeed, they became convinced that on the West Front nothing better than a defensive war, conducted at a minimum expense both of material and of men, could be attempted. The war could not be won in France, at any rate not until it had been won everywhere else. But the greatest care should be taken that it should not be

lost in France while it was being won elsewhere. Nor was this difficult. Once the decision had been reached that the trench line was primarily defensive of operations conducted for objectives in Poland, the Balkans, and Asia Minor, a few miles nearer Paris or farther away became of little consequence. If a retreat of a few miles to a new position essentially as good as the old would destroy the preparatory work for great offensives by the Allies, such tactics would constitute an admirable defensive. At such a rate of retreat, the defense at a minimum loss of men and material could be maintained longer than could the assault, for it could exact a cost from the Allies which would steadily approximate the maximum they could afford to pay.

The traditions of the past, the strategic position of Germany, pointed to only one definite road to victory, only one method of breaking the deadlock in France and of achieving a real decision. That in itself involved a large number of military operations, all of which must succeed, none of which could fail, and which would require a greater strength in the army, a greater efficiency of the German industrial organization, a greater endurance in the German people than had ever been contemplated. For its execution time would be essential—a good deal of time—and it was necessary, therefore, to investigate most carefully the military dispositions essential, the economic defense which must be created at home to provide the necessary time, to say nothing of the material resources which would be indispensable.

The decision could be won only by an assault upon the rear and flank of the great trench line in France, and to be effective it must come either through Switzerland or through Italy. It must be delivered in overwhelming force and with the greatest speed and dexterity. There must be in it something of the element of surprise. But once the German divisions burst through the line of the Alps and began moving with speed across the fair fields of France, the great trench line extending from Belfort to the sea must either be evacuated or extended. The new trench line could scarcely be effective if the German blow was sufficiently prompt and accurately timed. If the French chose to bend the line rather than to change it, a concerted assault in front, flank, and rear would be possible. The supreme effort of the war must be then made. An Allied defeat would be entirely probable, if not inevitable, and defeat would mean annihilation, the supremacy of the Central Empires in Europe. So the High Command seems to have reasoned.

The true strategy of this advance through Switzerland upon the French flank and rear required preparations of a military nature more elaborate than the High Command would have approved for the original campaigns of an aggressive war. The road through Switzerland was, unfortunately, flanked by the Italian passes, not merely in one, but in no less than four or more places. Since the Italians had entered the war, it was not to be assumed that in a moment of such extremity they would fail to cross the Alps

and assail the invader in places and in ways highly dangerous. It was easily conceivable that they might attempt a counter offensive of their own, either upon the Isonzo frontier or upon the Trentino, or initiate through the Inn Valley the old traditional attack upon Vienna which had so many times succeeded and which was invariably difficult to parry. Either maneuver would surely deprive the great attack upon France of its essential velocity and power. The passes of the Alps, the valley of the Po, and Switzerland itself must all three be in German hands before such a strategic move could become really feasible.

So far as Swiss neutrality was concerned, the High Command concluded that it was from many points of view an advantage because it would prevent the French from taking possession of Switzerland in advance, of fortifying the mountain barriers which were higher on the German side than on the French. It would therefore enable the Germans to overwhelm the Swiss, pour through the passes into the plains of France, and strike the French army upon disadvantageous ground. No great difficulty in marching through Switzerland is expected. It is supposed by the Germans that the Swiss will be more than glad to aid them. If not, they will come in such superior numbers that resistance will be promptly swept aside. Besides, the Swiss army is weak in numbers, known to be weak in officers, and also entirely lacking in high-explosive artillery of the nature now required to stop an advancing army. Nor have they artillery officers and a General

Staff adequate for such operations. Their resistance has been discounted.

Nor yet from the Italians were difficulties insuperable expected. The assault upon Italy, which must undoubtedly be delivered, would certainly not be difficult and would not improbably be easy and conclusive. Did not the Austrians already possess the Trentino, the key to Italy? Had not historic campaigns proved the immense power of this offensive down the western bank of Lake Garda? Had not the great Napoleon himself invariably permitted the Austrians to emerge from the mountains in order that he might meet them in the plains, instead of attempting to hold the mountains against them? Had not the annual maneuvers of the Italian army on these very fronts almost invariably resulted in the victory of the invaders? It was therefore to be expected that German troops, German officers, under the German High Command, would execute the operation easily, promptly, and conclusively.

The direction and character of the campaign would depend, of course, upon the position of the Italian army. The Central Powers must not only defeat the Italian army in battle, but drive it beyond the Po and into the Apennines, down beyond the possibility of defending the Italian passes, into a position where it would be comparatively easy to hold it at bay with a minimum German and Austrian force. Preferably it should be crushed, demoralized, demolished, swept to one side, the whole Italian kingdom brought to an

end and be made subject once more to Austria. Should the Italians attempt to defend the Isonzo front, still more should they attempt an offensive there, it would be clear that they had delivered themselves into the hands of their foes, that they had voluntarily committed the one great sin no army in such a position could or should commit; for that the Germans would be duly and entirely thankful. It would be poetic justice upon the Italians for their treachery to the Triple Alliance.

Yet, before any such campaign in Italy could be attempted, there were other essential preliminaries to accomplish. The Serbians at Belgrade controlled not only the Danube, but the great continental road leading down to Bulgaria and also the roads leading down the Morava Valley upon Saloniki. There was the true danger. The Allies commanded the sea and might easily transport an army of stupendous size to Saloniki and thence attempt a drive north upon the weak Austrian rear. So long as Greece remained neutral and practically under German influence, so long as the Turks and the Bulgarians were loyal, there was no immediate fear. But there was no definitive way to check such a thrust except by the previous conquest and military occupation of Serbia itself. Incidentally, other objects, highly desirable from the point of view of the strategy of defeat presently to be described, would be achieved, but the campaign would, above all, protect the rear beyond a peradventure. Hungary would then be safe, and the control of the Balkans assured.

The use of these strategic positions could scarcely be attempted, indeed, their possession might even be beyond Germany's power to procure, until the Russian army had been thoroughly beaten or crushed. A mere defeat would not suffice. The Russians possessed such immense reserves of men that the entire annihilation of the Russian army could scarcely be predicated. But it was desirable that the Russian corps of officers should be decimated; the Russian artillery should be captured or destroyed; that the war should be continued to a point beyond which the industrial capacity of Russia alone could not maintain it, and until the transportation service had broken down and was incapable of bringing in from Japan or from the United States across the Trans-Siberian the necessary additional supplies. If this could be achieved, it might then be possible to inflict upon the Russian army a blow which would break its organization and destroy its defensive power for the duration of the war. This was the real objective. Conquest of territory was in comparison of minor import, although it might be necessary to overrun and hold vast areas in the endeavor to maneuver the Russians into an unfavorable position, where such a crushing blow could be dealt them. After all, this was the most important of the prerequisites of victory. Without success in this, nothing could be undertaken and victory itself would be more than difficult to assure.

There was, of course, the possibility that Rumania, in her anxiety to acquire territory in

Hungary, would yield to the delusive promises of the Allies and join the Russians. In that case it would be necessary to postpone the great attack upon Italy and Switzerland for a year, until Rumania could be overrun, the Russian and Rumanian armies pushed back into the mountains, and the Danube cleared. Constantinople, Bulgaria, Serbia, the Danube, and the southern frontier were the danger spots from the point of view of victory and from the point of view of defense, not only because of the distance which the German and Austrian armies must be transported in order to hold the southern line, not only because of the immensely difficult positions to defend, but because of the general suspicion of the loyalty of the people in those great districts and the probability that they might be tempted to change their allegiance under the pressure of a hostile army actually upon their soil. Time was when Bulgaria, Serbia, and Turkey had been entirely riddled with British and Russian influence and it was by no means clear that the poison had been counteracted.

The rear must be made absolutely safe; the rear must be made absolutely loyal; the continuation of the Pan-Germanic Confederation must be assured beyond question before any attempt to deal a final blow to the French and British armies on the West Front. Until so much had been achieved, a victory in France would be delusive and the war itself might indeed be lost while it was being won. More and more the High Command has gravitated to the

view that *victory in the west is comparatively valueless*, because it can only assure the acceptance by Great Britain and France of vital arrangements already completed in the east and in the Balkans. If these are already won, the acknowledgment of the *fait accompli* by the Allies, the Germans believe, is largely a matter of time, even assuming an Allied victory in France. If these objectives have not been attained, victory in the west will be fruitless because of itself it cannot insure the German and Austrian objectives in the Balkans and Asia Minor, since the field of war in France and Belgium is without strategic relation to either area.

Unquestionably, for all of these complicated maneuvers time was essential. Time must elapse before the Russian army could be beaten, no one could tell how long. If Rumania should enter the war, time must elapse before she could be conquered. Serbia, too, would take time; Italy, perhaps, much time; the great campaign in Switzerland still more time—weeks, months, perhaps years for each one of these operations. It was undesirable and highly regrettable, but the German High Command could not see how it could be avoided.

Herein lay the military value of the submarine —it could fight for time. It might hinder the maintenance of the Allied armies in France and thus decrease the pressure on the West Front and free Germans for service elsewhere. By the decrease of British shipping it might interfere with the transportation of the British army to

France and with its adequate supply of munitions and food. It might also check the flow of raw materials to Great Britain, from which her factories must produce the necessary supplies and munitions for the army. It could certainly interfere with the co-operation of the United States and most assuredly could prevent any effective concentration of Allied forces at Saloniki and a dangerous attack upon the Austrian rear. It might most probably effectively interfere with the supply of coal, of raw materials, of munitions, of food to Italy, a factor by no means to be despised when the Italian campaign began to be fought, and one which might be highly important because the Italians might be forced to utilize their resources in advance. Less would therefore be on hand when the campaign began. It might be that the submarine could not win the war—the military men could scarcely believe that possible—but they did see that it would be useful in fighting for time, in reducing the forces which the armies would have to meet, and certainly might place obstacles of the utmost consequence in the way of the enemy. The moral disapprobation of the Allied and neutral world was undesirable, but time must be had for many reasons and there must be many forces fighting for it. War is neither a game nor a pleasant sport, and the Germans long ago determined to discount all such objections.

VI

THE STRATEGY OF DEFEAT

THE war was not a year old before it became clear to the Germans that the Allies were calculating upon a war of economic exhaustion which by its very length should in the end defeat Germany by destroying her economic power while it left their own unimpaired. They proposed to use their economic weapons to produce a definite decision which they were afraid the armies might not be able to achieve. The effectiveness of this type of warfare depended upon prolonging the war, and the Germans early saw that they did not in all probability have it within their power to regulate its length; that the Allies might and would prolong it in order to insure disastrous economic effects upon them and their allies. The Paris Economic Conference definitely convinced them that there was to be a war after the war, an economic war to the death, in which they and their allies would be shown no mercy. Such Allied strategy justified extreme measures: time must be made to fight not against Germany, but for her; the devices of the Allies must be turned to their own destruction.

THE STRATEGY OF DEFEAT

If time was indispensable for the execution of the new strategy of victory, it was even more essential for the new strategy of defeat which the Germans promptly elaborated and which they determined at all costs to pursue throughout the war. Not later than the second summer was it adopted, although in all probability its main features had been determined upon years in advance. It involved necessarily an economic defensive for the Germans themselves, measures which deserve treatment in a separate chapter. It involved a much more important series of measures governing the treatment of Allied territory then in German hands.

The familiar economic doctrine in regard to the vital elements of production was the starting-point of this strategy of defeat. If labor and capital were the essential elements of wealth and economic prosperity, the Allies must be weakened by their destruction. If the Germans could not well get at the capital of the Allies, they could reach the main element in labor, man power. They correctly see that the relative economic status of the various countries after the war will depend more upon the relative amount of labor available in each than upon their comparative natural resources. In no way could a permanent blow be dealt France and England more surely than by the systematic destruction of men in battle. The war must be prosecuted so as to kill steadily more and more Frenchmen, more and more Englishmen, always in greater ratio than the Germans themselves

should lose. The whole man power of France was in the army and could thus be reached; their reckless bravery would lead them to throw themselves away; their determination to expel the Germans from French soil, to liberate Belgium, to win Alsace and Lorraine, again threw the advantage enormously on the side of the Germans, because it encouraged offensives. What simpler than to foster this desire for the offensive, to yield here and there minor amounts of territory, to encourage the belief that the German morale was weakened, that the German army was losing men, and that one more push would be definitive? It would be definitive, the Germans grimly reflected, in the killing of more Frenchmen than France could afford to lose. France should be bled white. England should be bled as consistently as possible, although, as the Germans have sarcastically said, in all probability the English would allow the French to do their fighting for them.[1]

The conclusive character of these losses, the Germans congratulated themselves, would lie in their permanence. The French population had long been at a standstill, and any loss at all was positive, not relative. Indeed, it would be relatively far greater than the positive figure. The yearly accession of children becoming of age had been for some years smaller and smaller, and the increments reaching manhood in the

[1] Again and again this slander crops out in America in all sorts of forms. The Invisible Army considers it a valuable bit of propaganda.

coming twenty years would be still smaller and could not by any conceivable human power be increased in number. For all the children were now alive who could possibly add to her man power for twenty years. If the extremities of the war led her to draw upon the classes of sixteen, seventeen, and eighteen years old, so much more deadly would be the effect of this campaign and so much more irreparable her losses. After the war the population would recuperate slowly because of the settled French habit of economy and the national prejudice against numerous children, which would be all too probably intensified by the war and its expenses. The habit of contraception was also widespread in France, the morals of the nation condoned sexual irregularities of all sorts and again interfered with the growth of the population. The loss of man power was the loss of economic power; the difficulty of restoring it might well perpetuate any advantage which the Germans could win during the war.

True, too, of the British, the more killed the greater would be the loss of economic power. The relative loss could not be as considerable because the population was larger than the French, was growing faster, and its recuperative power was greater. But the relative losses would still be to the advantage of the Central Empires. Had they not had the highest excess of births over deaths in all Europe for thirty years, and was not this still true? Were they not, moreover, willing to go to lengths in the recuperation of

German man power which they felt sure that neither England nor France would be willing to copy? It had been the established rule at the outbreak of the war that every man who departed with the army should leave his wife pregnant. War marriages had been encouraged, stimulated, even commanded by the state: every unmarried man was to take himself a wife before going, and thus leave a child behind. During the war this same spirit has condoned adultery, bigamy, polygamy, and illegitimate intercourse of all sorts in the endeavor to multiply the number of children. Artificial fertilization and Official Pregnancy have, as some claim, been applied to all women still able to bear children, married or single. Thus would the losses be made good; thus would the calculations of the Allies for the economic destruction of Germany be defeated.

The original determination to fight the war in enemy territory had been completely successful and the war was being waged far within French boundaries, far within the Russian frontiers. This made possible a destruction of the maximum of enemy capital during the war under the guise of military measures, made it possible to fight the war in a manner as costly as possible to the enemy, to adopt the only method by which their economic defensive might be defeated. Systematic destruction should be organized by the army of all permanent improvements in enemy territory not immediately useful to the Germans themselves during the conduct of the war. The

land should be laid waste, trees cut down, towns destroyed, bridges blown up—indeed, every work of man, however slight its value. Mines and factories within the German lines should be worked to their utmost without any attempt to preserve the plant itself. Where the plant could be transported to Germany, it would be a permanent loss to the enemy and the transfer should be made.

Wherever, therefore, Germans have been compelled to abandon stretches of territory to the French, they have laid it waste with a systematic destruction whose motive has often puzzled the Allies. This is it: that the period of recovery for France may be long, progress slow, and the cost excessive. It will force the French to undertake an elaborate work of economic reconstruction in northern France which will undoubtedly hamper their effective economic competition with Germany for a number of years proportionate with the area and completeness of the destruction.

The probability or possibility of defeat made imperative the preservation of the German merchant marine at all costs, that the navy should not be risked in battle under any circumstances. What could be worse than to win the war in the field and still be unable to contest the control of the seas? The loss of the war in the field coupled to the loss of the navy would make defeat fatal indeed. Measures to save the marine had been undertaken promptly at the outbreak of the war. An astonishing number of German ships

were, therefore, in their home harbors; a very large number were in neutral ports; and the utmost efforts were to be made during the war to conciliate the neutrals and thus save the interned ships. Of course, the British would not sit quietly and allow this sort of diplomacy to succeed. The utmost pressure would no doubt be put by the sea power upon all those neutrals, in whose harbors German ships were to be found, to force them to declare war and confiscate the ships.

The probability that the German fleet interned in neutral waters could not be saved made more and more necessary the essential work of the submarine, for the submarine warfare, in particular the unrestricted warfare, seems not to have been intended primarily to starve England. It was thought, indeed, that England might be made to suffer considerable privation, that difficulties might well be put in the way of communication with the British army in France, of supplying coal and munitions to Italy, the preservation of connections with America and the self-governing colonies. But that the destruction could proceed to such a point that England would be literally starved was hardly expected by the High Command, although the naval authorities held out hope. Unquestionably, the destruction of Allied merchant-ships during the war could reduce the odds which would needs be met after the war by a Germany which had lost as an act of war a considerable section of her own merchant fleet. The submarine should restore the ratio between

German shipping and that owned by the rest of the world. This was its true work. If the ratio could be made more favorable to Germany, the submarine would then have accomplished almost, if not all, that could reasonably and rationally be expected of it. Of course, to use the submarine for such a purpose as this at the cost of the ships actually interned in neutral harbors would be silly in the extreme. It should not be thus utilized until the Germans had become morally certain that the preservation of those ships was impossible. Thus would a permanent loss of capital in all enemy countries result which could be replaced only with great difficulty and in time.

Might not this work of the submarine also have military results of importance? It would certainly force England to devote material and labor to the building of ships which might otherwise have been devoted to the maintenance of the army. It might even be possible to sink enough ships to make just that difference between the tonnage required to maintain the army at full efficiency and that which would just fall short of it. So much might be confidently expected; so much, indeed, the Germans have very nearly attained. The submarine would prevent the building of additional warships of large size during the war and would thus probably leave the relative strength of the German and British navies in capital ships the same. This was most desirable, for if the Germans should win, as they expected to upon the land, it would then be necessary to carry the war upon the sea, and, if

they had lost in the meantime the capital ships of the German fleet, it would be difficult to predicate the time when that war might be begun. To win on land at vast expense of life and treasure, only to find Great Britain more securely intrenched than ever upon the sea, would be serious; but to lose on land, and find the enemy still stronger at sea than before would be intolerable.

The strategy of defeat must above all insure Germany against loss of the economic control of strategic areas, Belgium, Serbia, Poland, Rumania, which, after a defeat in the field, she would most certainly be required to relinquish and which perhaps nothing less than a truly astounding victory would enable her to retain. Nor was it perhaps desirable to retain them as they had been before the war. Certainly the most important—Belgium and Serbia—had been populated by too vindictive and energetic a people ever to co-operate profitably with the Fatherland. The first year of the war proved that the Belgians would not easily be converted. If they could not be used, they must then be systematically destroyed. What was handed back to the Allies should be nothing better than the shell of Belgium, of Serbia, of Poland, and of Rumania, negligible in man power and incapable of resisting further German economic penetration.

"If we do not get Belgium into our sphere of power," wrote the governor of Belgium, Von Bissing, to Doctor Streseman in January, 1917, "and if we do not govern it in German fashion

(and use it in German fashion), the war is lost. For more than two years past my policy has been guided by such consideration of what may happen in the future." "Our only weapon is the policy of power," he wrote in his political testament; "this policy must see to it that the Belgian population, now still hostile to us, shall adapt itself and subordinate itself, if only gradually, to the German domination." "We shall never again have recourse to the vacillating policy of conciliation which was so disadvantageous not only in Alsace-Lorraine, but also in Poland." "He who remains in the country must declare his allegiance to Germany and after a certain time must declare his allegiance to Germanism. Expropriation is absolutely necessary in order to prevent such a state of things as exists in Alsace-Lorraine to the present day. Half-measures and a middle course must be condemned most of all." [1]

Such a policy could be carried out only through ruthless power and by unfaltering "German methods." The Belgian and Polish population must be decimated by physical suffering; too little food or unfit food only should be supplied them; coal, wood, clothing, should all be insufficiently provided; executions on the slightest excuse should take place. Whole villages could be expatriated on the slightest clash between them and the officials. Many might be worked

[1] *General Von Bissing's Testament, A Study in German Ideals*, London, 1917. Pp. 19, 25, 28, 31, 32.

to death by forced labor in Belgium itself, in Poland, and particularly in Germany. The deportation of people from Belgium and Poland to Germany by the thousand could be carried out and would be undoubtedly effective. If they survived, they would certainly be too few in number to be dangerous and would in time amalgamate with the German population. If they died, the end was even more securely attained. As for Serbia and Rumania, the general extermination of the population could take place as an act of war. With those people there was no need to bother; they were worthless and had better be slain. If too great difficulty was experienced, epidemics might be set free among the population and among the cattle. In all probability this was done in Serbia and in Rumania, where the typhus carried off most of the population.

Then, too, in these strategic areas there should take place that same thorough, systematic destruction of all permanent improvements not useful to the Germans themselves during the war, the removal of everything movable of the slightest value. If Germany should be defeated or be compelled at the close of the war to hand them back to France, Great Britain, and Russia, it would then be possible for them to say literally to their enemies, "Thy house is returned unto thee desolate."

The moral justification for this treatment certainly gave the Germans very little trouble. If the war itself was justifiable, if German pos-

session of these areas was in any sense necessary, these measures were legitimately forced upon them as a defense against defeat and the vindictive destruction of Germany by her enemies. If anything done since the first invasion of Belgium was justifiable, certainly this was; if what had hitherto been done was unjustifiable, the addition to the reckoning of this amount would scarcely increase it. Could it not in any case be plausibly declared that all this destruction was the result of the war, of the refusal of the population to co-operate peaceably with the Germans, whom strategic necessity brought into their land? There was a very real need for labor in Germany and a very real scarcity of food. Was it to be supposed that these aliens should be allowed to sit and eat the bread of idleness while the Germans worked? None who refused to work should eat; indeed, it might almost become a necessary principle that none disloyal should be allowed to eat.

In all this the Germans deny the slightest trace of brutality. That it involves pain, starvation, exhaustion, death, they readily admit. But they distinguish sharply between brutality and ruthlessness. Brutality is cruelty for its own sake, the needless infliction of suffering, the gratification of the lusts and hatreds of the individual. It is never purposeful, impersonal, calculated, objective. It is to be as severely reprobated as *Schrecklichkeit* is to be defended, which should not be rendered in English, "frightfulness," because that translation suggests a

condemnation of this practice by the Germans themselves which they are far from possessing. *Schrecklichkeit* is ruthlessness—the purposeful, impersonal, objective performance by the loyal sons of the Fatherland of acts which would be lustful, cruel, bloody, abominable if committed for their own gratification, but which become praiseworthy and commendable in the highest degree when performed in compliance with the needs of the state. Such is the "German fashion" to which Von Bissing referred; such the policy he initiated. Its results are assured; its expediency undoubted; its justifiability unquestioned. And therefore, exclaimed the Kaiser to the Emperor Charles, "Forward with God!"

VII

THE ECONOMIC DEFENSIVE

WE shall patently deceive ourselves if we suppose that the German expectation of a surprise campaign against France and Russia, which would bring the war to a prompt and glorious conclusion, closed the eyes of the High Command to the possibility of unexpected resistance and a long war. Thirty years of calculations and preparations would have been more than wasted if the economics of a long war, in which the participation of the sea power would throw Germany on its own resources, had not received elaborate consideration and produced results which were deemed conclusive. If Germany could be starved out by a few months' blockade, no war was feasible. The economic and financial preparations were, if anything, more elaborate than the military, both from the point of view of production and from that of subsistence. The High Command could not proceed upon guesswork, and the continuance of the war has demonstrated the essential accuracy of their economic calculations and the adequacy of their dispositions.

That they could be literally starved out they could not believe. Nor did they feel that there was real danger that the economic deficiencies might reach a point which would affect the strength and morale of the army or produce a revolution among the civilian population. The blockade itself would not be, could not be, tight. Holland, Denmark, and the Scandinavian countries would send in enormous supplies of metals, cotton, fats, grain, rubber, medicines, which they themselves would procure from the outside world. No regulation or supervision could entirely stop such a traffic. Only the prohibition of all importation into neutral states would be effective, and it was felt that the sea power would be unwilling to throw the neutral states on the German side by an interference with their trade. It would, furthermore, be a violation of the very laws regarding neutrals which the sea power itself had pleaded in the case of Belgium, and would impose suffering upon them which the Allies had bound themselves to forego.

This the Germans saw was to their own advantage, and for it they were duly thankful. It proved to them the correctness of their own logic, that morality could only interfere with the efficiency of the prosecution of wars. Not until the fourth year of the struggle did the Allies totally stop leakage to Germany through Scandinavia and Holland by forbidding importation to the neutral countries themselves. While these leaks perhaps did not reach the

proportion believed probable by the German High Command, they were nevertheless sufficiently considerable to assist Germany and to prolong the war. Substitutes for the necessary raw materials not produced or procurable in Germany were found. Medicines and hospital supplies presented greater difficulties, but in one way or another they have been surmounted.

The economic defensive for the war, the Germans concluded at the outbreak, was good, and, as the war has continued, they have more and more manifested their satisfaction in the correctness of their original calculations. The economic defensive now needed was the defense against defeat. The strategy of defeat would reduce the odds against the Germans at the end of the war, might indeed make the solution of the economic problem after the war easier, but it could scarcely solve it. Somehow or other Germany must so fight the war as not to emerge from it exhausted economically and thus lose its fruits by reason of a comparatively greater economic exhaustion than in the Allied countries. Such was the loudly trumpeted expectation in Paris and London. At all costs it must be foiled. In the eventual victory the economic defensive would be not less important than the military campaigns. Indeed, if an adequate economic defensive could not be devised, it would not be expedient to continue the war.

The economic defensive was necessarily conditioned upon an ability to continue the war indefinitely without wastage. Germany must

emerge from it with strength at least proportionately as great as her relative strength to that of the other powers before the war. Her central position, with a limited area, with a population growing by leaps and bounds, made the vital issue that of relative and comparative, not of positive, strength. This ratio could be maintained only if she could both prosecute and win the war at a cost positively and relatively far less than that which her adversaries must pay. It had been possible to devise a strategy of defeat which might cause her enemies to pay heavily for their victory; it remained to invent an economic defensive which should reduce the inevitable cost of prosecuting the war.

The High Command felt certain that this could be done. The war would cost Germany a minimum of material and effort. In the first place, she was already prepared; there would be no waste in experimentation, in the extemporization of an army; no costly errors and mistakes to be recorded; no costs due to delays. The industrial fabric to support the war had already been built, and indeed had already been paid for, in characteristic German fashion, with other people's capital. To prosecute the war at a minimum cost, they had merely to maintain and utilize what already existed.

Again, the perfection of German business organization could reduce every cost in production and distribution to a minimum. The banking system had long ago been centralized and was completely in the control of the government.

Industries had already been tabulated in their relation to the war; exactly which were to be transformed and which continued was already ascertained. New bureaus of priority and of employment could easily and quickly with a minimum effort, minimum friction, minimum cost deal with the great transformation of industrial Germany from a peace to a war basis. Transportation would again be simple and the cost at a minimum. Most of the railroads were owned by the states themselves, the strategic railroads in Alsace by the Empire. It made little difference whether one calculated that the railroads were conducted by the states during the war at a profit or that the states received transportation during the war at cost. In any case, the true fact was that transportation was provided, as well as most manufactures, by the state itself from its own resources, under the most scientific management imaginable, in which the principle of the cost itself had received definitive treatment. If the Germans did not win, if the economic defensive was not conclusive, it would be because science, forethought, organization, calculation, were more incompetent than muddling through. The whole history of civilization seemed to prove to the Germans the contrary.

The decision of the military authorities to fight the war on enemy soil, expedient for strategic reasons, provided also economic aid of the very first importance. The French iron and coal mines were rich and easily mined; their proxim-

ity, moreover, to the battle line was of the first consequence. The deprivation of the French of these resources was not to be forgotten in its significance. Belgian factories and foundries were numerous and adequate in equipment, and the saving to the German fabric by their operation in Belgium or their transportation to Germany and operation there would be immense. All would become the property of the state; all could be operated either by prisoners or by soldiers at a literal minimum cost or at the price of the sustenance of the people employed. Nor was it to be forgotten that the German army would as a matter of course take some hundreds of thousands of prisoners; that there would be within the German lines some millions of French and Belgian laborers, who could be utilized in the fields, mines, factories, or any place where skill was not indispensable nor secrecy imperative. Forced labor, the Germans realized, could rarely be applied to skilled tasks, but certainly there would be an enormous aggregate of rough labor of the coarsest kind which could in this way be secured at a price literally below cost. Thus also could the great strategy of defeat be best executed.

The war itself could be prosecuted with absolutely no depletion of the permanent plant itself other than wear and tear of its use and the loss of the ships interned in neutral countries. For such systematic destruction as they themselves would visit upon France, Poland, and Serbia would be impossible within Germany,

even under defeat, for they could scarcely conceive of the literal invasion of German territory. No Allied soldier should set his foot on German soil, and, at the end of the war, if their measure was defeat, they would find themselves with their permanent plant unimpaired. They would thus begin the period after the war with no work of reconstruction to do, with an administrative, executive, industrial machinery tried and experienced in the art of co-operation, in the art of producing the maximum effect at the minimum cost of labor and of material. Such an organization could scarcely fail to be of the utmost value in the period following the war. That organization itself must work effectively for Germany to defeat such extraordinary economic measures as its enemies might undertake. Through it prices and interest rates might be controlled throughout the war and kept practically at the old level. Thus the total figure of the cost would be nominally reduced; the great evil would be avoided of a change during the war of the level of prices, with the consequent unfavorable effect upon the incomes of those living upon permanent investments. There should be no financial jugglery during the war, no profiteering, no stock-jobbing, no huge fortunes created out of the conflict.

So far as possible private industry should be fostered and its normal profits preserved; the civilian population be kept busy and happy; an abundance of manufactured material made to loose upon the world at the close of the war, with which the necessary raw materials to begin the

new economic war for trade might be bought. A commission of experts was appointed to plan measures by which German trade in its full volume, if possible in increased volume, might be resumed after the war, and to meet such measures as the British and the French might in the mean time have initiated to prevent German competition from becoming effective. To this commission would be delegated at the close of the war that same type of dictatorial power which the war commissions had had during the great conflict itself. When the war was over it would, as a matter of fact, if it ended in a German defeat, have just begun, but the machinery to prosecute it would be ready and waiting.

Such an economic defensive would insure Germany's ability to extend the necessary aid to Austria-Hungary and to their allies, Bulgaria and Turkey. So long as the war should last she must manufacture for them and utilize somehow all their products in return. This would be, however, an operation of the utmost simplicity, its complete success assured in advance. They produced what she must have and could not create in sufficient quantities for herself. She could supply and must somehow sell, if her civilian population was not to suffer seriously during the war, exactly what they must have and could not otherwise obtain. The economic structures of the members of the Pan-Germanic Confederation were fortunately complementary. The war should impress that mutuality of economic interest upon the whole population from

Berlin to Bagdad and from the North Sea to the Adriatic.

If the blockade was from many points of view a disadvantage, it was, in view of the solidarity of Mittel-Europa after the war, a positive blessing. Carefully, methodically, scientifically, the economic development of the whole vast area could be nurtured and forced ahead at a pace and by methods otherwise impossible. A literal maximum of co-operation, of mutual aid, and of profit could be insured and made permanent. Whatever economic rivalry, duplication, and weakness there had been could be accurately and permanently obviated. Not otherwise could the economic problem of the war be solved. Most fortunately, these imperative needs of the war itself, the very dictatorial authority they allowed the state to assume, the exertion which the population could be persuaded to make under the stimulus of the blockade and the fear of defeat, would go far to solve the difficult economic and administrative problems of Central Europe, advance its development relative to its enemies, and insure precisely that economic structure and industrial co-operation imperative during the war after the war. The fighting of the war could be made to solve the problems of the future, even those of defeat.

For the Germans hold that national and international status depends in fact upon economic strength and not upon military victories nor upon territorial dispositions won by them. If one country is relatively stronger than another in

number of men, in industrial development, in the spirit of co-operation, no military victories can change that fact, if fact it be. Predominance in Europe means to the Germans no mere political or diplomatic prestige, but a literal superiority of economic development of which they are convinced armies, navies, treaties, congresses, are merely the counterfeit presentments. If they can insure effective economic co-operation throughout Central Europe during the war when they are undisturbed, can make continued co-operation mutually profitable to Bulgarians, Magyars, Slavs, and Turks, as well as to Germans and Austrians, can convince those numerous peoples of the reality of that profit and the assurance of its permanence by the mere continuity of co-operation, they have created a defensive which will be unassailable. No military defeat can touch it, for its basis is not military. No changes in strategic dispositions can render it vulnerable, because it is not located in any one spot. No dissolution of existing political and administrative agencies can prevent its continuation so long as the people believe it profitable and desirable to continue. For all of their blind confidence in force, they see that there are economic manifestations which force may extend and intensify, but which it cannot assist, once they come into existence, and which it is powerless to destroy. The reality of the new Pan-German Confederation must lie in the consensus of popular opinion in its favor, not in armies or factories. The war could more definitely establish it, the

Germans saw with unconcealed satisfaction, than two generations of peace.

The war would in the mean time have cost Great Britain, France, and the United States, to say nothing of Russia, the very maximum. Although their resources were greater than those of Germany, the cost itself would be greater. They must extemporize a war organization, pass through a long period of experimentation, through the inevitable costly failures. The general habit of business in those countries would compel the conduct of the war by private enterprise at a profit rather than by the government at cost. Upon such an extemporized organization the drain of the war itself would be greater; the wasted effort, the loss of time, would more than equalize the economic equation in favor of Germany. Like the military defensive, the economic defensive would rest upon the excellence of German organization, upon its admirable machinery, upon effective co-operation, upon the definite foresight with which their resources were actually utilized. Even defeat would thus find Germany proportionately stronger than before, even if actually weaker. Nor was more essential.

Nor could it fail; the lesson of history was clear. To be sure, the only analogous situation was not entirely recent, but the Germans do not believe that conditions have changed radically in the last century. France, during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras, fought a war for twenty-five years against every country in Europe by turns, and finally with the entire world.

She emerged from it beaten, after having experienced colossal disasters, an unprecedented strain upon her man power and upon her economic fabric. Her armies were broken and disorganized; she was despised and hated by the whole world; the allied armies were actually in Paris and there was nowhere in France any sentiment for resistance. The great leader and the majority of his subordinates were proscribed and about to depart into exile. Her enemies believed her crushed beyond any ability to recover within a generation, thought her man power destroyed, her economic fabric weakened, and they possessed an entire willingness to destroy her political independence and her international position.

Yet Talleyrand correctly saw France relatively stronger than other nations. Though her efforts had been greater, her suffering from the war had been less, primarily because of the careful administrative and industrial reorganization of the country by Napoleon. He had known how to utilize such strength as she possessed. He had known, moreover, how to conserve it; how to bring her through the war without exhausting her; and he had proved for all time that so long a war might be fought against great odds without destroying the country fighting it. Probably no fact in history has more appealed to the German leaders than this, nor have they more confidence in any of the assumptions on which their great campaigns are based than upon this. The Revolution, in fact, had given free play to the economic strength of France at a

time when the full economic power of other nations was still fettered by feudalism and by tradition. Napoleon had known how to utilize this new strength, had carefully arranged that the war should be fought on foreign soil, that the true damage should be done there, that the true economic reconstruction should be thrust upon other nations. Indeed, the plight of Prussia, of Belgium, of Italy, was far more desperate in 1814 than that of France, and the subsequent history of the nations indubitably proved that France recovered far more rapidly from the war than any country in Europe save England. And all this tremendous result had been achieved with fewer resources, with fewer men, without foresight, with much inexcusable waste and bungling during the early years of the Revolutionary period, and with an economic fabric far less capable and carefully adjusted to the needs of the situation than the German administrative, military, and economic fabrics certainly were. What had been done before during a war with inferior resources and amid great economic difficulties, at a time when economic administration was not fairly understood, could certainly be done at the end of the twentieth century by forethought and scientific management by the ablest and strongest country in Europe.

The French defense had been absolutely conclusive. Talleyrand had merely to point at Vienna to her truly undiminished resources, to her yet unexploited man power, to convince the allies that their original scheme of imposing

terms of peace upon France highly unfavorable to her international position and even to her political independence must be abandoned. A settlement hostile to France could not be made because she had devised a satisfactory economic defense. Had not the same thing proved true after the war of 1870? Had not France then been beaten and crushed beyond precedent? Had not her army been disorganized and vanquished, her capital captured, and such terms of peace dictated to a humiliated nation as one European country had rarely exacted from another? And yet France had recovered from the war far quicker than had Germany. Indeed, in the subsequent ten years the economic progress of France was such as to cause Bismarck to feel that the war had been almost a failure. He had meant it to cripple France for a generation, and the industrial organization of the Second Empire had thoroughly retrieved Napoleon III's military and political blunders. Once more France was saved in the face of military defeat. Once more the victory of a foreign army had proved futile to achieve its real result. The more fools they if the Germans should not learn from history the lesson of their own past, should not conduct this war in a way certain to win it, even although it were lost.

VIII

UTILIZING THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

SHOULD the strategy of defeat and the economic defensive both fail, there would still remain the Russian Revolution. The Germans have long been familiar with the fact that the greatest undeveloped economic area in the world lay at their very door, its strategic approaches in their control—Russia. Long ago they saw that its economic structure was essentially complementary to their own and that the economic benefits of close co-operation would be entirely mutual. While we shall scarcely believe that the outbreak of the Russian Revolution was unexpected in Berlin, its character and the extent of its success were probably unhoped for. Its importance for victory was already great; its significance in defeat might be unparalleled. It might even turn defeat into victory.

Germany has been and expects to be an industrial nation on a large scale, a country importing, not exporting, labor, anxious, for political reasons, to retain the population at home by the development of intensive industry and by the reduction of the amount of extensive labor em-

ployed within its bounds. This involves the progressive decline of agriculture in comparison with the growth of population, the progressive dependence of Germany upon imports of food and of raw material. Here is the true secret of Pan-Germanism. How can the population be retained at home and yet continue to grow at the rate of the past generation? How can the ratio of military and industrial strength of Germany to other nations be maintained permanently, however great the growth of other nations may be? They see only one solution—a market for manufactured goods in which she may buy at favorable rates the food and raw materials she needs. Both the market for the goods which she expects to sell and for the goods she must buy must be capable of expansion; for the production of food and the manufacture of goods must keep pace with the growth of Germany herself. Both must, therefore, be capable of unlimited expansion. This is the true object of the war. This lost, the war would be lost, even if won; this won, the war would have been won, even though lost.

Russia is and long will be a country vast in area, condemned to extensive agriculture by the ignorance of its peasant population and the character of its soil. It is even a country in which the colonization of unoccupied land is still progressing, of a type which ceased in Europe during the early Middle Ages and which even in America is now a thing of the past. As yet its industry is rudimentary; for its own needs Russia produces and for generations can produce no ade-

quate supply. Economic competition with Germany, therefore, in manufactured goods is impossible for many decades to come. Hence Russia needs manufactured goods and requires a market for the food, oil, and metals which she can export in great quantities. Some of it has been already sold to the Germans, but the true markets have been found in England, France, and Italy, and involved a long, expensive transport, both for exports and for imports. The mutual economic advantage to Germany and Russia of an exchange of products is striking. Each is able to supply precisely what the other needs, each is able to supply it in adequate measure. Even if shut off completely from the rest of the world, neither would suffer seriously, for their economic structures are complementary. This fact is not in dispute and never has been. Still less is it new to the statesmen of both countries.

The difficulties in the way of the development of this intercourse have been political and international, not economic. Russia is so placed in the world as to require access to the ocean highways through the Baltic and the Black Sea. She is worse off than Germany. Not only are England and the Channel in her way, but Denmark, the German fleet, and the Baltic Sea itself, on the one hand; Constantinople, Malta, and Gibraltar, on the other; while her northern harbors are frozen for nearly six months in the year. Such obstacles in the way of Russian access to the world's trade have brought Russia to

terms with the sea power, for she has been in Britain's hands for any access at all to the outside world. Naturally, too, the sea power has drawn to herself the great bulk of Russian trade.

This same necessity for access to the outside world has made Russia the natural foe of Germany and Austria and of their hoped-for economic and political expansion. If they should succeed in strengthening their present position in Europe by a more extensive control of the Balkans and of Constantinople, they would place themselves permanently across Russia's path and be dangerous in proportion as that permanence was assured. All of this has been thoroughly realized by the dynasty and by the great majority of intelligent Russians. The foreign policy of Russia since 1892 has been definitely anti-German and has become more so with each succeeding decade. The czars concluded that her destiny lay in Europe, and not in Asia. More and more were they determined to solve adequately the problem of western Russia and to sacrifice imperialistic ambitions in India and Manchuria.

But so long as the dynasty cherished such a foreign policy, based upon such views of Russia's position in the world, it was impossible for Germany to permit an exchange of trade beyond a very moderate point, or to countenance the creation in Russia of an industrial structure of real force. Still less must Germany depend on the Russian market for the solution of her future needs; she could not thus afford to nourish the

adversary, increase her wealth, solve his economic problem, put behind unlimited man power a strong economic fabric, built by German capital and skill and capable of maintaining an army of unlimited size in the field. Such a policy would solve the economic problem in Germany at the expense of her political, military, and international position. Did not her safety rest upon the ratio between the armed forces of France and of Russia to those of Germany? If she should thus increase by economic development the potentialities of the Russian army, would she not destroy the possibilities of maintaining that ratio in the future? It could not be thought of for an instant. Russia must remain undeveloped. In the continued weakness of its economic fabric would alone lie the true safety of Germany. The solution of the German economic problem must be sought elsewhere. It must result in political as well as economic benefit and prove to be not only self-supporting, but self-defensive.

The object, therefore, of the great Pan-Germanic scheme for a confederation which should stretch from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf was to solve the German economic problem without at the same time making more complex its international and military difficulties. Undeveloped territory must be found, undeveloped territory not accessible to sea power, or at the least not directly within the sea power's control. In Hungary, in the Balkans, in Turkey, in Mesopotamia lay great undeveloped trade

areas capable of almost unlimited expansion. True, they were less adequate as markets than Russia and their future development was less assured, because the population had still to be educated in the arts of production and in the economic wants which would create the necessary markets for German manufactured goods. Mesopotamia, indeed, was almost unpopulated and in some respects nothing more than a desert.

The development of these areas, moreover, meant a long railroad haul through districts none too friendly to Germany and susceptible to attack by the sea power. The Bagdad Railroad was vulnerable—a fact never to be forgotten—and could be effectively protected only by a dominant Germany in Europe, already in control of the military situation and, so far as possible, of the economic. Against a victorious sea power no defense of this situation by a defeated Germany was possible. The Pan-Germanic solution of Germany's needs, in fact, depended upon victory. Defeat would effectively destroy its adequacy; the loss of Constantinople and of Trieste would be fatal; the loss of the German merchant marine and fleet would be even more deadly. Never again would it be possible to build a fleet by surprise and so change the ratio of strength between the British and German fleets as to put the former into real danger of defeat should it accept battle. This has always been the greatest weapon of the so-called Peace Party in Germany. The Pan-Germanic solution was infallible in case of vic-

tory, but what should be done in case of defeat? Where was the possible provision for the strategic retirement which every good general must provide?

And now has come the reply—the Russian Revolution. There is to be in the future a Russia intent on the solving of Russian problems and willing to free itself from the diplomatic policies of the old dynasty, ready to renounce its schemes of aggression and of imperialism, to renounce the control of the Black Sea and of the Baltic, to renounce conquests in Manchuria in favor of a definitive solution of economic problems in European Russia. No longer should the Russian army be the controlling element in the industrial problem, and Russia's foreign position the controlling fact in domestic policies. All of the contending parties in present Russia are anxious to try socialistic and anarchistic experiments, to abolish to a greater or less degree private property, to interfere with the hitherto established methods of production in industry, to institute a government so loose as to approximate in modern thinking no government at all. They are for the most part theorists and they are all anxious to put their theories into practice at whatever costs to international and diplomatic traditions.

This Russia Germany can control and Germany may safely develop; this Russia would be an asset and not a liability, a solution of the German economic problem so adequate that she might snap her fingers at defeat and see Belgium

restored, Constantinople neutralized or lost. The strategy of defeat would become in large measure superfluous and the democratic defensive far less imperative. For the future her position would be secure. Communication between them would be entirely within their control, for both the railroad lines and the approaches by sea would be inside the German defenses, invulnerable to assault by the sea power and with the whole of Germany between hostile armies and the Russian communications. Should the Allies win and attempt to foreclose Germany access to the outside world, prevent her contact with South America and the Far East, Germany might then foreclose their access to Russia. She would have something to barter. There would be a section of the world which she herself would economically control, a great market to which the Allies had been accustomed to sell and which would be as regrettable a loss to their merchants as German access to South America. Here German capital and skill might utilize Russian man power in the erection of an economic structure complementary to Germany, which should avoid all competition with the existing German structure and with which the latter should not compete, an economic fabric profitable to the Russians, profitable to the Germans—continuously profitable—permanently profitable.

Whatever the origin, therefore, of the Revolution, whatever the intention of Germany to create it, to foster it in the beginning, there can be no doubt that at present the German Govern-

ment is resolved at all costs to take control of it and to establish there in the hands of its own agents the sort of an economic and military state which will be useful to Germany. This, too, less for the present than for the future. The military strength of Russia the Germans had already discounted. Two years ago they announced that the army was broken and its reorganization impossible. Nor were they far wrong. The industrial fabric was exhausted and never had had the ability to maintain such an army; the railroad system was entirely incapable of carrying the volume of traffic required by the military authorities; and the industrial fabric was unable to replace the railroad equipment worn out by the heavy traffic of war. The educated class in Russia could supply only a distinctly limited number of officers, and, as no modern army can exist without adequate officers, the vast peasant population could not produce another effective army. The Revolution did not remove Russia from the military arena. It merely completed a work already begun and made it rather more decisive than it would otherwise have been.

At the same time, it is idle to deny that the Russian Revolution possesses an immense immediate significance in the prosecution of the war, for it makes possible the addition of Russia's economic resources to those of Germany, the perfection of the German economic defensive during the war, and the impossibility of a victory for the Allies by economic exhaustion. In a measure,

it may be said, this acquisition of Russian resources offsets the addition to the Allies of the economic wealth of the United States. True, the latter's resources are far more considerable, but it must be remembered that in the past they have been to a very large extent already at the disposal of the Allies, and what the latter are receiving now is not the total of the economic equation of the United States, but merely that additional increment due to the co-operation brought about by government action. This is an amount far less than its total economic power, while whatever economic assistance Germany receives from Russia is positive gain, relatively the more important on account of the blockade and on account of the straits to which she has hitherto been driven. The moral effect upon Germany is certainly incalculably greater than any possible military exploit could be. It will convince the people of the Central Empires that defeat from economic exhaustion during the war is impossible and that in all probability the tactics proposed by the Allied Economic Conference at Paris will in the future be unavailing to destroy German trade.

We must certainly not delude ourselves into supposing that the Germans believe that the Russian economic power is to be immediately available. They are as well aware as we should be that part of the Russian failure during the war has been due to the weakness of her economic fabric, which the war itself—and now the Revolution—has rendered even more disorganized

than ever. Should the new Government agree to hand over the factories to the working-men to operate in a socialistic manner, this weakness would become even more considerable. Should the peasants be given the land, as seems at present probable, the cultivation of grain would greatly increase, and it is food rather than manufactured goods which the Germans want. In any case, time must elapse before the economic resources of Russia can be of even moderate value to them. They must organize production; they must provide for adequate transportation between Russia and Germany; and—a vital element in the situation to be thoroughly borne in mind—the German railroads as well as the Russian have suffered from the wear and tear of the war and from the inability to turn the factories which formerly produced railroad material aside from work on munitions.

The preoccupation of the Russian people, too, with socialistic schemes, the disorganization of the Government, of the credit and financial structure, will also very much hinder prompt and adequate Russian aid to the Germans, but there should be no doubt that in the long run German ability will solve this problem, if not directly, then indirectly. Russia is sown with German spies. German agents are to be found in every counting-house, in every factory, in every village, and, if the German Government cannot openly undertake this great reconstruction, it can certainly do so through the hands of the Invisible Army, whose functions and importance were

never greater than at this moment. Indeed, it is more than probable that, after six months more of relative anarchy, the peasants will be glad to receive direction from the competent hands of the German secret agents, the more so because the true character of these agents will not be realized. Nor must it be forgotten by those of us on the outside that the Germans can well afford to provide Russia with excellent and stable government, with an efficient economic organization, with an adequate and impartial administration of justice such as Russia in the whole of her history has never known. They can afford to do it at a minimum cost and can thus confer a very real and lasting benefit which the Russians are incapable of conferring upon themselves and with which the late dynasty never provided them.

The renunciation of diplomatic and international schemes Germany would regard as the key of the new Russian policy. That Russia should have no ambition is far better than that she should cherish the type of ambition she formerly had. Therefore, if through the Invisible Army a really efficient organization of Russia's administration, agriculture, and industry can be made, Germany may control Russia in Russian interests for the benefit of Russia and to the detriment of the rest of the world, and, at the same time, without making it possible for the rest of the world to convince the Russians of what is being done. It must be remembered that the vast bulk of the Russian people cannot read, and receive their comprehension of the world it-

self, of their own Government, and of what is taking place, only by word of mouth from such people as they trust. The German agents are men whom unquestionably the peasants have long known, whom perhaps they have long trusted, or whom they can be easily, by the pressure of local administration and of local justice, persuaded to trust with entire confidence.

Pan-Germanism can also offer the Russians freely and without any price beyond loyalty in international relations the fulfilment of the old ambitions. Pan-Germany holds already the control of the approaches to the Baltic and to the Black Sea and can assure the Russians of that very continuity of access which they have so desired. At their disposal will be the great German merchant marine; the German navy will be ready to fight their battles in the North Sea, as will the Turkish and Austrian in the Mediterranean. That for which the dynasty spent so much treasure and shed such rivers of blood can be had merely by the acceptance of terms which will seem entirely favorable and satisfactory to the new governors at Petrograd. Nor will they fail to appreciate the difference between the position of the dynasty after an Allied victory and their own after alliance with Pan-Germany. The Czar must have great armies and fleets to maintain possession of Constantinople against the Germans and would still be obliged to pass through a Baltic completely in German hands and through the entire German fleet at its mouth. He must have paid a great price for his

new position and still face a relative inability to preserve it without the constant expenditure of more. The new rulers can actually attain more for no cost at all in men and treasure either to achieve or maintain, and, whereas the Czar was by no means positive of victory, they see that their acquisition of freedom of access is absolute. The mutual benefit of the agreement is the sure measure of its permanence. To receive they must give and the Germans can well afford to give good measure, pressed down and running over, for such an alteration of the European balance of power as the continued loyalty of Russia to Pan-Germany would create.

No aspect of the situation is indeed more serious than the fact that the very virtues of the German Government may give Germany a control of Russia which it may be impossible to break, which the Germans may exercise entirely for their own benefit and to the detriment of the rest of the world. For they may convince the Russians that the price they are paying for good administration, for impartial justice, and for the development of agriculture and industry—that is to say, the sacrifice of Russian imperialism—is indeed cheap compared to the price which the dynasty compelled them to pay for nothing at all. Thus the Revolution in the hands of the German Invisible Army would become a great success. Thus the new Russian Government would be organized with a minimum of difficulty and the maximum of benefit.

There would be no moral scruples to stand in

the way. Those men who prove themselves incapable of obedience to the German cause will suddenly disappear. Those measures which it becomes necessary to undertake will somehow or another be undertaken. If the Revolution itself could be bought, certainly the control of any peasant assembly can be paid for, if not in coin, in other things. The Germans are adepts in the paying of a price, in the buying of men. Nothing is required except determination, unscrupulousness, and ingenuity, a conviction that all men are base and a willingness to take advantage of it. It is idle for those of us who are determined to win this war and to destroy the German menace to nourish the delusion that these facts are not true and are not important. It is idle for us to believe that this type of menace is to be removed by military victory in France or by provisions written down on paper at a peace conference. The Germans have clearly seen that much more is involved in winning the war than military operations, and we too must become aware that it is to be won in many other places than in France, and that many more things are to be achieved than the restoration of Belgium and the reconquest of Alsace-Lorraine, if the destruction of German militarism is to be its result.

In fact, now that the Russian Revolution has occurred, now that Russia is likely to come under the control of Germany herself, the German army may be disbanded and sent home. The Government and the people may enthusiastically

abolish militarism, for the menace on which it was based is now removed. What was previously Germany's deadly foe has now become her chief asset; what previously had to be done by the army in the field can now be trusted to the Invisible Army; what cost in the past hundreds of millions of marks may now be achieved at the price of millions, or indeed at nothing more than the cost of good government and thorough economic reorganization for Russia. The price is very easy to pay, cheap beyond all belief in comparison with the benefits to be received. The German military machine will presently become, if the organization of Russia in this manner is successful, not only unnecessary, but inexpedient. It will be to Germany's advantage to turn her expenditure of money and material into the navy rather than into the army. If the Invisible Army can conquer Russia during the remainder of the war, Germany may face a military defeat on the Western Front and the abolition of militarism without fear. The war will have been won even though lost. The German economic, political, and international future will be secure.

IX

THE DEMOCRATIC DEFENSIVE

NONE are more conscious than the Germans that in administrative centralization, and in the diplomatic, military, and naval powers of the Empire lie the true foundations of German international independence and of their ability to fight the war. None are more conscious than they that here is the vulnerable spot, the Achilles heel of the Central Empires. Change the Prussian administrative question, change the Imperial constitution ever so slightly, and the result might well be fatal to the entire structure. That the Empire is an international and diplomatic expedient rather than a political constitution they have long been aware. That it was neither entirely lovely nor of good report they also know. Yet the overwhelming majority of the people have voted since 1870 unhesitatingly and uncompromisingly for its maintenance. It is widely believed outside the Central Empires that a democratic revolution during the war would so cripple its prosecutors as to give the Allies an immediate victory; that a democratic constitution created at the end of the war would

provide the necessary guarantee of security for the future. What resistance to such a weapon can the Germans oppose? Would it not be conclusive and final for an Allied victory and an Allied peace?

As Voltaire said of the old Holy Roman Empire that it was neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire, so it might be said of German federal Government that it is not in a racial sense German, nor in a constitutional sense federal, nor in an administrative sense a government at all. The present German Empire consists of certain sovereign states, all monarchies, which govern Germany partly through the federal Government, or Empire, but principally through the administrative, legislative, and judicial machinery of their own states. The Empire is not a government at all, because it possesses neither judicial nor executive nor, in the strictest sense, legislative machinery. It is rather the international representative of the German states, created and operated, not for domestic purposes, but for international policies, utilized by the Germans themselves as a useful organ of cooperative action in local government, but not intended primarily to serve that purpose or created with reference to it.

Unquestionably and hopelessly undemocratic, because its object is not domestic and internal, but external and international, it therefore lacks the prime administrative purpose of a government in the American sense of the word. It lacks the necessary administrative and judicial

machinery for carrying into effect the popular will. Indeed, the Imperial officials are compelled to rely upon the states for the execution of imperial legislation. The true operative force of the Empire is a secret executive council, composed of the delegates of the sovereign states, all of which are monarchies. The members of this Bundesrat have no representative capacity of their own, nor do they vote as their own discretion dictates; they constantly receive and must await explicit orders from their own home governments. Really the German states themselves direct the executive and foreign policy of the Empire.

The Imperial compromise as Bismarck created it was, therefore, an attempt to retain a league of sovereign states, each of which should possess complete autonomy and administrative independence, and which demanded, therefore, the right and privilege of enforcing both their own and the Imperial laws. To create an Imperial administration was, therefore, impossible. The Empire and the states could not at the same time possess sovereignty nor exercise full administrative powers. Moreover, the small states must be left in the legal control of the Imperial machinery because the overweening size and importance of Prussia had hitherto prevented them from co-operating in any scheme of federal government at all. At the same time Bismarck saw that a unit must be built capable in external affairs of prompt action, of continuity of policy, of military efficiency, and

an organ as well for co-operation between the German states themselves, effective beyond doubt, but permissive rather than compulsory. Such was the Empire—a peculiarly subtle compromise between the German past and the German present.

To give Germany a central government, a real administrative system, and to place the control of the administration in the hands of such a democratic régime as England and the United States possess, would abolish the present control of administrative agencies by the states, and thus in German phrase mediatize them—that is to say, deprive them of their true sovereignty. To make the Reichstag a truly important body, to reduce the Bundesrat to the position of a second chamber, to make the Imperial Chancellor and Ministry responsible to the Reichstag in the English and in the French sense, would absolutely destroy the chief feature of this subtle government, and end the rule of Germany by an executive council of princes. It would as promptly mediatize and destroy the sovereign power of all the kings and princes. No German army as such legally exists, for each state still possesses an army of its own, although by virtue of certain treaties the direction and organization of all the armies is confided to Prussia. To make the army an Imperial army under the constitutional control of the Imperial legislature, as in England, France, and the United States, would abolish the present sovereign control of each state over its army and give the new Government an

extended power which Prussia now does not possess.

If, then, the Reichstag, becoming the controlling element in the Government, should be reorganized by a new apportionment of seats, Prussia would become almost the sole constitutional force in Germany, the present lesser states would be practically absorbed into it, and their independence to all intents and purposes lost. The present arrangement gives Prussia only one-third of the votes in the Bundesrat and hence has left the small states always the ability to overrule her, except on certain vital issues upon which she possesses a veto. She can now usually prevent something from being done, but she can rarely take action without the consent and cooperation of the other states. Such an immense increase in the authority and power of Prussia would be entirely contrary to the notions of Imperial government as entertained by the states. If, then, the Prussian Government itself should be reformed by the introduction of universal suffrage on the French and American plan, the abolition of the three-class system and of oral voting, the whole basis of that constitution would be at once changed. The control would be taken not alone from the propertied classes, but from the men who believe in the subordination of political reforms to international necessity, who see the Prussian Imperial system as an international fact rather than a domestic administration, and would supposedly give control to the democratic and socialistic elements who would

further these changes in local government at the cost of Germany's defensive strength and international influence.

So, too, the German Empire, like the Prussian state, has been hitherto independent financially of any yearly vote of taxes by a legislative chamber. To introduce the democratic rule of the British, French, and American governments, of financial responsibility to a popular chamber elected by universal suffrage, and thus create the necessity of passing annually a budget without which the Government could not function at all, would practically destroy the machinery of the Empire and of the Prussian state as they now exist. To weaken Prussia, it has been often said, we have merely to put the democrats and Socialists on the throne; to destroy the Empire, we have merely to weaken Prussia, which is its backbone; to destroy the efficiency of the army we have merely to emasculate the Prussian administrative and executive supremacy. For two generations students in Germany and in foreign countries have agreed that the success of the Empire and of the Prussian Government, the heart and the soul of the present Germany, lies in the controlling and directive influences exercised by Prussia through the peculiarities of the present Imperial constitution. It is this democratic defensive which the Allies have announced their intention of employing against Germany.

What conceivable defense in case of defeat can Germany offer to such a use of the weapon of democracy? Would it not effect finally and de-

cisively what armies can only approximate? The German leaders think they see an answer in the case of France in 1814. Then she lay helpless and disorganized before the allies marching on Paris; the army beaten, Napoleon ready to abdicate, the people disloyal and her foes possessed of an entire willingness to weaken and destroy her by requiring indemnities and territorial concessions. Talleyrand pointed out to the French leaders that the country could be saved from the exaction of the reckoning for the Napoleonic conquests only by a principle, the principle of legitimate monarchy in the persons of the Bourbons. For that principle her enemies had fought; to it they were officially pledged; by it alone could their designs be frustrated and brought to naught. France had only to restore the Bourbons in advance of this final conquest and the allies would be helpless, bound fast by the chains of their own logical principles. And so it proved. The statesmen of the allies chafed and fretted, but, consider as they might, they could see no way out of the dilemma save a new war. Not so could they afford to offend their own people and outrage the decency of Europe.

So to-day for Germany the only salvation, the only defense against the destruction of Germany's international power by democracy, the German leaders believe, is to adopt the principle in advance before it can be forced upon them, to declare Germany penitent in the matter of absolutism and militarism before the real control of the internal situation passes from their hands

into those of their enemies, that is to say, before the defeat becomes final. The reform of Prussian and Imperial government by the introduction of the democratic principles commonly accepted in Great Britain, France, and the United States would at once defeat the purposes of the present Allies as certainly as the recall of the Bourbons hampered the purposes of the allies in 1814. From a democratic government ostensibly created by the German people through revolution, controlled for the moment by the proscribed Liberal and Socialist leaders, few concessions could in all honesty be exacted which the German people could not thankfully accept. Certainly none of those demands could be countenanced in the name of democracy which could be made from a government still under the control of the Hohenzollerns and administered in accordance with the present constitution of the Empire. Perhaps all territorial concessions could be avoided; an indemnity certainly might be prevented; much of the bitterness of the war could thus be removed. In any case there could be no humiliation of Germany.

Would not such a democratic reform in Germany bring into power in Great Britain, France, and the United States a strong party, already in existence (fostered, by the way, by the German Invisible Army itself), favoring no territorial cessions, no indemnities, no humiliating guarantees? Thus aid could be found in the enemy nations for the German campaign for a mild and honorable peace, for a peace which would neither

weaken nor crush Germany, should neither place her in a position where her influence in international affairs would be negligible, nor force upon her a sort of government which would make effective administrative initiative impossible.

Of course, the political compromise, the international settlement effected by Bismarck, the old Empire, would, as anticipated, have been destroyed. The Hohenzollerns themselves would in all probability need to be sacrificed; the smaller kings and princes would naturally have been mediatized; and the small states to all intents and purposes absorbed politically into Prussia. So much would be regrettable, but the result would scarcely be calamitous. The true purpose of the Bismarckian compromise had been already achieved. Had it not been meant to grapple with the difficulties and the conditions existing in 1870? Had not the German people and the German states effectively outgrown them? Had not the power, intelligence, and importance of Prussia to the safety of Germany itself been only too well proved, and could not now the small states with something approximating resignation submit in the interest of the Fatherland? Was it not true that, however sweeping and extensive the changes in the form of German government might be, the reality need in no sense be altered? The expected political, administrative, economic, and military result, the weakening of Germany internally and internationally, might be easily frustrated by the German people themselves.

The German leaders see that the remedy of democracy rests for its effect in favor of the Allies upon the assumption that the democratic Liberals and Socialists will have a strong majority in the new state and will still retain, after defeat in the war, after being placed in control of the new state, that leaning toward political reform at the expense of international and diplomatic prestige which has characterized them in the past. They see also that the Allies assume that the new Government will be a weak Government and will prevent prompt and rapid action and efficient co-operation because the democratic governments with which they themselves are familiar have been inefficient and slow, because democratic government in Great Britain, in France, and in the United States has been the history of muddling through, of corrupt statesmen, of inefficient delays, of costly experiments. They assume that the history of democracy in Germany will necessarily be similar.

The German leaders correctly appreciate that the key to the situation is the attitude of the German people themselves. If the majority are, as the Allies claim, hostile to the Kaiser and to militarism, and if they do prefer liberal government in Germany to the Empire, domestic decentralization to international prestige, then indeed the Allies will have won. But if they see in democracy, as the German leaders expect, humiliation for Germany, loss of international status, the imposition upon the German people

of a new form of government in order to destroy their international prestige, then the old line between the democrats, the liberals, the conservatives will be wiped out. The whole nation will be united in the determination to effect through the new democratic machine that same efficient, prompt co-operation which the old autocratic machine produced. The great German weapon against such a democratic assault lies in the true democracy of Germany, in the Germans themselves, in the educated intelligence of the German population, in its habit of co-operation, in its comprehension of the value and meaning of discipline, in its readiness to do the expedient thing rather than the theoretical, in its conviction of the indispensable necessity of international independence for Germany and its priority in German politics, both local and Imperial, over any other issue. Only by the aid of the majority of the German people themselves, the leaders believe, can the Allied plan of imposing democracy on Germany be successful and result in the weakening of state and army, in rendering Germany internationally less powerful.

Similarly, the German democratic defensive can fail only if the majority of the people refuse to co-operate. For what again does the deposition and exiling of the Hohenzollerns stand than the attempt to drive from Germany her military and diplomatic leaders, to force her to place her Government in the hands of less experienced men, and compel her to train and educate new

rulers? This can easily be frustrated by the simple devices of American party government, with which the Germans are thoroughly familiar. The men who direct policy need not hold office nor need they even reside in Germany, so long as the elected officials are still willing to look to them for leadership.

The German High Command can see no reason whatever why a campaign of publicity through Germany, explaining the object of the democratic offensive of the Allies, should not enable them to continue all the essential features of the present arrangement under the new democratic machinery. The sort of political agreement common in English and American parties would provide, as used, for instance, in the southern part of the United States, exactly that opportunity for the giving of mutual guarantees, for mutual consultation outside legal assemblies by means of which the true efficiency of the old Government could be continued. If the new legal Government should prove itself really inefficient, it might practically be dispensed with and the real control of affairs carried on by secret committees of the old officials, who would call themselves, in true American fashion, a party. A national party for the Empire as a whole might also be created in whose committees solemn pledges might be exchanged with the smaller states to prevent the full effect of their mediatization, the loss of their full independence. Local autonomy might be conferred upon all present administrative divisions and in the guise of

party politics the administrative machinery of the older states might be continued under democratic forms. If the true heads of the state could not be elected, they might continue in power as political bosses.

What indeed could prevent it? Had the electoral machinery in America ever been able thoroughly to defeat the machinations of parties? Had the English Parliament ever been able to free itself from the power of the two party machines? Was not the influence of the Home-rulers entirely due to the defects of this same party government? Certainly, administrative confusion could thus be prevented, the loss of the specialized information of its experienced officials obviated. Certainly a sufficiently intelligent campaign could prevent the revival and extension of the old political hatreds and jealousies.

Nor would such a democratic government be necessarily permanent. To achieve the original purpose of such a democratic defensive—the procuring of milder terms of peace than could in any other way be secured—it must be done with a convincing array of detail and it must be preserved long enough to prevent any claims of bad faith. But after ten years it would be possible to reform it, and in reforming it to destroy it. The necessary breathing-space for the recovery of Germany would have been secured, the vindictive plans of its enemies would have been defeated. The great issue could be raised once more by restoring the Empire in case it had been found in

the mean time impossible to achieve results without it. What mattered ten years or fifty? Time might be essential. Time would now work in favor of Germany, whose strength was waxing as that of her adversaries waned.

X

THE BASIS OF GERMAN CONFIDENCE

THAT the Germans are still confident of victory is easier to disbelieve than to disprove. Nor do the more experienced and conservative observers on the Allied side deny the existence of this confidence. Indeed, they have deplored sincerely the persistent effort to encourage people by assuring them that the Germans already believe themselves beaten. There can, indeed, be no one thing so important to realize about the present situation, so thoroughly significant to remember in connection with the attainment of victory for the Allies, than this fact that the Germans still, now in the fourth year of the war, in spite of all that has taken place, believe themselves certain to win. One has merely to talk with a few German-Americans who are still unconverted, who are neither terrorized by the German state nor deprived of adequate information, to realize the truth of this statement.

Unquestionably the basis of German confidence is to be found in their conviction of the superiority of scientific calculation over muddling through, of knowledge over ignorance, of forethought over careless expedients, of ruthlessness

over "the English mouthing about humanity." They are fully conscious of the great odds against them in men and resources. They are well aware of the existence of the blockade and of the participation of the United States, but they know these complications were foreseen, and that, after a long period of preparation, the High Command nevertheless undertook an aggressive war with full confidence of victory. They regarded it as scarcely probable that the issue would have been opened at all without the knowledge that all exigencies had been provided for. Upon the Invisible Army they also rely. They believe that they are proceeding with the most exact knowledge of the organization of their enemies and have, therefore, been able to determine scientifically the proper ratio of German strength which victory will require. They believe themselves able to continue the war with a full knowledge of the enemies' plans, and think that they have already created a powerful ally in the peace movement in England, France, and the United States.

If they lose, it will be, they think, because exact information, coupled with elaborate system and method, utilized with prevision and foreknowledge, is incapable of estimating correctly the resources and capabilities of great bodies of men. If any intangible human factor not easily measured and enumerated enters into the calculation, the Germans are positive that the advantage lies on their side. They see themselves as a people disciplined to war, consecrated to hard-

ship, ready to do whatever is necessary to win. No silly sentimentality, no paper promises, will interfere with their notions of expedient action. This they consider a great advantage. War is not a game, nor yet a sport, still less an ethical exercise or an attempt to project spirituality into some dim future. The prosecution of war consists in the exercising of force in the most advantageous way.

The second fact upon which they rely with confidence is the definite unity of purpose with which they and their allies entered the war. All of its objectives were determined beforehand; upon all definitive agreement had been reached; nothing was left but the execution of the plan itself, and even upon that essential agreement was not difficult. This definite unity of aim has made possible the unified direction of the war by the High Command, has made feasible military campaigns for military purposes, and the assistance of the army with such diplomatic measures as were necessary, without, on the other hand, sacrificing the prosecution of the war in an endeavor to achieve diplomatic ends.

While the military situation is somewhat different from that originally expected, the new strategy of victory, the Germans feel, is making as rapid progress as is expedient from a military point of view and certainly as swift as was desirable in view of the strategy of defeat. Time is essential properly to weaken Belgium, Poland, Serbia, and Rumania, whether they are to be useful to the Central Empires in the future as pos-

sessions of their own or whether they are to be economically penetrated after they have been handed back to the political domination of their enemies. In the west, the trench line has held invulnerable. Here and there, at enormous costs of men and material, it has been dented, but such offensives have made possible the scientific decimation of the French army in a manner which the Germans believe has been entirely successful. Already they think the French begin to realize that they may win the war only to lose it.

That the Allies can break through the trench line the Germans do not believe, and, even if they should break through, the Germans can not see how the result could be more serious than the withdrawal of the present line to one already prepared further in the rear. The offensive of Haig against Cambrai toward the end of November, 1917, was a surprise, but not a danger, because the Germans had never admitted that one position in France rather than another was of value, aside from the fact that it gave them control of French territory, allowed them to utilize French resources, deprived the French of them, and made possible the scientific destruction of permanent improvements which time and material would be needed to repair after the war. The loss of ground might also have consequence if it should affect the morale of the people or of the army, but short of that they saw no reason why one acre of ground was better than another nor why the whole trench line should not slowly yield before the British and French pressure.

At the rate of the recent offenses they could afford easily to continue to yield for two or three years without reaching any point from which the German frontier itself could be attacked. To yield rather than to defend a trench line would always be good policy because the offensive in France was long ago given up and any truly adequate defense involved the sacrifice of more men than the Germans could afford to lose. No, the British and French might have all the French soil they were willing to pay for in blood, money, and iron. Besides, it could always be recovered, as this was.

If an unusually dangerous and extensive attack had been planned, involving unusually elaborate preparation, a retreat could always prevent the delivery of the assault itself and make worthless the extended preparation. And, inasmuch as before the recent drive of Haig no attack had been successful without the construction of special railroads and a readiness to move large artillery, such a strategic retreat as was executed in February of 1917 could always prevent the renewal of such a definitive assault for months and thus win time for the process of the new strategy of victory and the new strategy of defeat. Not even the loss of all Belgium and France, the German authorities feel, can affect the issue of the war. So long as the German army is undefeated and the German frontier uncrossed, the issue of the war is safe.

Nor could swifter or more decisive progress have been made in the execution of the new strategy

of victory. Poland was crushed in 1915; the Russian army destroyed in the summer of 1916; Serbia crushed in the autumn of 1915; Rumania in the autumn of 1916; and Italy now in the autumn and winter of 1917 is already in process of annihilation. In the cases of Poland, Serbia, and Rumania, the work of the High Command was rapid and unexpectedly decisive, and in all the systematic attrition of the population and the destruction of resources have continued apace. Within another year it will certainly have reached the point beyond which nothing more can be desired. If the Italian campaign can be brought to a successful conclusion this winter it will then be possible to begin the great move on France next summer. Surely nothing more than this could have been asked; surely the great victories in Poland, in Rumania, and in Italy offset, so far as the morale of the German people and of the German army is concerned, any retirement that may become necessary in Flanders or in France.

So far as time is necessary for the execution of the campaigns against Italy and for other preparations against it which will make the final campaign against France decisive, that time is now assured. The Russian Revolution put an end to all fears that the blockade might accomplish the starvation of the Central Empires. It may be that for some time rations will continue short, but in the long run the Invisible Army may be counted upon to take control of Russia and to add her economic resources to those of the Central Empires during the war. If not

next spring, at least next autumn, food from Russia is to be expected. Moreover, the release of the prisoners of war at present held in Russia, or, if preferred, the exchange of the German and Russian prisoners, would at once more than counterbalance the arrival of the new American army expected in the spring. For the prisoners returning from Russia would be trained troops, captured in the earlier years of the war, while the Americans would still be raw material. The danger, therefore, that time alone might defeat the Central Powers has been reduced to a minimum. The lines in the west can now be held indefinitely, the Germans boast; Germany can prolong the war without limit of time.

The submarine, too, has made satisfactory progress in sinking Allied shipping, the Germans feel. Already the losses are greater than the ship-building during the war can replace and greater than the loss to Germany of her interned ships confiscated in the various neutral harbors when Allied diplomacy induced the United States, South America, and China to enter the war. Thus the reduction of the ratio of the British merchant marine to the German is actually proceeding apace, and, if the war lasts long enough, may be literally accomplished. The Germans also feel that British dominion on the seas is already destroyed by the creation of the great American merchant marine. That Great Britain would have ever allowed the United States to build a large sea-going fleet the Germans refuse to believe. It has been per-

mitted as a war measure for the saving of Great Britain herself, but will have, when the war is once ended, the effect of reducing the extent of British supremacy upon the sea. No longer will it be true that the only great merchant fleet flies the British flag. Other great fleets will also sail the seas, and, however large the British fleet may be, it will no longer remain the only one of great size.

The Germans feel that there is something more than hope that the submarine will prevent the transportation and maintenance of the new American army, except at the price of impairing the military efficiency of the Allied armies in France and in Italy. To supply the American army, the Allied armies, and at the same time not affect the steady stream of food and raw materials going to England, to France, and to Italy, will be exceedingly difficult. Both France and Italy are literally dependent for coal on England and the United States. The work of the submarine has already made the burden very great, and the Germans rely upon it to make it greater. The railroads in France and Italy also are showing the wear and tear of the war. It is even essential that the American troops should be provided with rail connections with the coast from their own country maintained by American supplies and operated by American mechanics. For the repair of the strategic lines used by the armies, France and Italy are again dependent upon supplies brought by sea from the United States and England.

Is it not probable, the Germans ask, that the potency of the submarine will be sufficiently great to interfere with the adequacy of some of these dispositions? Is it not true that if any one ceases to be effective, the result will be a material weakening of the military strength of the Allies?

As for the United States, the German High Command does not expect that the American army in Europe will be of sufficient size for many months to be a peril. If an army of real size is transported—that is to say, at least a million men, they cannot believe that the troops will be of good quality. If the private soldiers are good—and this they readily believe possible—the officers will not be sufficiently experienced to be able to handle them. If the officers are trained, there will still be the necessary support from the artillery to await. The Germans well know that artillery officers are not to be trained in a brief time, as the British and French also realize from their own sad experience in the early months of the war. Artillery defense cannot be extemporized, and the accuracy of artillery fire is a matter of the utmost significance. But if an American army of real size, of real quality, with adequate artillery should be transported to France, it would be on account of its size correspondingly difficult to maintain. The burden upon Allied shipping would be correspondingly greater and the economic burden upon the people of the United States would assume huge proportions.

Not only must everything go well in the drafting and training of the army and its officers, not only must everything proceed scientifically and rapidly in the construction of its necessary equipment of arms and of artillery, of clothing and of food, not only must the necessary reorganization of industry and of railroad transportation be made which will permit the maintenance of such an army in France from the United States itself, but the ships must be provided to carry the men and their subsequent supplies. No link in this chain must break and in it are several links suspected of something rather more than weakness. The most essential point still is that of shipbuilding and in that the least progress has been made and the least effective dispositions seem to have been created. To the discovery of the necessarily weak links in this chain the Invisible Army in America has long been devoting its time. The High Command counts upon the destruction of ships, of munitions, of food, of factories, and the like. The Invisible Army is never to the Germans an instrument whose aid is merely desirable. It is the very first line of the German defense, the army which stops the offensive before it is begun, which meets bullets with ballots, which with a few shavings and a little gasolene accomplishes more destruction than an entire German army corps could undertake in a week, which may save by the destruction of munitions possibly more German lives than the ending of the war a month sooner might effect. Best of all, the American people seem not, to German

thinking, to have been aroused to the importance of the presence of this Invisible Army. All the better. May they for a thousand years remain blind and deaf!

There can be no question, either, but that the German High Command is counting upon the services of the Invisible Army in the division of public sentiment in the United States by the rousing of the old Anti-Federalist hostility to Great Britain. The one thing which they see of most danger to them is unity among the Allies, unity of purpose, unity of action. The one depends upon the other. Therefore they must foster all possible differences between the Allies. Nothing seems to them as promising as the Anti-British propaganda in the United States. Already the Irish and German societies, the Scandinavian and Slavic societies, are organized on a great scale. And all of these the Invisible Army will effectively utilize. The mere fact that the great bulk of Americans are not descended from parents of British origin, they feel, should suffice to make this propaganda all but universally successful.

As for the economic and diplomatic offensives of the Allies, Germany regards them almost as good as beaten. The economic defensive, already adequate, was put beyond all question by the Russian Revolution and the acquisition of Rumania. And the Germans maintain that the war itself, conducted in accordance with the strategy of defeat and the fortunate circumstance of the Russian Revolution, may win the objective

for which it was begun, even though it be lost in the field. Mittel-Europa is a free-will association of peoples who find it desirable for economic, political, and administrative reasons to co-operate. No such state could be made by force, or continued by military or administrative pressure, still less made permanent unless the reality of co-operation and of interest existed. So long as the people themselves decide to co-operate and find it possible so to do, no constitutional jugglery called democracy, no scraps of paper signed by diplomats and called peace, no artificial boundary lines created at the dictation of foreign powers, can prevent such economic, political, and administrative co-operation. The consensus of public opinion in its favor is all that is necessary. If that does not exist scarcely anything is powerful enough to create it. If it does exist, all the forces in the world cannot change it.

And the war has created it. The bitter jealousies of the ante-bellum period, the Germans feel, have been largely wiped out by the fact of the war itself, and defeat would utterly demolish them. The Austrians, the Hungarians, the Balkan nations, the Turks, far better appreciate than before the importance of co-operation between them, the strength and extent of their common interests, the weakness or superficial character of the old traditional antipathies and hatreds. No such disunion as obtained before the war can ever exist after it, the Germans declare. Mittel-Europa, the Pan-Germanic Confederation, is already a fact because the unity of



CENTRAL EUROPE

determination to create it, the consensus of opinion as to its desirability and expediency, are already facts.

The war is already won because the future market, continuously expanding with the growth of German production, is already assured, not only within the Pan-Germanic Confederation itself, but in Russia. There the Revolution has removed those compelling military and diplomatic dangers which had hitherto dominated German strategy and policies. The development of Russia has now become safe; commercial alliance with Russia has now become possible; the conquest of Russia by the Invisible Army the Germans already believe to be a fact. The war has already been won because, whatever the military outcome, the real counterpoise to the German and Austrian power in the east is already destroyed. Russia as a diplomatic and military entity has in all probability ceased to exist for a quarter of a century. If she does recover, that she will revive her former policies and alliances the Germans believe improbable. The old Europe is gone, destroyed by the war. Where Germany and Austria-Hungary were once will now stand a compact federation of peoples, thoroughly organized, firmly united. On the one side will be a disorganized and anarchistic state, and on the other, France, devastated by the war, economically weakened by the strategy of defeat; Great Britain, also weakened by the war, with her strategic position lost through the fall of Russia; Italy

commercially dependent upon other countries, hopelessly in debt, and broken by the war.

Had it not always been declared before the war that the loss of Russia to the Triple Entente would alone make the Pan-Germanic Confederation a reality and the decisive, dominant force of Europe for half a century? Did not the Russian Revolution as decisively accomplish that fact as any defection of pre-revolutionary Russia would have done? Did not the old balance of power become from henceforth impossible? Are not France, Great Britain, and Italy now incapable of producing a union in Europe which can save them from eventual extermination at the hands of the new confederation, or is it to be supposed that in the future they can decline her diplomatic advances for a proper settlement of Africa, Asia, and South America?

The Germans look upon the war as decided. The military operations continue merely to determine the extent of the victory. France and England are not only beaten, but crushed. Shall the massive British Empire, whose firm organization might be truly perilous to the Germans, be made impossible? Shall Germany become not only the predominating, the preponderant power in Europe, but dominant and regnant? Shall she rule the seas as well as the land? Shall the defeat include the United States and among the spoils enumerate South America?

BOOK II

THE POSTPONEMENT OF ALLIED VICTORY

XI

THE HEAVY COST OF OPTIMISM

NO sooner had the battle of the Marne given the Allies a moment to catch breath than they began proudly and exultantly to compute their fundamental superiority over the Central Empires and to base upon it a logic of victory. Their superiority in man power was almost unbelievably great, the power of their economic fabrics combined scarcely less astonishing, the strength of their financial and credit structures almost unbelievably greater. When the total area of the countries involved was added to the size and value of their annual industrial output, when the number of colonies was joined to the size of their merchant marines and fleets, and the great factor of the control of the seas taken into consideration, it seemed scarcely possible that the Germans could hope to win the war, or that the Allies might muddle through it with such lack of success as to lose it. If the Central Empires were blockaded, and the Allies had at the same time access to the markets of the world, would not this difference in resources alone decide the issue, when the type of warfare made the amount of material available and the

strength of the economic fabric a military factor of real significance? If, moreover, the productive capacity of the neutral nations were added to that of the Allies, would not its mere volume be sufficient to overwhelm the Germans? How could the Central Empires even imagine for a moment that they could win a war against the whole world?

The Allies were soon entirely confident, once Great Britain was in, once the Empire had proved itself loyal, and the United States had shown itself sympathetic and not likely to add its resources to those of Germany, that the previous calculations of the ability of the Triple Entente to fight a war against the Triple Alliance would prove reliable. Did not the Germans fear them? Had they not hesitated in 1907 and in 1911 to open the issue of the war? Did not that mean that they themselves calculated the resources of the Allies as not less formidable than they seemed to the Allies themselves? Comfort, too, was derived from the general German description of the cause of the war. The British colossus astride all trade routes, able and willing to strangle German commerce, the French octopus, fastened upon Africa, sucking out the blood of its colonies to the detriment of German trade, created pictures of power which led very naturally to conclusions of invulnerability and consequent certainty of victory.

The first analysis of the causes of the war also led the majority of the people in Allied countries to conclude that Germany would easily be beaten.

They could see no reasonable basis whatever for the Pan-Germanic movement in Germany itself. The German people must have been duped and fooled by the military class. Could it be supposed for a moment that they wished to fight and die for the glory of the Hohenzollerns, that there could be a real basis in the public opinion of Germany for the policy of aggression and the structure of militarism? The great majority refused and still refuse to believe it. A little real information, it was felt, would speedily change the attitude of the German people. Nor could they see any solidarity in the alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary, in the relations between Austria and Hungary, between Bulgaria and Austria, between Turkey and Bulgaria. The coalition was weak; it would fall to pieces of its own weight; it lacked the necessary staying power to fight a great war. It was a mere conglomerate of people, pieced together by unscrupulous madmen and escaped lunatics, made drunk by the gospel of power, and devoid entirely of moral scruples. Their leadership could scarcely be intelligent enough to be dangerous. It may be that the time has already come when such statements as these sound peculiar and wild to people in England and in America, but the author well remembers the day when nothing else gained credence.

Time certainly would win for the Allies. To be sure, they were not prepared, nor had they foreseen the war, but nothing but time was thought necessary to make such potential strength as

theirs overwhelming in the field. Day by day the Allied army would increase in numbers and in efficiency. Day by day the German army would necessarily grow weaker. It was felt that Germany was depending for victory upon the first great aggressive rush, upon the first strength of her first army. It was not thought that she could continue such an effort, much less increase it. Even from responsible quarters came opinions of this sort. The only German strategy of victory, it was explained to the people, depended upon the success of the dash on Paris, the annihilation of the French before the Russian army could be put into the field. Once the dash on Paris was stopped, once the Russians had moved, the defeat of the Germans was certain, for they had made no less grievous a blunder than to leave the resistance of the French out of the calculation and to forget that Great Britain might join the war. Hence, when the battle of the Marne was over, the triumphant proclamation went forth that the war was won, that German hopes were destroyed, that the Germans themselves knew it, that nothing now was left to be done but to estimate the extent of the victory the Allies wished to win and to wait for time to make it conclusive and final.

Among the optimists were those who insisted that there was not enough money in the world to fight such a war for three months. Their number was legion and unfortunately there seemed to be many in London and Paris who believed it. Even Mr. Lloyd George himself declared in the

House of Commons that the war would be decided by the possession of the last pound of money. The economists also pointed out that Germany was a debtor state, owing vast sums of money to France and England, that she must necessarily go bankrupt in six months and would thereafter be unable to finance the war. If she should try such a perilous experiment, she would be unable to tax the people such sums as were needed, and none of them could figure a method by which she might float loans. All beliefs united upon the amazing strength of the Allies, the astounding weakness of Germany, the certainty of victory, and the shortness of the war.

So much indeed was said about economic exhaustion, about the pounds doing the work, about the lack of raw materials in Germany, that the public came almost to believe that a military victory was not imperative, or at the very least would not be the essential element in the winning of the war. Victory was only a question of time and there were several ways in which it might be attained, nearly all of which were much more decisive and far cheaper than a military victory. Still, the army must stop the Germans and hold them while the navy and the factories were winning. There was in many minds a certainty that the economic cost of fighting the war would destroy the German economic fabric for at least a generation. When the war was over, they confidently assured themselves, Germany would no longer be an economic or military rival of Great Britain or France. She had dug her own

grave and would now proceed to fall into it. Hence most men felt entirely easy about the length of the war; the longer it was the more surely it would destroy the enemy. Some were even inclined to think that it ought not to be won too soon. It would be better to visit a little economic retribution on Germany before she was allowed to taste the blessings of peace.

It was widely anticipated that the Socialists in Germany would stop the war by a general strike in the factories such as they had themselves proclaimed they would undertake should a war break out. For some years, too, it had been whispered (and in some quarters shouted) that the socialistic and trade-union movements in all European countries had come to a formal agreement that no war should in future be permitted, and that, if one should break out, they would all prevent its prosecution by a general strike. From the general belief that the German people had been hoodwinked and fooled the Allied nations came to the conclusion that the democratic and liberal element in Germany would soon discover the deception and precipitate a revolution which would depose the Kaiser, the General Staff, and the High Command, and inaugurate the rule of the people by a democratic peace and a democratic constitution for the Empire itself. Such a belief, indeed, still persists in many quarters and is perhaps the most familiar formula for the ending of the war. The true significance of this optimism was that it led the Allied public to rely upon other than military factors for victory.

Indeed, the war was not ten weeks old before an almost invincible optimism took possession of the British, French, and American people. No one could conceive that the Allies might lose the war or that the Germans might by any possibility win it. That optimism continued undiminished until the Italian defeat and the invasion of the plains of Italy by the German and Austrian armies in the autumn of 1917. There lay behind this optimism something far more than assumption—elation. There was the completeness of the moral victory over Germany. High moral resolve commonly does lead to optimism, to the belief that God fights for the right, and that in the end right will win. Then came the astounding completeness of the victory of the British fleet on the sea, the rapidity with which German cruisers were captured and German merchant ships driven into neutral harbors. Almost immediately the transportation of the world was in British hands and the Germans completely cut off from the outside world. Then the blockade, instituted promptly by the British fleet in the North Sea, the promptitude and accuracy of whose movements cannot but compel the utmost admiration, awakened once more the memories of the Armada, of Blake, of Nelson, of the old days of British superiority and the decision of wars by the sea power. British as well as Germans had read the great book of Admiral Mahan and had by no means forgotten his conclusion that the majority of the wars in history had in one way or another been decided by sea power.

All the facts and figures cited to prove these achievements were beyond doubt true and it was more than natural that people should conclude them more potent than in the end they turned out to be.

Optimism led the Allied peoples to believe that because the war was not being lost it was being won; that because the Germans were not winning victories in France they were therefore being beaten. The almost exclusive preoccupation with the war on the West Front resulted from the fact that the French and British themselves were fighting on no other front. The inevitable personal ties between the armies and the people concentrated attention on their own armies. Then came soon the feeling that if the Germans were not making progress in France they were losing the war, that if the Allies were holding the Germans in France they were winning the war, because time fought against the Germans. With vast confidence the British assured one another that somehow or other muddling through would prevail. Often in the past they had been in worse plights than in this war and they had somehow or other always muddled through.

But the difficulties primarily serious, which this optimism brought in its train, were not those due to the extemporization of the war. They were those which caused regrettable and costly delays in preparation for the war, extemporization rather than calculation, reliance on past tradition rather than on present analysis. This cheery optimism also tended to make the general public

in Great Britain feel easy, work less, worry less, and hence fail to supply that energy and concentration of effort which was imperative at that particular moment, if the war was to be won in anything less than a great number of years. Invaluable time was wasted in the attempt to create an army by voluntary enlistment. Vast difficulties were encountered in the handling of criminals and slackers by the failure to pass the conscription bill more promptly. Conservation of food was not attempted until serious troubles were already in sight. Agriculture was not stimulated and the maximum of production for the war itself was far from attained. Shrapnel was manufactured long after it should have been abandoned for high explosives. The workmen on government jobs declined at first to work full daily shifts, to say nothing of overtime and Sundays. All of this delay inevitably threw a greater burden upon the devoted French army and caused it to bear the total burden of the German invasion of France much longer than was expedient.

But, however inevitable this optimism may have been, however desirable in those first months when it seemed to many as if the heavens had fallen and the pit of hell yawned beneath, it was a thousand times regrettable that men should have forgotten that the German High Command had been studying these very figures of economic preponderance for decades in order that they might devise dispositions and ratios of troops which should rob them utterly of conclusive effect when the war should break out. The

Allies relied for victory upon the potency of the very factors to obviate which the Germans had spent years of preparation. This disparity of numbers and of economic resources the Germans concluded long ago was the great obstacle they had to meet. To deal with it, they spent not less than three decades in the creation of a military and administrative machine which should bear that exact ratio to the probable allied forces, which could be created within any reasonable time, needed to make victory for the Germans a scientific fact.

To provide the High Command with the necessary data for this scientific ratio, the Invisible Army of German spies in foreign countries had been created and maintained. No extemporized system prepared after the assault should be able to resist the German dispositions; at the very least these calculations should neutralize this disparity in numbers and in economic resources and allow the two alliances to fight on an equality. A card catalogue was created in Berlin of every officer in the British, French, and Russian armies, with his relatives, his money, his weaknesses, his crimes, and his virtues. Indeed, it was commonly said before the war that the French and British armies were better known in Berlin than in London and Paris. There were, too, exact statements of the number of men of probable military fitness who could be drafted, of the number of men well enough educated to make officers, of the number of artillery officers and the number of men of

scientific education who could be quickly trained for artillery work. The possible output of every munition-factory in England, France, Russia, and the United States was calculated, working on one, two, or three shifts. The number of factories which were possible of transformation into munition-factories had also been elaborately calculated. Then the probable number of skilled workmen who could be at once turned to munition work had been computed; the number who could be quickly trained; the amount of raw material needed; and the carrying capacity of the British marine with relation to the transportation of forces to Europe, to the food-supplies of the British Empire, and to its ordinary trade. Nothing was forgotten; everything was scientifically determined by the Invisible Army so far as time, money, and brains could do it.

What then, asked the Germans, should be the ratio of a German army of known strength, with a known war reserve of officers, with a known artillery, with a certain definitely assumed mobility, with certain strategic positions to utilize to the Russian and French armies—of such and such definite strength, of such reserve, with such and such material to be called up and quickly trained? There was no guesswork. The net result was the preparation of the first plans for Allied victory upon the basis of economic and potential factors which the Germans believed themselves to have already neutralized by preparations made before the war

was begun, upon the very same factors upon which the German strategy of victory itself was based. There can be little doubt that we have here one essential explanation of the inconclusive character of the first two years of the war. How could it have been otherwise? Even assuming that the German calculations prove in the end to have been wrong, it was scarcely to be supposed that their inadequacy would so soon have been manifested.

The optimistic belief in the infallibility of their own calculations led the Allies to other conclusions of great significance. They decided that a maximum victory was possible at a minimum price; that victory would perhaps not need to be won in the field, but could be had at the price of the economic exhaustion of Germany as the result of the blockade by the sea power, or as the result of a revolution brought about by the awakening of the German people themselves. The original military campaign was therefore planned to achieve political and diplomatic objectives which were desirable rather than essential, which assumed that the winning of victory was not a thing with which the army need primarily concern itself. It should be the task of the military forces to take possession of those strategic locations which the Allies had already determined at the very outset must be in their hands at the end of the war. Their possession was obviously essential from a diplomatic and political point of view.

At the same time they were not objectives

which the army found it easy to achieve because they involved at once military operations soon seen to be costly of both men and material. In particular they involved a direct frontal attack upon the German trench lines. Once more the Allies directed their first assaults upon a series of positions chosen by the German General Staff only after the most elaborate investigations and reports by army officers and by the Secret Service, worked out with relation both to a defensive and offensive war by the Staff in Berlin in many long and tiresome sessions. The Germans fell back after the battle of the Marne, as all observers were agreed, to a series of positions which they had prepared in advance. The Allies, buoyed up with the optimism of almost certain victory, proceeded then to deliver a frontal assault upon these prepared positions. The result was to impose upon the Allied army military tasks of the utmost difficulty and not primarily related at this time to the strategy of victory.

It is easy for us to sit here after the event and criticize and carp; to point out that this should have been otherwise and that should not have been done. It is of course idle to suppose that the Allies possessed any other factors to use in preparation for the war than those which the Germans had so carefully calculated and catalogued, or that the war could have been fought in France at all without an assault upon the positions which the Germans themselves had prepared. There was not the original difficulty. The difficulty lay in the optimism which con-

cealed from the Allies the foresight of the Germans, made in view of precisely the preparations which the Allies themselves proceeded to undertake, to deal with the only type of assault which the Allies would be able to deliver. No doubt this optimism was more common among the people and among the military class than among officials, but it certainly should not have been allowed to gain so complete an ascendancy over the public mind.

XII

THE PRICE OF GERMAN ISOLATION

THE diplomatic successes of the Allies have been brilliant and conclusive. The whole world stands in serried array against the Central Empires. The moral victory, fought and won in the first months of the war on the issue of Belgium and of the atrocities, was not more sweeping than conclusive. Indeed, the intimate connection of the two is obvious and success was the almost inevitable result. A moral and diplomatic isolation of the Central Empires was thus created as complete as in any similar case in history. The achievement was surpassingly great, but a price was necessarily paid, and only the outcome of the war can show whether or not it was too high.

Probably history does not record an alliance between nations more varied, more dissimilar, more scattered. Great Britain, France, Italy, and the United States find themselves the allies of Greece, Portugal, Siam, Arabia, Japan, China, Rumania, Serbia, the South American nations, and Cuba. Nor has any war presented a greater extent and variety of diplomatic ends to be

achieved by the united efforts of the coalition. Mr. H. H. Asquith, ex-Premier of England, under whose régime the greater part of this diplomacy was achieved, has again and again made authoritative statements of its purposes, and the following sentences from an authorized interview in November, 1917, are important and clear: "We should be stultifying all our professions, and throwing away the incalculable sacrifices which we have made, if we were to submit to a so-called peace which left France still despoiled and Italy as a nation still truncated and incomplete; which did not curtail the Turk's powers and opportunities of misgovernment; which did not provide for an emancipated and restored Belgium; for an enlarged and autonomous Serbia; for the creation in Poland, the prey in the past of dynastic and military ambitions, of a united and self-governing state. The security of France; the placing upon an unassailable foundation of the rights of the smaller nationalities; the destruction, not of Germany or the German people, but of the military domination of Prussia, which is their curse as it has become the curse of Europe and the world—these were and still are the purposes for which we have spent and are spending freely and without stint the best blood of the Allied peoples. They are none of them selfish objects. There is not the slightest taint of an aggressive or even a vindictive purpose in any one of them. . . . They do not profess to exhaust the indispensable material safeguards against the recurrence of the dangers which have



THE BALKANS IN 1914

come so near to drowning the civilized world. They can be pursued with clean hands and a clear conscience by the democracies of the world."

The most striking characteristic of these aims was their lack of essential unity; the only common denominator lay in the fact that they were all to be attained by the defeat of Germany. Not one of them possessed the same value to all of the Allies which would induce them all to make the same degree of sacrifice to attain it. Nor were they consistent with one another. We must certainly remember that even the official interpretations in the various smaller nationalities, based upon such statements as this of Mr. Asquith, were not necessarily those understood and accepted in Paris and London. Yet was it not a matter of real significance that two or more countries were apparently promised fulfilment of mutually antagonistic ambitions? Thus Italy, Greece, Albania, and Serbia all expect territory at the close of the war, and whatever each receives it must necessarily obtain at the others' expense. Greece and Serbia claim the same section of Macedonia; both claim Albania. Italy also desires the diplomatic and economic domination of the entire western Balkans, including Albania and the harbors of the Adriatic. Both Serbia and Albania wish to gain these same harbors. Then, too, Russia scarcely found agreeable the promise of an autonomous Poland, created at Russian expense and erected between her and Germany, a buffer state which deprived

her of the control of her own proper military frontiers against German aggression. Nor is it probable that Rumania and Greece saw the promises to Russia of the possession of Constantinople with equanimity and pleasure. Still less would Italy see the arrival of a new naval power in the Mediterranean with satisfaction.

As originally aligned, the members of the Triple Entente cherished ambitions, to be won at one another's expense, almost as serious and as antagonistic as those which they all possessed against the Central Empires. England and France have long been rivals in northern Africa; Russia and Great Britain have long been struggling for the control of Denmark and Scandinavia, while the objections of Great Britain to the possession of Constantinople by Russia have been a commonplace of history. Nor is it to be forgotten that not so very many years ago the Russians made a determined attempt to get control of the approaches to India and more than once clashed with Great Britain in the Far East. There, too, the claims of Japan, of Great Britain, and of Russia were by no means harmonious and consistent even if all were prepared to make certain concessions for the sake of harmony and mutual assistance against Germany. The concession which one made to the other was scarcely as agreeable to the third.

From all of these considerations it necessarily followed that campaigns were fought for objectives not of the same value to all the Allies. How could the Italians, the Greeks, and the

Serbians attach the same value to the independence of Belgium as Great Britain and France? How could Alsace-Lorraine possess the identical interest for the British that it has for the French? Nor could they, on the other hand, be expected to shed their blood to conquer the Trentino and Trieste with that same patriotic devotion which the Italians were sure to display. It could not be to the interest of all the members of the alliance to prolong the war until everything was won, nor to attempt certain objectives most difficult of attainment by armies. It was not to be expected that the Italians would be willing to fight as long to free Alsace-Lorraine as the French, nor that the French and the British would be anxious to prolong the war in order to achieve what they consider almost insuperably difficult aims in the Balkans.

In many cases Great Britain, France, and Russia, the major members of the Entente, undertook an objective difficult in the extreme, without being assured at the same time that the military assistance which the new ally could exert would add as much to the resources as the new objective did to their burdens. Still less did they insure effective assistance in the main theater of war. Indeed, it must be remembered that only one of these very numerous alliances and agreements, made by the Allies with so many of Germany's enemies, included a definite understanding that military assistance of any importance should be accorded them in France. That is the understanding with the

United States. No doubt the adhesion of Italy was important. The Italian army would occupy on the south a considerable number of Austrian troops and would therefore reduce the odds against the Allies in France; the Government would certainly stop the flow of raw material through Italy into Germany. Both were significant, but only indirectly important to the prosecution of the war on the West Front and scarcely likely to be the decisive element in victory.

Yet Italy was determined to occupy during the war either the Trentino, or Trieste, or both, both of them major military operations, believed to be beyond the unaided power of the Italian army and requiring for their achievement, therefore, effective assistance from the Allies. For this reason the Allies preferred to postpone these conquests until greater progress had been made in France. The adhesion of Italy made heavy demands upon them for food, coal, iron, munitions, artillery, all of which required extensive railroad and shipping arrangements which they could at that time ill afford to provide. The hope that in time the Italian army might become capable of more than compensating for the amount of assistance required was, of course, likely to be fulfilled. Then the justice of the Italian case against the Austrians; the entire anxiety to aid them; the old traditional sympathy between France, England, and Italy; the desire to rupture once and for all the old Triple Alliance, made the Allies labor for the

adhesion of Italy and receive it with a peculiar satisfaction and joy. But the gain was diplomatic and political, moral rather than military, a future rather than an immediate asset. It is no disparagement to the gallant Italians to say that for the moment the gain in military strength was not equal to the added military and economic burden.

So, too, in the case of Greece. Under the king that unfortunate kingdom controlled the rear of any army operating on Serbia and Austria from Saloniki, a campaign believed by many military men to be the necessary and conclusive blow against the Central Empires. It was not to be thought of while Greece was pro-German, nor did the Allies wish to treat Greece as another Belgium and literally coerce her. Still less was it necessary. Venezelos had been strong in Greece for many years; his followers seemed to comprise the vast majority of those Greeks who had not been purchased with German money. To secure the adhesion of Greece without the application of military force took time, and, when the way was clear for the military attack from Saloniki, it was too late to undertake it. The Germans had already anticipated it by the occupation of Serbia and of Macedonia and had so strengthened the Bulgarian and Turkish armies that a simultaneous campaign in France and in the Balkans was not to be thought of. The alliance with the Greeks, therefore, improved the strategic position of the Allies on the south, but brought them no military assistance of im-

portance. At the same time it raised hopes in Greece of accessions of new territory, which it may be difficult to achieve without exhausting campaigns, and which will certainly not coincide with Serbian and Italian notions of the reconstruction of the Balkans. The economic burden assumed by the alliance with Greece was by no means unimportant. Food, coal, munitions, money were also needed. It was in this case an uneven exchange for an amount of military aid which certainly could not be during the conduct of the war of much importance.

The championship of the case of the small and of the suppressed nationalities necessarily included not only Serbia and Belgium, but also the cases of Bohemia,[1] of Poland, of the southern Slavs in Austria,[1] of the Rumanians in Hungary. Whatever the justice of their case—and so far as democratic premises go that seems clear—the attainment of autonomy by most of those people would involve the overthrow of the constitutional arrangement in Austria-Hungary and would to the thinking of Austro-Hungarians destroy the monarchy. They will scarcely, therefore, accept such terms except after a defeat much more sweeping and considerable than would be essential to satisfy the just claims of France, Great Britain, and Russia. Once more the price paid by diplomacy in expected military achievement was not necessarily too high, but was

[1] These have thus far received no official promises, but they are none the less expectant of aid and claim many unofficial assurances of support.

indubitably great and added considerably to the burden of the war and to the extent of the victory.

For the assistance of Japan a price was demanded, no doubt, and it seems already to have been paid in the domination of China by Japan, under whatever diplomatic subtlety the fact may be for the time being concealed. Russia not improbably also sacrificed claims in Mongolia and Manchuria, while public announcement was made of the delivery of the Pacific into Japanese hands by Great Britain almost at the outbreak of the war. In this case the Allies purchased valuable economic assistance and naval aid against the German raiders at the price of an increase of physical power in the Pacific which Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and India regard with disquietude. They have all, with or without reason, feared Japan, perhaps not less than France feared Germany. Japanese assistance on the sea during the war meant certainly the physical control of the Pacific by the Japanese navy and its predominance in that ocean. In case of the defeat of the Allies Japan would not need to fight for control; she would already possess it. In the case of an Allied victory Japan would still be more powerful in the Pacific than before, unless the German navy should be destroyed and it should become possible for the British navy to operate once more in Pacific waters in force.

The heterogeneous character of the coalition and the great variety and inconsistency of its

aims and ambitions were assigned by some as the reason for the persistent refusal of the Allies to announce definite peace terms, upon the granting of which by Germany they were willing to end the war. They could not well announce the maximum terms which all of them hoped to achieve, the arguments ran, because all members of the coalition were not agreed upon the expediency of all of those demands. For Italy, Greece, Serbia to learn definitely in advance what had been promised to the others might create diplomatic and military difficulties greater now than their original adhesion to the war solved. It might also not be possible to achieve all of those objectives and it was, therefore, scarcely wise to pledge them in advance, to say nothing of the possible moral effect upon the German people of such a list of territorial changes as the great majority of the Allies hoped the ending of the war might involve. It would give the German propagandists an opportunity to insist that the war was undertaken for aggression, for the destruction of Germany and Austria, a statement certainly untrue as the war was understood in London, in Paris, and in Washington. On the other hand, it was difficult, if not impossible, to announce a set of minimum terms, because no member of the coalition was willing that any of its designs and ambitions should be omitted from such a list, and, necessarily, any list of terms less than the maximum meant the omission of some one of those cherished by some member of this un-

wieldy coalition. Already Great Britain has felt it essential to make public oral guarantees to France of a continuation of the war until Alsace-Lorraine is won. Both France and Great Britain delivered a written guarantee to the old Russia promising the possession of Constantinople at the end of the war. The Italians have also received general and vague, but nevertheless public, promises of the recovery of Italia Irredenta. The most formal pledges have been delivered by all the Allies regarding the restoration of Belgium and of Serbia, promising in both cases the addition of a sufficient amount of territory to secure them against future aggression. Beyond these statements nothing much has been promised, although a very great deal is understood to be implied.

It is hard to see how this was blameworthy or reprehensible, for certainly all of these claims were just, desirable, and, it may be, necessary for the future. Yet once again we must remember that the military results were serious in the extreme. Such a list of terms imposed upon the armies the very formidable task of winning nothing less than a maximum victory. The campaigns must cover all possible objectives and not merely aim at defeating the German army. Interpreted literally, the maximum terms of peace meant that the war could not be considered won till Germany had been driven from all conquered territory—Belgium, France, Alsace-Lorraine, the Balkans, Rumania, Poland, the Trentino, Trieste, and Serbia.

The net result, therefore, of Allied diplomacy during the first years of the war was greatly to increase the military task before the army, to set it at the maximum of extent and of difficulty. The second and perhaps more immediately important result was to prevent unity of command in the field. Such was the necessary corollary of the lack of singleness of purpose among the Allies in the fighting of the war. All of them were anxious to defeat Germany for reasons which had for no two the same force and cogency, by specific campaigns which could for no two of them have similarly important objectives. That the German army should be beaten in the easiest way seemed questionable to many of them, for fear that such a campaign might not at the end of the war leave them in physical possession of the objectives most important to them, and that their own desires and aims might be frustrated, as so many were in the great peace conference of 1814. Such was inevitably the disadvantage of the outside as opposed to the central position. The location of the Central Empires itself naturally created a certain relationship between the various campaigns, a certain ability of the various armies to support one another in different campaigns, the achievement of strategic objectives almost equally valuable to all members of the coalition. Such an essential unity the Allies could never attain because such an essential geographic and strategic unity the positions they held did not possess. For this reason, therefore, nearly all

of the Allies very early reached the conclusion, which they still maintain, that victory will not be victory unless it possesses certain preconceived characteristics.

Does this not in some measure explain the apparent unwillingness on the part of the more important members of the coalition to renounce control of their own armies and accept the dictation of a generalissimo, appointed necessarily from the military staff of some one of them? Do they not to some extent fear that the campaign finally decided upon might not provide for their own objectives and might favor those of the nation to which the generalissimo belongs? Or even that the campaign finally deemed expedient for the defeat of Germany might make no provision at all for their own particular objective, and the war therefore end without the territory in their own hands? Beyond all doubt the French were not anxious for the war to end before Alsace-Lorraine had been won and France liberated from the enemy. Equally the British were not at all desirous of making peace until Belgium had been cleared of Germans. Neither had any intention of buying back the territory now in enemy hands by the sacrifice of valuable colonies in Africa, or by the betrayal of their own associates in the Balkans or elsewhere.

Each wished, therefore, to retain an effective veto on any of the general objectives undertaken in the war, because both were determined that the main attack must continue in France, and that the main force of the Allies must therefore

not be moved to Saloniki, or to Constantinople, or to the plains of the Po. Nor is this statement contradictory to the affirmation of Lloyd George that the military control of the army had not been interfered with by statesmen and civilians. No doubt, once the object of the campaign had been determined the soldiers fought it in their own way. At the same time there can be no doubt whatever that the soldiers have not been allowed to determine the objectives of the campaigns either in location or in character. For these reasons the new Central War Council, created in November, 1917, to give unity of aim to the war, still had no power to act or to take the initiative. It was to make simpler a working agreement between the various Allies, who, as before, retained control each of its own army, who, if they disagreed with the general conclusion reached by the majority of the conference, would still be able practically to veto the decision by refusing to co-operate. The real division of authority remained as before, the real dissimilarity of purpose continued, the heterogeneous diplomatic character of the alliance still weighed heavily upon the military conduct of the war itself and dictated conditions under which the armies must fight the campaigns.

Many will ask why was so much undertaken, why were so many nations invited to join in the war against Germany at a price which may require the prosecution of the war for five or ten years more if all is to be achieved? Undoubtedly the answer is to be found in that

optimism which spread through the entire world, outside of the Central Empires, very early in the war, that the victory of the Allies was certain, and which until the autumn of 1917 never wavered. It was felt that victory was, after all, a mere question of time. The sea power, the economic exhaustion of Germany, the inability to import raw materials for munitions, the wearing down of Germany's productive power, the attrition of the German army, must necessarily give the Allies a military predominance which would be invincible, one so great that there was no need to worry about winning the war here or there. It was to be won by defeating the German army, which might well be beaten by such an army of the Allies anywhere. Expectations were also widely entertained in responsible circles of a revolt of the German people against the war, of a definite loss of morale by the German people, of a revolt against Austria by Hungary, of a rising of the southern slavs. These it was thought would make a military victory scarcely essential.

Still less was it possible to conceive that a military victory was a matter of doubt. The superiority of the Allies in man power was so immense, their resources so incomparably greater, their economic productivity so enormous, that, in a war where potential man power, productivity, and economic resources were felt to be almost, if not quite, the fundamental factors in the military equation, victory seemed to the military men demonstrated by a logic as in-

fallible as that of mathematics. It should be possible, therefore, to fight the war for the purpose of accomplishing the expedient as well as the imperative objectives in view of the period after the war. To sacrifice any of them merely in order to end the war a little sooner, to end it in a particular place or in a particular way, was unnecessary. Time would fight infallibly for the Allies, and the longer the war lasted the more crushing would be their victory. The armies might well devote themselves to the task of clearing the ground for the peace conference and for the final victory of democracy. Hence the campaign in the west had as its objective the driving of the Germans from France, Belgium, and Alsace-Lorraine. The Russians undertook to reconquer Poland, to invade Hungary, to stimulate the revolt of the Hungarians, of the Bohemians, and of the southern Slavs. The Rumanians were to invade Hungary and retake Transylvania; the Italians were to operate against Trieste; an expedition was sent to take Constantinople; and other British forces proceeded to campaign against Bagdad and Mesopotamia in order that the territory crossed by the famous railroad should be entirely in their own hands at the end of the war. There were also Arabia and Persia, highly desirable districts to hold and which they had not hitherto sufficiently well controlled. There were the German colonies in Africa and the Pacific. Those, too, should be gathered in while the gathering was good.

The inevitable result was a lack of unity in the campaigns. The army campaigning against Verdun did not directly support nor was it directly aided by armies operating on the Yser; neither possessed any direct relation to the Italian armies operating against Trieste, nor did the latter support or aid the Italian army operating against the Trentino. The Russians in Poland were obviously far from the French, British, and Italians, and were themselves of no direct aid to the Russians and Rumanians operating against Hungary or the Allies gathering under Sarrail at Saloniki. The only unity was provided by the fact that all were fighting the armies of the Central Empires. It was assumed that simultaneous pressure anywhere and everywhere would weaken and make difficult the German defensive anywhere and everywhere. They were all killing Germans. Was that not enough? Was it not probable that an effective attack in France would make impossible an effective defense in Poland, and that an effective defense by the Germans and Austrians against the Italians would weaken the forces in the Balkans and make easy the work of the Allied army operating from Saloniki? Such was the necessary logic of the outside position: the armies did not and could not support one another. This difficulty of position the Allies neither chose nor created. Of its disadvantages they were well aware, but, nevertheless, the result of Allied diplomacy was rather to intensify these disadvantages; to add new difficulties for the armies to solve; to put further

obstacles in the way of their effective unity and co-operation; to prolong the war rather than to end it.

It is always easy for those who sit at a distance to point out the simplicity of operations whose difficulties they do not entirely understand and to expose the insuperable foolishness of military and diplomatic measures whose full purpose they lack the information to comprehend. What is done is done, and, as the Frenchman said, there is little use in crying about milk which has already passed under the bridge. But any attempt to analyze the situation of the war in February, 1918, in the middle of its fourth year, any calculation as to what must be done to win it, and as to what had already been done toward winning it, should not commence with the idea that the work set the armies at the beginning was less in amount and in importance than it really was. In the size of the task set by diplomacy lay one of the chief reasons for the postponement of Allied victory.

XIII

POLITICS IN WAR-TIME

IN a war fought by Allied armies, but directed by civilian officials, chosen from England and France by legislative chambers elected by a wide suffrage, politics would necessarily play a part in furthering and expediting or in delaying and obstructing the winning of victory. The totality of efficiency of the Allied armies in the war would depend not upon military or economic factors alone, but upon their combination with administrative and political factors. In a comparative test of strength with the Central Empires, the ratio of Allied efficiency would therefore depend upon the relative ability of the Allied and German Governments in correlation, prompt action, and expedient decision. Nor would inadequate political and administrative organization be less serious to the conduct of the war than inadequate tactics or a failure of the economic organization to maintain the army in the field. As an element postponing victory, it must by no means be forgotten. As an element in the winning of the war, it is by no means to be neglected. Until a real solution of the administrative problem has been

effected the maximum strength of the Allies can scarcely be exerted. For the political officials in Allied countries are the brains of the army. They have insisted upon their right to decide fundamental objectives and significant questions and have overruled the suggestions and decisions of military and naval officials. The armies, already provided by optimism with a task unexpectedly great, loaded in addition by diplomacy with the burden of a maximum victory, were to be directed (or misdirected) in accordance with the traditions and limitations of democratic decentralization and of party politics.

The handicap to be overcome was in no sense political corruption, venal appointments, or the ordinary jobbery charged against democratic administration. The difficulty was not that the system worked worse in war than ordinarily in peace, but that the system itself was planned for peace and not for war, that no single administrative or political disposition had been made with a view to so great and difficult a crisis. The efficient conduct of the war depended, like the capable performance of any executive task, upon the appointment of able and experienced men, who understood the exact work at hand; they must be allowed wide discretion if they were to correlate their efforts and achieve unity of purpose in essential strategy.

The German system of centralized administration, of secret diplomacy, of military command almost if not quite free from any civilian dictation, made such appointments simple and

already recognized in time of peace as an essential element in government the need of correlation and unity in times of crisis. Provision was therefore made for it. The officers of the army and navy were appointed by permanent officials of state, impervious to social influence, to economic greed, or to personal advantage from the appointment, and the extraordinary extent of the Imperial authority supposedly vested in the Kaiser, and theoretically delegated by him to all of the military and naval officials, made possible the exercise of wide discretion which would necessarily result in the correlation of effort and in unity of purpose. Only the officials themselves need understand the necessity and desirability of those ends. It is no wonder that the political system of Germany made the conduct of the war easy. It had been created for that end and for none other and lacked and still lacks conspicuous qualities deemed by Germans themselves necessary for a satisfactory domestic administration. The political systems of the Allied States were, on the contrary, constructed for peace and for domestic administration, and made either no provision at all for war, or one admittedly inadequate, one necessarily to be changed when the crisis itself appeared. Time was needed, therefore, to effect these changes, and much of the delay of the conduct of the war in England during the first two years was due to the attempt to transform the political and administrative system so as more adequately to meet the crisis.

In England and France the task of finding experienced and able men to conduct the war fell upon the shoulders of the Ministry, composed of men elected because of their personal opinions upon domestic issues. They had not been provided by previous experience with information of the available personnel in the country for the important posts to which they were forced to make appointments. Well they knew that the selection of able and experienced men was essential, but how were they to tell who were able, who were experienced, whose advice they should take? The whole governmental structure provided no satisfactory basis of information as to the ability and experience even of the officers already in the army, to say nothing of the many thousands of new officers and new departmental heads inevitably to be appointed from men without any personal experience at all. Where so few possessed any *a priori* qualifications, the choice of able and experienced men became practically impossible and all appointments necessarily contained much personal bias, much assumption, and very little exact knowledge. It was not to be expected that the Ministries of England and of France would be able to make adequate appointments in the first year of the war.

It was thoroughly to be expected that the permanent German political, military, and administrative staff, trained for fifty years for precisely that exigency, provided by German methods with elaborate information regarding

nearly every man in the Empire for precisely this end, should be able in the first year of the war to choose better and should therefore possess a handicap of real importance, bound to increase Germany's ability to resist and to postpone the victory of the Allies. It was nobody's fault; it was government by democracy in comparison with autocratic, militaristic government. Some errors, however, were exceedingly regrettable. All the skilled workmen in France and England were allowed to go to the front with the first forces, or to enlist, and as a result the whole industrial system was completely disorganized. The preparation for the war in some cases became impossible until the men had been recalled from the army. Then, too, the bravery of the British officers in the first months of the war led them to expose themselves unduly, an opportunity which the Germans were only too prompt to appreciate, and which resulted in a mortality which imposed very great obstacles in the way of the efficient training of the new army. There seems to be no great doubt that one of the serious mistakes made by Great Britain early in the war was the manufacture of an undue amount of shrapnel and the continuation of its manufacture long after it had been demonstrated less effective than high explosives. This, on the other hand, was due to the military heads, not to the civilian chiefs.

The administrative machinery already in existence in England and in France, in the War Department, the Admiralty, and in the Foreign

Office, were consumed with petty jealousies and traditions, which seem to grow up like weeds in such departments in countries committed to peace. There was a lack of the habit of co-operation, a lack of readiness to correlate various services, which only too often reached a definite refusal to co-operate at all. If this was done thus at the War Office, it would not be done thus at the Admiralty. If the Admiralty wanted this, the War Office would find good reason to question it. There was in this nothing surprising, but much that was regrettable. It became necessary to clean the administrative house and to devise new machinery before true progress could be made.

It was almost instantly clear that the co-operation of the entire industrial fabric of both countries, of the entire transportation system, of the railroads and the merchant marines, of the agricultural resources, of the mines, would be absolutely essential to the winning of the war. Yet it was to be brought about by a governmental machinery entirely unaccustomed to such tasks, not provided with the necessary legal authority, and hampered by the strong British tradition of decentralization, of individual initiative, of the right of free competition. Few things had been considered in England better established than the inalienable right of the individual to conduct his business in any fashion he saw fit, to labor or not as he liked, for as long a time as he chose, to make in his business as much profit as he could, to demand and receive such wages as he could

get; to loaf if he liked, to strike if he liked, to discontinue manufacture at all if he preferred. It soon developed that in war-time none of these "rights" could be tolerated. To prevent their exercise, however, from obstructing the prosecution of the war was at once seen to be an administrative and political task of the first magnitude, to be achieved by the existing democratic machinery only with great difficulty.

With all this unaccustomed work to be done, with a decided need for haste and an imperative need for efficiency, the political machinery found itself not only without the legal authority, not only without the administrative tradition of co-operation, but handicapped by the political dictum that the first virtue of democratic government was publicity, that the first duty of a democratic Ministry was to keep the public fully informed of its plans. In France and England the executive held office at the pleasure of the Chamber of Deputies or House of Commons and was by custom compelled to resign after a hostile vote. No money could be spent unless approved nor could it be voted unless the reasons for spending it were detailed. No policy could be adopted which could not be satisfactorily explained to the body to which the Ministry was responsible.

Secrecy became a political crime and the traditional demand for publicity resulted naturally in the complete opportunity for enemy spies to acquire advance information of nearly everything of importance about to transpire. To interfere with the operations of the German Invisible

Army was insuperably difficult. The traditional regard for personal liberty in England and in France, the freedom of the individual from surveillance of any kind by the police or by the authorities, the "rule of law" in England that no man could be held legally responsible for intent to commit a crime and certainly could not be interfered with by the police until he did commit it, hampered greatly the attempts of the British Secret Service to detect and arrest spies. All this made incredibly difficult the creation of any army at all, of anything resembling adequate maintenance, and increased the probability enormously that Germany would be able to meet the Allied efforts with adequate strength, because that foreknowledge essential to the German method of warfare was not difficult to acquire. From the speeches which the leaders themselves were compelled to deliver on public occasions and in the legislative houses much valuable information was necessarily given. But the war could not otherwise be conducted. No one was better aware of the difficulty than the British and French Ministries, but what could be done?

All around them rose frantic cries that democracy must not itself be lost in a war fought for its preservation, that the conduct of the war must not destroy those very liberties which victory was intended to perpetuate. The most obvious problems created by this jealousy for the safety of democracy need not be enumerated, but some of the subtler issues are significant. Both in France and in England very great and natural

fears took possession of the parliamentary parties lest party ascendency and organization be lost in the course of the war. Victory would not be victory, they thought, unless won by the right men. No great experience was required to tell them that the winning of the war would enthrone the successful party for a generation in its control of the parliamentary régime. Each determined to be that party. Those who were in were agreed at all costs to stay in; those who were out decided at all costs to get in. In particular the Radicals and Liberals, already in control in both countries, regarded the accession to power of the Conservatives as a calamity scarcely less serious than the losing of the war.

They realized that at the end of the war the reconstruction of Europe would begin with the rebuilding of each country. Was it to be tolerated that the war should be won for democracy and the reconstruction of England and France then be undertaken by Conservatives as bad as the Tories of the Reform Period, or by the Clericals and Royalists? The war must not only be won, but it must so be won that, at the end of it, right opinion in each country would be in control and the social and economic reconstruction, upon which political parties in both countries were more intent than upon any other issues, should be prosecuted with "adequate" intelligence. Both countries, therefore, started to fight the war with political parties based upon the domestic issues of the past, thoroughly determined to conduct the war with definite regard

for the social and economic war to be instituted at its close.

It is difficult to see how it could have been otherwise. The party in power in each country had been chosen as a result of strong feeling upon economic and agrarian issues. Its attitude toward the Church in France had bulked large; Home Rule in England was even of greater consequence and trade unionism scarcely secondary. Hence the conduct of the war, its diplomacy, the preparations for it, became the natural subject of party politics, far less with the purpose of deciding correctly upon the issues at hand than to preserve the political authority of certain men who, for personal, economic, and social reasons had been put in power. Hence came in England hesitation over the reduction of the amount of liquor produced, over adequate censorship, over the mobilization of labor. A strong wave of adverse opinion in the country would be certainly reflected in the House of Commons and might cause the downfall of the Ministry, a result to be avoided at all costs because they believed the war likely to be short and the probability, therefore, that they might return to power small.

In France, not only did similar issues make the conduct of the war almost insuperably difficult, but the parliamentary practice of interpellation had long been established and made the very existence of the Ministry precarious and any continuity of policy practically impossible. Where in England the Ministry had been ac-

customed to resign only after a defeat upon a question of real moment, the practice in France had been to interpellate it upon any question, however insignificant or unimportant, and, if an adverse vote could then be procured—a matter not commonly difficult, for administrative questions of great detail were ordinarily involved—the Ministry was compelled to resign. Inasmuch as the conduct of so great a war, involving so many administrative issues of difficulty, made it improbable that no mistakes would be committed, the life of Ministries in France has been short and the continuation of able men in power problematical. In both countries, Ministries have felt the public impatient for results, anxious for victory, insistent upon some sort of hope that the war was being won, and that it was being efficiently conducted. The knowledge that such a public opinion permitted their political opponents to create parliamentary crises led to military campaigns conducted for moral effect, battles fought to encourage the people, to keep the government in power, to secure a favorable vote by which some parliamentary crisis might be tided over. All this did not particularly advance the winning of the war and tended naturally to prolong it.

There have been fears, too, in both countries of the increase of executive power. The extensive patronage, placed by the war in the hands of the executive, could be used by one party to the other's detriment, to drive opponents entirely from power and to create for itself an

impregnable political position. Similarly, the party exigencies in both countries, the previous jealousies, the personal antipathies of the leaders made difficult a coalition Government composed of the strongest men. The best that has yet been done, either in France or in England, has been to form a Ministry including some of the strong men of both parties. Issues of domestic polity constantly obtruded themselves into the strategy and conduct of the war as led by the Asquith Ministry in the House of Commons, and votes upon the war were cast on the basis of loyalty to Mr. Asquith or to Mr. Lloyd George, upon previous convictions about Home Rule or the labor unions.

Scarcely less difficult to meet was the definite determination of the laboring men that victory should bring in France and England certain political and economic results favorable to them. They were therefore suspicious of any method of conducting the war which seemed in any degree to render improbable the securing at its close the solution of domestic issues they themselves were eager to procure. The unions possessed representatives in Parliament who voted solidly as instructed by the union leaders; were represented in the War Cabinet by a member whose prime duty it was to see that nothing was done in the conduct of the war to prejudice the case of labor during the war or after its close. They very much complicated the prosecution and the winning of the war. For a while the unions entirely refused to permit the em-

ployment by the Government of non-union labor, declined to work overtime, to work on Sunday—in other words, prevented the utilization of the maximum economic resources of England. After women became commonly employed in the factories, the men insisted that the old rule of less pay should apply and declined to recognize equal pay for equal work. They even fought for a time strenuously against the admission of women in certain types of work. There was again the great jealousy of the skilled laborers against the training of the unskilled. They were afraid that the training of more men would decrease their supremacy and destroy their domination of the trade. In order to retain their monopoly, they proposed to prevent the undertaking of more work than they themselves could perform. This economic decision they registered politically in the House, in the Cabinet, and in the War Council. Only after the greatest difficulty, after the passing of guarantees regarding the period after the war, whose terms have yet to be revealed, was the maximum of Great Britain's economic strength exerted.

On the other hand, the workingmen were ardently in favor of a heavy excess profits' tax upon all manufacturers, favored municipal and public ownership of all public utilities and of transportation, were anxious for a type of land reform likely to change radically agricultural and social conditions in England. It was to be expected, too—and the expected happened—that they would oppose a definite veto to the devising

of any adequate machinery to prevent strikes, walkouts, or to punish any failure to push ahead the great economic program, not because they were unwilling to fight the war, but because of their fear of untoward consequences after the war was over. They had not the slightest intention of winning the war, if the price of victory was to be the loss of their own objectives in British domestic politics and economic reconstruction. However natural, excusable, and explainable all of this attitude was, it was none the less a formidable handicap to prompt action and effective co-operation and certainly prolonged the war.

Very early a decision became manifest in France, in England, and in the United States that victory was not to be won by the executive at the expense of the legislature. The old traditional hostility in these democratic countries to executive authority reappeared with all its old virulence. The legislature again claimed the power and the right of initiative in policy, and wished to treat the executive as nothing better than its servant. Fears were vehemently expressed that the increase of executive authority would destroy the position of the legislature in the state; that the conduct of the war in the way deemed most expedient by the Ministry enabled the executive to escape altogether from the supervision of the elective bodies and would therefore destroy the constitution. The demand for secrecy was roundly opposed and the utmost publicity demanded. Delays were devised in all legislative houses merely to make sure that the

house really did approve of what was being done. Half-measures were passed to prevent adding to the constitutional authority of the executive, and throughout the first two years, both in England and in France, there was a manifest lack of full confidence in the Ministries, apparently due to a suspicion that the extent of executive power demanded was based upon ulterior motives in regard to the relative positions in the state of executive and legislature. It was charged that the Ministry intended to free itself as far as possible from responsibility, political, administrative, and financial. This the majority of the houses determined to resist to the bitter end.

The discretionary authority in regard to military policy and objectives, which the military chiefs at once insisted was essential, was promptly negatived by the political leaders. Victory was not to be won at the expense of the freedom of the army and navy from political and civil control. In England, in France, and the United States this was at once made clear. No antipathy was older in those countries than the jealousy between the military and the civil authorities; no constitutional tradition was better established than the necessary control of the former by the latter. In conformity with it, the Ministries in both countries insisted upon exercising the power of appointment, whenever their opinion differed from that of the military heads. The military objectives they also insisted upon choosing in accordance with political and diplomatic considerations; their right to veto all

plans and movements by the military authorities still exists; the right of constant supervision was not only insisted upon, but persistently exercised. Political observers were appointed to accompany the army to see what took place. The war should not be conducted in such a manner that at its close the army should hold a constitutional position inconsistent in a democratic state. Better far to lose the war than to create a militaristic state in order to win it. So argued great numbers of men in England and France in the first two years of the war and so a great many still argue in the United States.

A very considerable minority of the community, if not a majority, was, moreover, anxious in all countries that the war should not be conducted to the detriment of individual liberty, of freedom of speech and of the press. In France the executive was able to meet this difficulty far more promptly and more adequately than in England, but difficulties are still to be met in all countries. The legislatures were chary to sacrifice the right of trial of all individuals before the ordinary courts, declined to confer upon the Government discretion regarding political crimes. German spies have been tried in the United States in the ordinary courts for arson, incendiarism, placing of bombs, and have been fined or awarded short terms in prison instead of being shot as they deserved—all in accordance with the good old democratic maxim that it were better that ninety-nine should escape than that one innocent man should be shot. Effective control by

the executive and military authorities of civilians has also been difficult to obtain, and in the way of its adequate exercise almost insuperable difficulties are still placed.

Very great trouble was experienced early in the war in securing the necessary degree of co-operation between the Allied armies, partly because of the differences in diplomatic and national purpose already discussed, partly because the Allies lacked any sort of central organization responsible for the conduct of the war. They lacked any central military council with power to act and the right to take the initiative. Political and diplomatic objections to the creation of such a board were at the outbreak of the war insuperable and are still considered by many of the leading statesmen in England, France, and the United States to be very great. What is needed is a central council with power to act, not merely power to suggest; with power to create and dictate a campaign to all the Allied armies; power then to conduct it, free from all interference by the political organizations. Mr. Lloyd George declared himself against conferring the initiative and the power to act. The most Great Britain was willing to allow was a council with power to suggest, and such a council was created in the late autumn of 1917, although an advisory body had existed before. Co-operation between the different parts of the British Empire was also at the beginning of the war difficult, due to its anomalous and peculiar constitution or lack of constitution. The creation

of the Imperial War Council was an attempt to solve this problem, and it has in the main been strikingly successful.

Real delays from these political and administrative sources are over in England and in the United States. The troubles of the British Empire are in all probability solved. In France the difficulties are still great, but to a large extent solutions seem to have been found. At the same time, any one who will honestly study the history of the war and of the countries engaged in it thus far will find it hard to see how any better solutions could have been devised, or how any prompter release from these shackles could have been had. Democracy is self-government and demands that the overwhelming majority of the people should be convinced of the expediency of important action. It takes time to reassure so many people. Moreover, if we have real faith in democracy as a form of government, if our protests against militarism are truly sincere, we must adapt democracy to the crisis, not destroy it.

None the less, the solution of the administrative and political difficulties in England was sufficiently sweeping. First, the party system was practically abrogated for the duration of the war. Next, the responsibility of the Cabinet to the House of Commons was to all intents and purposes abolished. It was then deemed imperative that the House should renounce the old right to vote money only for specific purposes, in specific sums, and for reasons already explained. Votes were authorized of indefinite

sums to be spent at the Ministry's discretion. Finally, the Cabinet itself was practically deprived of the control of the war, relegated to the conduct of affairs in England, and a War Cabinet created with almost dictatorial powers. Thus far this solution has worked well. In France no solution has as yet been found for the instability of the Ministry, no grant of discretionary authority of any extent has yet been made to them. They are still compelled to report, to explain, to receive directions, and are forced to resign if on any of these counts the Chamber votes adversely.

In the United States the solution was not only excellent, but unexpectedly prompt. It was based upon the fact that the Constitution grants the entire executive power to the President in person. He is allowed or required to appoint such advisers for such purposes and in such ways as he sees fit. He himself must act, but he may act in any way or on the advice of any men he may choose. Promptly President Wilson constructed a new administration of so-called committees and boards, composed of exceedingly able men, entirely apart from and outside of the ordinary administrative departments, and freed therefore from all of the old routine and traditions. The President was constitutionally free to take the advice of these new boards and was not required to submit such matters to the departmental heads. No ministry yet in power, either in France or in England, has the confidence of either country to the extent that President

Wilson possesses that of the American people. The force of public opinion behind him, the known approbation by the people of his policies and their willingness to trust in his discretion and in his rectitude, not only enabled him to create these new boards, to subject to them the older departments, to conquer and dragoon Congress, always reluctant and suspicious of executive authority, but also to secure the recognition of the authority of these new boards and committees from the country at large. Manufacturers, railroads, steamship lines, willingly accepted authority which they were not required legally to recognize, and performed services at a sacrifice to themselves which they were legally empowered to refuse. Constitutional questions were involved in the assumption of the direction of the railroads and in the order of the Fuel Administrator suspending all work east of the Mississippi, which in earlier years and under other circumstances would have resulted in a temporary nullification of the law by a prompt appeal to the courts on the constitutionality of the authority. As it was, the acquiescence of the country was immediate and unanimous.

There will be no serious delays in the United States due to the inadequacy of administrative machinery or the influence of politics.[1] The

[1] The agitation in Congress in January, 1918, in regard to the inefficient conduct of the war seems to have had no satisfactory basis. For a time it seemed as if the Republican party meant to create a partisan issue in order to hamper the Administration, but those who read events thus were either wrong or the leaders changed their minds.

President has been great enough to appoint the ablest men he could find, regardless of previous party affiliation and to an extent far greater than has yet been proved possible in England or France. As Lord Northcliffe informed his countrymen, the United States had dealt conclusively and adequately with problems over which they were still bickering and bungling in Great Britain. America, supposedly the least efficient of all the democratic Governments, proved herself in this moment of crisis more capable of rapid and adequate transformation than any European state.

XIV

PROBABILITY OF GERMAN ECONOMIC EXHAUSTION

NO prediction was more confidently believed, none thus far more conclusively disproved, than that the non-military weapons of the Allies could win the war despite the German effort to counterbalance them and without anything more than indirect assistance from the Allied army. Prominent in the first rank of fallacies stood the expectation of the economic exhaustion of Germany and her allies. They would be unable to feed one another; their supply of raw materials necessary for the prosecution of the war would give out and could not be replaced; adequate production to support the war would not be possible without keeping men in the factory who were needed in the army. If the economic interdependence of the world was true, how could a few countries be isolated and still survive? If no countries any longer expected to be self-sufficing in the medieval sense, if the German economic fabric was, as the Germans themselves declared, utterly dependent for prosperity and existence upon easy access to the markets of the world, could not that fabric be ruined by foreclosing it

access to the world's markets? The logic seemed good. Perhaps nothing in the whole course of the war so surprised many observers in Great Britain, France, and America than the failure of this logic to be proved true. The fact that so many people implicitly believed in it for so many years, the fact, indeed, that so many still believe in it as a method by which the war may be won, makes the discussion of this point exceedingly important. Nothing has been more potent in postponing Allied victory than the expectation that it need not be won in the field.

The secret of the difficulty most people seem to have experienced was due to their assumption that economic exhaustion was positive and implied a very great degree of necessity for things hitherto used. They should have remembered that it was entirely relative, dependent not upon what people had, but on what they could not and would not get along *without*. Needless to say there was a very great distinction between a lack of certain kinds of food, a bad distribution of food, the inability to eat as much food as people had been accustomed to have, the necessity of eating foods other than they usually had bought, of eating food which they ordinarily had rejected, of eating less food than they wished to have, and that long line of fine discriminations which begins with the eating of less food than they might well have and ends with malnutrition and actual starvation. Starvation, too, means death—not merely discomfort or suffering. Economic exhaustion of a people is not reached when

people are literally dying in large numbers, but when they surrender because they are dying in large numbers. The surrender of Germany was what the people of the Allied countries desired and expected, and, unless the economic shortage reached the point which made the Germans prefer surrender to the continued discomfort, it could not avail to decide the issue of the war.

Apparently there were not many who seriously thought that anything more than a very great shortage of food, much inconvenience, some discomfort for many, suffering for a few, death for the old and infirm, could have been brought about in Germany. This seems to be the maximum possible suffering anticipated by the Allies. Did it not, therefore, rest upon the assumption that, long before the economic exhaustion caused death for many people or even discomfort, the population would revolt against the war, overturn the Government, and make peace on any terms which would give them bread? But suppose the Germans did what the people of Paris did in 1870, what people in countless sieges had done before—suffer! No amount of suffering or death which they were willing to endure would end the war in favor of the Allies! Indeed, the essential element in the equation was really not the scarcity of food in Germany, however great that might be, but the strength of German belief in the rightness of the war and the readiness of Germans to suffer for it. If they honestly believed the war to be defensive, that the liberty of the Fatherland from foreign domination was at stake, that the

Kaiser was a true patriot and Hindenburg an inspired leader, would they not be ready to experience a very great degree of privation rather than surrender? And if they did not surrender, of what avail to the Allies would be the distress? Indeed, the existence of suffering was not the important thing; it was the effect of it upon the German people.

The argument about ending the war by economic exhaustion really depended, therefore, not upon economic, but upon moral factors: upon the belief that the German people were not honestly behind the war, that they had been hoodwinked into supporting it, dragooned and thrust into the trenches, driven to death like dumb cattle by their military leaders. From this compliance with unjust demands, the suffering would rouse them, waken them in very truth, and cause them to demand the end of the war. Hence this extraordinary interest in Allied countries in those who spoke for peace in Germany on whatever terms or for whatever purpose. They saw in it the beginning of the end, the rising of the German people against intolerable conditions, the progress of economic exhaustion. The argument, therefore, was not a mathematical calculation about supplies of food and the adequacy of the blockade, but the method by which certain moral facts could be brought home to the German people, or rather the method by which the German people could be made conscious of the moral beliefs which they themselves already possessed. But suppose

this analysis was wrong, suppose that the German people had not been hoodwinked, that they did honestly believe in the war and in its necessity. Then they would co-operate with their Government, go on short rations, and submit to discipline of all sorts and kinds in order that the intention of their enemies might be thwarted. And if they should do this would they not thwart it? Would not the tightening of the blockade intensify their determination?

Once more, the important fact was not what the people had been accustomed to have, nor yet what they would like to have, but what they were willing and able to do without. The Germans in this generation have, to be sure, not been accustomed to privation, but there are few of the older people alive who do not remember a time before 1870 when they got along very comfortably on what is now in Germany looked upon as privation. Distinguished men have declared that they remember when rye bread once a day was their entire food. Nor is an abundance of food, clothing, and fuel as old in Germany as in Great Britain and America. Prosperity in the Central Empires is a very recent thing. For them it is easier than for us to bear comparative privation. They, too, are more determined than we should be not to return to it because they are better aware of what it means, better able to realize that it may become necessary. Even supposing, therefore, that the economic distress in Germany should reach the point expected by the Allies, it would not *necessarily* end the war.

But the scarcity seems never to have reached that point. To have attained it the blockade must have been literally tight. There should have been no leaks through neutral countries. Evidently, too, the calculation left out of account the discovery of efficient substitutes and presumed a comparative lack of adaptability in the German economic fabric, a certain lack of resourcefulness among German scientists. While the blockade has proved far more adequate than the Germans originally expected, it has not been nearly as conclusive as was necessary. Enormous quantities of things indispensable to the conduct of the war have passed through Holland and Scandinavia. Many substitutes entirely adequate were discovered by German scientists, and some materials, hitherto imported in large quantities, will never be imported again. Ways of getting along without others were discovered. Worst of all for the Allies, new resources were added to those of the Central Empires. The conquests of Poland and of Rumania, of Serbia, and now the plains of Italy, placed in German control, as in the oil-wells of Rumania, an adequate supply of a raw material she previously lacked. No doubt much inconvenience to the Germans resulted from the blockade. They were driven to dispense with butter, sugar, milk, cocoa, chocolate, and coffee; few were able to eat those prodigious meals to which they had become accustomed or to consume such amounts of fat as most Germans had; but real discomfort and real suffering did not become widespread. The problem

that for some years the interference of the Government, both in production and in distribution, may be essential not only in the Central Empires, but in Allied nations.

We must, therefore, renounce any idea that the war will end as a result of the economic collapse of the Central Empires on the score of food or raw materials. Certainly, now that Russia is about to fall into Germany's hands, whether by means of a separate peace, or by the penetration of Russia by the Invisible Army, that possibility fades into insignificance. Food, of course, the Germans might get along without, but guns can scarcely be created without iron, and the importance, therefore, to the Germans of supplies from Russia and Scandinavia can scarcely be exaggerated. Rumanian and Russian oil, again, is an asset of the first consequence. From Turkey and Mesopotamia can come in time all the cotton that the Central Empires can use, the one raw material of real consequence for which a substitute has not been devised. A considerable accession of war material was also captured from the Italians which will be immediately useful to the Germans and a corresponding loss to the Allies.

If all this is true, the campaign on the West Front must be no longer fought on the assumption that time is of no consequence, that the resources of the Allies in men and material are exhaustless, and that those of Germany are limited. Still less must the campaign be conducted with the idea so prevalent early in the

war that a military victory was unessential because the economic victory was so sure. But these conjectures vitally affect calculations regarding the length of the campaign possible in France, the amount of men and material that the Allies can afford to pay for the recovery of that territory, and the type of attack which it is possible for the Allies to deliver against the Germans without weakening themselves more than is expedient.

The present issue between the Allies and the Central Empires, indeed, is not that of exhaustion or the blockade, but their relative ability to continue that type and degree of production essential to maintain the war. More and more the conflict is becoming a test of the comparative efficiency of administrative and industrial machinery; the extent to which co-operation can be perfected and friction and delay avoided; the ability of one Government or the other to foresee for long periods in advance what the economic necessities of the army will be, and to provide the machinery to manufacture them. Here the Germans rely upon what has been often regarded their greatest asset, the efficiency and adequacy, the elaborate correlation and interrelation of their economic fabric, a structure they have been building with a view to this exact contingency for something like half a century. The Allies, unfortunately, are compelled to rely upon one largely extemporized for the crisis, one produced with astonishing speed, and, considering all obstacles which had

to be overcome, a marvel of ingenuity and efficiency. Undoubtedly the greater resources are those of the Allies, both in material and in men, and no one familiar with the English, French, or American people will believe for a moment that they will not be adequate in this crisis. But the continuity and intensity of their efforts must not be in the least affected by false expectations of the economic collapse of Germany. It is entirely possible that Germany may suddenly crack and break, but, until the event occurs, we shall scarcely be wise to make our dispositions in expectation of it, as too many arrangements unfortunately were made in the first years of the war. Continuous and efficient production is essential to victory, and the British and American people cannot realize that fact too promptly and too definitely.

XV

PROBABILITY OF DEMOCRATIC REVOLT IN GERMANY

THERE are few facts in the intellectual history of the war so striking as the extent to which it has led men to deny the validity of conclusions about history and political science universally accepted in 1914. German professors of all ranks and kinds have repeatedly stultified themselves by announcing propositions about the war which were elaborately demonstrated false by the very books on which their own reputations were based. In Allied countries, too, a great shift in opinion has taken place, and on no subject more than upon German history and the attitude of the German people toward democracy.

There is perhaps no question upon which it is as important to reach an intelligent conclusion, because our decision will in large measure govern our attitude toward the prosecution of the war itself, the character of the settlement which must be achieved, and the expectation of assistance from the German people themselves in the ending of the war and in the securing of that

reorganization. All conclusions depend upon premises, and the great danger is that we shall prove our conclusion infallible by the simple expedient of assuming it as our premise. It is hard to see what test we can apply to this democratic issue, if we do not judge it in the light of what was universally agreed to be true by historians and students of political science before the war, not only in Germany, but in all other countries, and, so far as Germany and German democracy are concerned, demonstrated by evidence vast in amount and of high authority. If this evidence be not valid, we have nothing better to substitute for it.

There is little use in supposing that the probability of democratic revolt in Germany can be determined by an exposition of facts in regard to the lack of democracy in Germany, or to the belief of the Germans as to what democracy ought to be. The vital fact to establish is whether the Germans attach the same value to democracy the Allies do. The second vital fact to demonstrate is whether they are willing to believe that the anxiety of the Allies to bring liberty and democracy to them, to free them from the incubus of Kaiser, empire, and militarism, is literally as disinterested as it professes to be. What the German people do believe, not what they ought to believe, will be the vital thing. What they think the facts are will be of greater importance than what the truth is. Indeed, the more we study history the more we come to realize that the vital force is not the

truth as later generations see it, but what men then alive believed it to be. Those impulses which result in action are the important things to study if we are to understand why men undertake great movements.

In assuming that this democratic appeal to the German people would be irresistible, Allied statesmen supposed that the political alignment in Germany, as in England, France, and the United States, made the issue of individual freedom and the control of domestic politics paramount. They took for granted the existence of a political and international independence long regarded as unassailable, not only by themselves, but by their enemies, and treated constitutional issues as if there was only one problem to be solved, that of political and administrative convenience. The German invariably approaches such questions from a different angle, and sees in them not only administrative convenience, but also the definite relation of the form of government to national independence and international status. The problem of Federal and Imperial government is therefore not commonly regarded by the majority of Germans as a constitutional or a domestic issue *per se*, one between liberalism and conservatism, between democracy and reaction, between the independence of the individual and the existence of a militaristic state. The imperial issue is an international question, a choice between freedom as a nation and subjection to foreign influence, between integrity and partition, between the

decision of German issues upon the basis of German interests or upon the basis of Russian, French, and British influence.

The Empire is not democratic, and few Germans think it is; still less was it a constitution satisfactory to the great majority at the time it was made; Bismarck scarcely thought of it as a constitutional device at all. It was an international alliance between Prussia and the South German states, which should create a means of common action sufficiently powerful to maintain the alliance in the teeth of the expected opposition from foreign powers. Unity, secrecy, the correlation of power, the ability to decide quickly and act promptly, these were essential, and to them all democratic theory and individual convenience were ruthlessly sacrificed. The great object was a literal international independence of all other powers. Its necessity was to them clear. Why, too, had it not been attained before? Because Germany had not been united. The attempt to settle local German issues in a particular way had enabled foreign countries, for the most part, to settle them in accordance with their own convenience rather than in accordance with German interests. It became, therefore, for a time necessary to sacrifice local issues, to bury the hatred of South Germany and Prussia, to postpone political reforms until the great sore, open for five hundred years, could be closed and healed.

This became the object of German patriotism—to put the Fatherland first and all state, indi-

vidual, and local interests far in the distance; to place international independence, national strength, diplomatic supremacy first, and to make everything else wait upon their achievement. Democracy was thus swept to one side as a necessary obstacle in the way of international independence, not because it was not good, nor yet because the Germans would not like to have it, still less because they do not believe it desirable, but because they did not believe it could be attained until the question of international independence had been definitely settled in their favor. They expect this to be achieved during the war. They claim that they will then welcome democracy with open arms.

The second difficulty, which was experienced in Allied countries and which led people to suppose that the democratic appeal to the German people would be irresistible and cause a revolt against the constituted authority during the war, lay in their analysis of the German people. It assumed that they have not yet fully understood democracy, have been deceived and hoodwinked by the military class, kept perhaps in forcible subjection, certainly educated in false ideas about the world and about other countries and their intentions. Such a view maintains that the Germans only need to learn what the truth is to espouse it. Reduced to lowest terms, it means that the attitude of the German people toward the war is not based on honest conviction and a study of the real facts; that they do not believe in war, in brutality, in conquest; that they agree

fundamentally with the Allies and have merely to be told what the situation is to throw aside militarism and imperialism with horror.

I have never known a German or heard of one who could listen to this sort of an analysis of German character with patience. The Germans vehemently deny that they need to learn from the Allies what democracy ought to be. They insist that there has never been a country where the love of pure and theoretical democracy was greater than it has been in Germany. They explain earnestly that German unity itself was postponed primarily because of the uncompromising refusal of liberals and democrats to accept anything less than the full measure of democracy and because of their disdainful refusal of any compromise which the international situation made possible of attainment. The chief problem of the Empire and of the Prussian state since 1870 has been the irreconcilable attitude of the strong democratic popular minority. Few Germans theoretically object to the propositions about political reform in Prussia and in the Empire upon which Allied authorities lay so much stress. The Prussian three-class system, oral voting, the present apportionment of seats in the Imperial Reichstag, most of them consider undesirable international expedients. They would prefer a real responsibility of the Ministry to the popular chambers, an accountability for finance as in England, a complete initiative in legislation possessed by the lower and popular chambers, but they have hitherto agreed that

until the foreign issues were settled such reforms could not safely be introduced without weakening the aggressive strength of the Empire.

If Germans are certain that the form of government is to be decided with relation to international issues, if they are sure that they themselves understand and appreciate democracy, they are no less convinced that they understand why Germany is not already democratic, why the Empire is still an anomaly, a diplomatic and international expedient instead of a real constitution. The attitude of the Allies themselves and their own policies toward Germany is the reason. For centuries they prevented the formation in Germany of a strong central government and did their best to keep the country weak and disunited. Stein, therefore, found in Germany and Prussia at the beginning of the nineteenth century feudalistic survivals and particularistic vested interests which strong government in England and France had long ago swept away. They were embedded, however, in tradition and in law. To get rid of their cramping and fettering influence it was necessary to make the state superior to the individual, to ride rough-shod over vested rights and feudal privileges, to sweep away prescriptions and charters, and thus clear the ground for the development of the country. To have taken a majority vote upon the abolition of such privileges would have defeated all reform. Here began the doctrine of force as a necessary element in the construction of the state, the doctrine of the superior obligation

of the interests of the state over those of the individual, the beginning of ruthlessness, of *Schrecklichkeit*.

When Bismarck came to study the situation and saw the helplessness of Germany and of Prussia in Europe he found that international situation which seemed to him so intolerable recognized and consecrated by many treaties and agreements. To accept the English and French view of the obligation of international law was to agree, he felt, that they possessed a prescriptive right to interfere in German domestic politics upon such considerations as seemed good to them. This was to recognize that real international independence for Germany could not be secured. Such a conclusion was impossible and intolerable. Independence must be attained, but it could be had only by force, by the abolition of the old agreements, by breaking treaties, by denying that any past agreement could give any country a vested right to interfere with German interests or German politics. To expect the other powers to consent, to suppose that they would not do their best to interfere with any change in the old arrangement, was idle. All their relations with one another depended upon their ability to control Germany between them, their ability to keep Germany weak. Such an issue could be solved only by "blood and iron."

The importance and accuracy of this logic must be demonstrated to the people at large, Bismarck saw, because the degree to which they would accept it would become a necessary and

significant part of the ability of the state to act in the maintenance of the new international independence won in 1870. The state, therefore, undertook a definite propaganda about German history in schools and universities, and had German history in the light of this view written by such men as Treitschke, Von Sybel, Delbrück, and others. German literature became impregnated by it; the atmosphere of German life reflected and very soon absorbed it. For it, an intellectual background already existed in the admiration of German literature, of the German language, of the supremacy already accorded German scholarship in science, philology, history, and the like. Such an intellectual background made the movement for Deutschtum convincing to the German people and proved to them that literal political and international independence for Germany was an axiom because Germany was a nation at least the equal of any and the superior of most.

To this end the great movements in German history were depicted and analyzed—the blood and slaughter of the later Reformation period; the wasting of Germany during the Thirty Years' War, when the French and the Swedes harried the land until the exhausted states agreed to pay the price they were determined to exact; the vassalage of Germany to Austria in the interest of Europe during the eighteenth century; the humiliation of Prussia by Napoleon; the control of Germany by the Metternich system, and the constant interference during the

nineteenth century of England, France, and Russia under cover of the Treaty of Vienna. In particular, the opposition of the early liberal movement to German unity was developed and thrown into strong relief. The German people were taught that democracy was synonymous with weakness, with subjection to foreigners, with opposition to a strong, active state able to raise an efficient army.

How may we expect them to react to the offer of democracy by the Allies in the light of these beliefs and premises? They see in the present war an attempt to restore the old condition of affairs before 1870. Call it liberty, democracy, freedom, by any name it spells to the German virtual conquest and the dictation of German international and domestic politics from London, Paris, and Petrograd. They are sure, too, that the origin of the war is easily explained by the tradition of German history; that the desire to introduce democracy and thus restore the old, decentralized, amorphous government is exactly the policy France and Great Britain followed for two centuries and more. Are not the Allies obligingly frank in the disclosure of their purpose? Do not prime ministers, novelists, poets, and journalists insist that militarism in Germany must be abolished and the Hohenzollerns dethroned so that the menace of German strength may be destroyed? They believe the Allies inveigh against the Empire precisely because it is capable of initiating and directing a great war in the defense of Deutschtum. They deride

the Allied orators who shout with one breath for democracy and freedom and in the next proclaim their fear of Germany, of German strength, ability, determination to be free. Do they not inform the German people in season and out of season that they are to be freed by the war from kings, kaisers, and militarism and be given democracy, liberty—and weakness?

The German official and military class, and the bulk of the intellectual class as well, have never been slow to follow the lead of Bismarck and stigmatize as traitors to Deutschtum those political parties and all their adherents by whatever name or creed willing to sacrifice ever so little of international prestige for administrative efficiency in the interest of democracy and electoral reform. Such electoral changes would make considerable alterations in the unity and strength of the Government highly probable. The Germans admit with grief and rage that for generations the best allies of the foreigners were the Germans themselves. Germany was conquered always and held in subjection by and with the aid of Germans; it were otherwise impossible. Such conquests must be made impossible in the future. No German must be tolerated who would for a moment countenance co-operation of any sort, kind, or degree with the foreigner. Hence there has been since 1860 scant patience in Germany with those who do not place first national integrity and prestige, and who are not willing to sacrifice to it all present administrative convenience and all theo-

retical considerations. The majority consider all others not enlightened men, but fools; not liberals, but traitors.

When, therefore, the Allies hold that the Social Democrats and the Socialists will bring about a democratic revolt in Germany which will cripple the Government in the prosecution of the war they are leaning upon a broken reed. If our knowledge of Germany before the war is of the slightest validity or accuracy, on German issues—on the question of domestic reform, the desirability of democracy, the necessity of a reapportionment of seats—there has been and still is an overwhelming favorable majority. These men form the strength of the Social Democrats of which party the Socialists pure and simple are only a minority. But the slogan of the party is not political reform at all costs, but political reform without injury to the diplomatic and international settlement of Bismarck. The Empire and international independence are to come first and reform is to follow after they have been made safe.

The only debate, therefore, in Germany has been whether the moment for reform had come, whether it was not now possible without danger to the international position of the Empire to undertake it. At times there have been differences of opinion and large majorities have voted that the moment was propitious, only to be later convinced by messages from the authorities that they had made a mistake. They have wished to take no chances and propose to adopt

no reforms which might conceivably hamper the state in the prosecution of a war. The probability, therefore, is unfortunately slight that a majority can be found in Germany during the war for the adoption of those precise measures which all have long agreed would most decidedly weaken the state and prevent the adequate prosecution of the war. The issue of domestic reform or a united front to the foreigner is so old in Germany, now so well identified with Bismarck, the Old Emperor, the success of the Empire, and the prosperity of modern Germany that it is to be feared that those who believe democratic revolt in Germany possible against such influences, reach their conclusion by virtue of the strength of their desire to believe it.

Nor is it probable that the jealousy of Prussia in the South German states will lead them to revolt against the Empire and institute a new and democratic régime. The fact seems to be that the real opponents of democratic reforms in the Empire have not been the Prussians, but the South Germans themselves. To reapportion the seats in the Reichstag would decrease enormously the influence of the smaller states. To make the Ministry and Chancellor responsible to the Reichstag would destroy the power of the Bundesrat, and therefore the control of German politics by the states, and put it into the hands of a legislative body controlled beyond all hope of change by the numerical superiority of the Prussian delegation. It has long been agreed by the Germans that such changes would destroy the sov-

ereignty of the small states, mediatize their princes, and practically merge the states themselves in the political system of Prussia. The appointment of the Bavarian Prime Minister as Chancellor was made in all probability to placate this very opposition and to guarantee that the Imperial promises of reform in Prussia would not lead to changes in the Empire detrimental to the autonomy of the small states.

There has also been in Germany a large and influential section of the Liberal and Democratic wing which has held with Bismarck that German democracy cannot be necessarily of the English, French, or American pattern. It must be indigenous and must grow out of German traditions and German expedients. To suppose that a responsible Ministry of the English type would work well in the Empire is to close one's eyes to the difficulties which France, Italy, and Spain have experienced in the attempt to transplant the English system. Presidential democracy of the American type the Germans have regarded impossible. In any case the real strength of English and American democracy comes from the fact that the central legislative body always represents local entities of prime administrative importance. There the democratic, elective system is an essential part of any government. This is not true in Germany, where ordinary every-day affairs would go on very well without any elective machinery at all, where the real administration is monarchical and not democratic, executive and not legislative in character, where

the real work is done by a permanent organization of paid officials, appointed during good behavior on the basis of rigid examinations and strict civil service regulations. The Germans have felt that the best English and American authorities were right—democracy of the Anglo-Saxon pattern is a type of government which must grow from below and cannot be imposed from above; that it certainly is not the kind of government which can be successfully imposed by external influence upon a people whose traditions are hostile. Democracy cannot come from above. Still less, the Germans hold, can it satisfactorily come from *without*.

The keynote of democracy is self-government, not government by others, the decision by each nation of the way in which its affairs shall be conducted; not the attempt of one nation to decide the expedient form of government for another. Its imposition by force or by treaty upon an unwilling people, who had not of their own initiative adopted it, would be a logical absurdity and a moral crime against the very theory of democracy itself. For the Allies, therefore, to talk of the necessity of deposing the Hohenzollerns by force and dissolving the Empire as a precedent condition of any treaty with Germany, is to commit a democratic inconsistency so absurd as to demonstrate to the Germans that the Allies intend to use democracy, not to produce administrative results for the Germans, but in order to change the international status of Germany in their own favor. No doubt this

is "one of those truths as is the whole truth and a little left over," but it is idle for the Allies to protest against it and declare their entire innocence of aggression, their very real disinterest and desire to promote future German happiness. Unless the Germans accept those protestations at face value there will certainly be no democratic revolt, unless one undertaken, like the hypocritical restoration of the Bourbons in France in 1814, to strengthen the international position of the Empire.

The importance of these conclusions about the German people to all thinking about the origin of the war, about its prosecution, and its conclusion, is entirely beyond the power of exaggeration. It is impossible to suppose in the face of such traditions that the Germans are really deceived and hoodwinked by the Kaiser and the military class. That the Kaiser and the military class are entirely wrong I firmly believe, but I also see that the Germans believe them to be right, that the people are honestly in the war, that they mean to fight it to the bitter end and regard their tactics of aggression, of ruthlessness, of calculated brutality as thrust upon them by the covetousness and greed of the Allies. They glory in the ethics of Pan-Germanism and are sure the war has proved the expediency of the political dictum which put the state above the individual and which banished ethics, morality, and "phrases about humanity" from intelligent statecraft. It is idle to fight the war with the idea of converting the Germans. It is idle to sign a

treaty of peace with the idea of changing German government so that the aggressive use of German strength will become impossible. The Germans, if they wish, can use democracy as well as any other form of government to that end. No doubt their logic is absurd and their interpretation of history wrong, their ascription of motives to the Allies false; but for all that they believe them to be true, and what they believe is of vastly more consequence to the prosecution of the war and to its ending than the truth itself. To conduct the war on the basis of any other notion of the German people, to frame peace with any other idea of their attitude toward the Allies and toward democracy, is to risk the loss of the victory after it is won.

XVI

THE SOLIDARITY OF CENTRAL EUROPE

THE attitude of the allies of Germany toward her during the war and after the conclusion of peace was seen at the outset to be one of the most significant elements in a complex situation. If they were convinced of the mutuality of political and economic interests, if they really believed in the desirability and expediency of the Pan-Germanic Confederation, accepted it as necessary for defense, and regarded economic cooperation as essential to adequate commercial development, then the military task before the Allied armies would be great indeed. Moreover, only a decision upon this question could in last resort determine the extent of the military victory which the Allies must win. No very long or elaborate consideration was needed to convince the Allies of the expediency and desirability of a war directed explicitly against German autocracy and militarism. Formally and officially the German people were separated from the Kaiser and the army, and a distinction no less important maintained between Germany and her allies in hope of separating the latter from her during the

war and after it. Indeed, to conquer Germany with the help of the German people and of her present allies would be one sort of a military and political problem. To conquer the German army and bureaucracy, supported and sustained loyally by the German people and their present allies, would be a very different task. The magnitude of the undertaking involved in the subjugation of Germany, *and* Austria, *and* Hungary, *and* the Balkans, *and* Turkey, gave pause to the most confident and optimistic. Some sort of conclusion on these significant questions of loyalty in the Central Empires would also determine many problems of peace. One sort of a settlement would definitely guard the Allies against the hostility of an unrepentant Germany, separated from Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, and Turkey. Quite another settlement must be evolved to render them safe from the continued enmity of the entire group of powers fighting under the German banner. The estimate of the present and future solidarity of Mittel-Europa became an element in the diplomatic and military situation second only in importance to the estimate of the German people.

Indeed, such a reconstruction of the German and Austrian Empires as the Allies at once declared desirable was so thorough and sweeping as to presuppose the use of other forces than armies for its creation and maintenance. The Allied statesmen concluded it to be already the literal aim and ambition of the peoples of the Central Empires themselves who had hitherto

been thwarted in its achievement by artificial hindrances and fortuitous circumstances. Naturally, the true basis of such a belief was the entire lack of organic strength in the German and Austrian Empires. They were shells, artificial structures, weak in foundation and in the middle story. The shock of war might well topple them over and resolve the fabric into its elements which would prefer, if left to themselves, to combine in other ways. The Allies, therefore, did not intend, as the statesmen of the Central Empires promptly charged, to effect such a reorganization at the point of the sword. They looked upon it as the true ambition of the peoples themselves which nothing but the incubus of army and bureaucracy had hitherto thwarted.

They pointed to the admitted lack of racial unity in Austria and in Hungary, to the lack of a consensus of opinion in favor of the continuance of the form of central government as it had existed since 1867. Nor were the German and Austrian Empires geographical entities; neither was the result of normal political association; both were created in the past as the result of feudal relationships, of conquest, of marriage and inheritance. This was the result of the overlordship of the old Holy Roman Empire; that of the election of the Archduke of Austria as King of Hungary; the other he acquired by election as King of Bohemia, arrogated by prescription into a hereditary right of succession. Germany, moreover, was definitely established to be

the result of the purchase of Brandenburg by the Hohenzollerns, of the inheritance by that royal house of Prussia and of Cleves and Julich, of the conquest of Poland in the eighteenth century, of the diplomatic annexation of Saxony in 1814, of the conquest of Hanover and other North German states in 1866, of Alsace in 1870. The final adhesion of the South German states to the Empire in 1871 was effected by the military power of Prussia and by the diplomatic pressure exerted by Bismarck through his knowledge of their negotiations with Napoleon III. Here, therefore, were two artificial aggregates, created by force and craft, by diplomacy and the accident of marriage, with nothing better than a tardy acquiescence on the part of the population. The existing governments were in no sense the evolution of popular will. Their strength had lain, like that of the old Roman Empire, in the excellent local government carried on by the bureaucracy, in the official educational system which had taught the people the official interpretation of history and of necessity in politics, in the excellence of the old Roman law.

The Allies, therefore, did not desire to reorganize Germany, Austria, or Hungary at the point of the sword. They wished by the sword to remove the tyranny which had so long imposed uncongenial expedients upon the people of those empires. They would provide an opportunity for the people themselves to adopt that form of political association most agreeable to them, and would make possible the abolition of

that political connection which had never had real roots in national sentiment or local interests. The Allied statesmen, however, naturally assumed that the normal reaction of the people, when they should attain freedom of choice, would lead them to espouse that sort of democracy and liberty already established in Great Britain, France, and the United States. That they would not so elect, that they would vote to continue the old system, was scouted during the first years of the war by all British and French observers who had resided any length of time in Austria or in the Balkans. The Allies had only the kaisers and the military minority to fight, the people could be depended upon to spurn their authority at that identical instant when protection from the Allies could be assured them. A defeat of the Germans in France would thus precipitate the deluge in Austria, Hungary, and the Balkans. Upon this supposition the war was begun and to that end was prosecuted for over three years.

It is vital to study its history with the realization that the Allied strategy of victory assumed a positive certainty of internal assistance from the Central Empires which at once made futile and inexpedient any military movements in the Balkans beyond demonstrations in force, beyond the creation of armies ready promptly to assist the southern Slavs once they had revolted. To undertake an elaborate offensive campaign from Saloniki would be to raise that very issue of the literal defense of Austria-Hungary against foreign

invasion which seemed to statesmen in London and Paris the one eventuality which might turn the expected disloyalty into a grudging but effective co-operation with the monarchy. The calculations upon which victory rested were once more not military, but diplomatic and political, and involved opinions and conclusions regarding the imponderables, whose accuracy could not in the nature of things be commensurate with their importance. Moreover, any error in these assumptions would as instantly invalidate the adequacy of the military dispositions based upon them, and as effectively postpone victory, as any defeat in the field possibly could.

The Allied formula of victory was compounded first of the expectation that German economic exhaustion would reduce the size of the army which must be beaten and destroy its morale. The second ingredient was the belief that the war would be cut short by a democratic revolt in Germany and hence that the army need provide for no prolonged resistance. The third element was the expectation of such assistance from dissensions in Austria-Hungary that the Allied armies might devote themselves to the destroying of the German army in France, thus diminished and weakened, with full confidence that the first Allied victory would set free internal forces in the Central Empires which would make victory not only complete but permanent. The last element alone was military and the notion of the size, character, and efficiency of the army, the extent of its operations, the fields upon which it

might campaign, the objectives it must directly achieve, were all conditioned by the non-military elements of the formula. None seemed to realize that error in the latter would be as fatal as defeat in the field, or, indeed, that a sufficient degree of error might make victory in the field all but impossible, if it did not insure defeat itself.

The expectations of revolt in Austria-Hungary involved not only known facts about diplomatic and constitutional history, but assumptions in regard to the conclusions the Austrian, Hungarian, and Slavic peoples would draw from them which were neither probable nor dependable in the light of history as it had been written before the war, but which became vital to the validity of the calculation. The Allied analysis involved the belief that these various sections demanding nationality, autonomy, and democracy were literally oppressed, deprived of real liberty, and in need, therefore, of a very practical kind of freedom. If the slightest reliance could have been placed in what the people of the Central Empires had hitherto written about their own administrative interests, the various provinces of Austria and Hungary, the various states of Germany, already possessed as complete local autonomy in the direction of their own affairs as any part of England, France, or the United States. Indeed, they wielded rather greater authority in local administration than did the counties in England or the departments in France. The oppression about which the most radical complained was

theoretical rather than actual, and expressed a national ambition rather than a lack of individual freedom and liberty. They had in mind rather the satisfying of an intangible longing for the name of political independence than the achievement of certain practical reforms.

Indeed, the true discontent in Austria and in Hungary was with the German and Magyar domination. By democracy they meant that the Slavs, already the numerical majority, should acquire a more absolute control of domestic politics and administration than they then had. The program did not involve fundamental changes in law, administration, or the form of central or local government. They did not wish to dissolve the Empire or to renounce political association with each other. Austria and Hungary were already federated states and the question was which of the national elements should control policy, which of them should dominate the others. The Germans felt that the Slavs had too much power, an idea which the Slavs heartily reciprocated. Both wished all the power. This was scarcely democracy according to British, French, and American thinking. Indeed, the Czechs already dominated Austria. The leading ministers had for a generation or more been chosen from their number, and the policy of the Empire had favored them to such an extent that the Pan-Germanic movement in Austria was a vehement protest against this Slavophile politics.

But the Allied statesmen assumed that a de-

sire for autonomy was the same as a wish for democracy, that the notion of nationality was the real equivalent of liberty and freedom as they understood those terms. Unfortunately, the national lines both in Austria and in Hungary were not clear. The various nationalities did not occupy neat geographical entities, easily divided from one another and already provided with definite local government. Each race wished to rule where it was in the majority, and to treat the minority in that particular province exactly as the Germans had dealt with the population in Alsace-Lorraine, in Poland, and in Schleswig. They desired by political oppression to erase the national consciousness of the minority and to absorb the latter into the majority. The Czechs themselves were so overwhelmingly in control of the local government in Bohemia that the Germans were scarcely able to do better than to register a vehement protest. To the Czechs autonomy meant an ability to do the oppressing rather more completely than they were already doing it.

While it was true that the political bonds of association in Austria-Hungary had never been in our sense strong or the product of natural growth, it was probably an error to assume that there were no natural and traditional lines of association. Latin Christianity was the true tie between the Austro-Hungarian people. For centuries they had looked upon themselves as the outpost of the Roman Catholic Church, the leaders in the great crusade against the Arian

heresy which prevailed among the Russian Slavs. Here was a deep and abiding influence for unity, reaching back into the past for more than a thousand years and making truly difficult that sort of political association with the Slavs of the Greek Church and of Russian dominion, which their racial affinities would otherwise have produced. Austria-Hungary was the Roman Catholic nation *par excellence* and the religious tie had been in the past strong enough to outweigh many difficulties of politics and administration.

These same people had also become during the last generation definitely conscious of the value of co-operation in commercial development, often called the economies of nationalization. They saw very clearly that they must all employ the same outlet to the ocean trade, that they had all similarly suffered from the fact that the Danube was the only water system available for their use, that the Iron Gates were long a bar to navigation, and that the Danube emptied into the Black Sea behind the defenses of Constantinople. The possession of Constantinople by the Germans was therefore regarded by the Austro-Hungarians as a great boon, as the achievement of one of their own greatest political and international ambitions. It had opened the Black Sea and made the Danube a great highway. They were all intent upon the retention of Trieste and of developing and strengthening the control of Austria-Hungary over the Adriatic. They found in the past half-century that this type of co-operation was profitable to them all, more profit-

able than the continuation of the old traditional customs warfare. They also saw the real profit in an economic union with the German Empire and with the Balkan states. The identity of economic interest of all these states had before the war become a fact regarded in them as beyond dispute.[1]

Such an economic tariff union, however, was difficult to maintain without some sort of political association. They saw very clearly that their hold upon Constantinople, their ability to open the Danube, to retain possession of the Adriatic, the power to ship goods through the English Channel, all depended upon close cooperation between them in international affairs. The strength of Mittel-Europa, its existence even as an entity, with a definite policy and a united purpose, was a prerequisite of the achievement of all or any of these aims. Economic profit in a very real sense depended for them upon international status and political unity, upon the willingness to sacrifice somewhat of local ambitions in the general interest of the economic development of a country hitherto so decidedly backward.

There should, therefore, have been no doubt that the people of the Central Empires had before them no simple choice between something good and something bad. They must choose between a variety of disagreeable alternatives, none of them entirely desirable, nor yet entirely

[1] See, however, M. Chéradame's emphatic opinion to the contrary in his numerous books.

expedient, all of them in a measure certain to involve consequences which they would choose to avoid. If they satisfied the traditional desire for autonomy, they must sacrifice the profits which they very well knew were to be had by the creation of the tariff union, whose real efficiency would depend upon close political and international co-operation. If their desire for autonomy involved a disruption of the German and Austrian Empires, it would necessarily mean the sacrifice of the international position, which had hitherto enabled them to control Constantinople and to have a certain assurance of freedom of exit from the British Channel. Certainly it had preserved to them their control of the Adriatic, and, once lost, the Adriatic would become an Italian lake. On the other hand, if they preferred to choose in the future as they had in the past, they must expect in the future, as in the past, to sacrifice their political ambitions, their notion of democratic expediency, their ideas of political reform, and that intangible but powerful urge toward the name of political independence. They were between the upper and the nether millstone. What they really wanted was the two alternatives combined, and they could not have both at once.

The failure of Allied diplomacy "to raise the wind" in Mittel-Europa was complete. No democratic revolt broke out in Germany or in Austria; the Czechs in Bohemia were disappointingly quiet; the Croatians and southern Slavs remained loyal. The much-heralded and

widely expected disturbances and revolts upon the death of Francis Joseph failed to materialize, and Charles quietly succeeded to the throne. Thus far there has come no adequate evidence of serious hostility between Austria and Germany, Hungary and Germany, or between Austria and Hungary. In the parliaments the usual bickering over local issues continued, but clear traces of disloyalty to the war or of an unwillingness to prosecute it with earnestness and conviction have been absolutely lacking. In the Balkans, Bulgaria and Turkey never wavered in their allegiance, while Greece made an unexpected and prolonged resistance to the diplomatic pressure of the Allies. All the first Allied computations regarding the winning of the war had been based upon expectations of disloyalty which were not fulfilled. The result was the complete invalidation of Allied plans and the loss of the war in the east.

Nor was Allied diplomacy calculated to foster and strengthen the sentiment of disloyalty, the conviction that the war was being fought in the interests of the suppressed nationalities, upon which so much depended. On the contrary, it unfortunately gave color to the official statements and explanations which the German and Austrian Governments furnished their people in regard to the origin of the war and its purposes. They declared it a war fought literally in defense of their own political and international integrity. They charged the Allies with designs to crush and destroy them, to rob them of territory which

they regarded as essential to their protection, to weaken the administrative structure upon which they depended to direct their armies in the field. They found proof of these assertions in the speeches of Lloyd George, of Clemenceau, and of President Wilson, all of whom had frankly and publicly avowed the intention of their respective nations to continue the war until German militarism had been crushed and extirpated, and that sort of a polity, that type of defense, that sort of future development which those peoples had long regarded as imperative had been made impossible in the future. It cannot be denied that such diplomatic objectives were essential to obtain the co-operation of the nations opposed to the Central Empires. There are very few who have not believed such objectives imperative to the continued prosecution of the war by these nations in loyal alliance. Few outside the Central Empires will maintain that such a policy was really aggressive or spoke the language of imperialism and vindictive hatred. But was it not idle to suppose that the people of Mittel-Europa would accept such a construction of it? Indeed, there were many who saw in the restatements of Allied aims by Lloyd George and President Wilson in January, 1918, an anxiety to deal with this very implication and to reassure the Austrian and Hungarian people on these very points, as well as to answer adequately the diplomatic demands of the Russians.

At Paris a formal economic conference was held at which a war after the war upon the trade

of the Central Empires was determined upon. Official announcements of this decision were made by the French and British Governments and frank statements published of the sort of warfare which they expected would destroy the efficiency of German competition in the future. This seemed to the people of the Central Empires the clearest possible proof of the animus with which the Allies entered the war. Had they not always been told by their own Governments of the iron ring, drawn tighter and tighter about Germany by English jealousy of German trade and commercial development?

The formal pledge given to France by Great Britain and Russia to restore Belgian neutrality and the possession of Alsace-Lorraine would result, no one denied, in the loss by the Germans of the offensive strategic position in the west. Indeed, one of the prime Allied objects in fighting the war, one of the chief results with which it must end, was this loss by Germany, the stronger power, of the offensive position. A public pledge had already been made by the Allies to restore the kingdom of Poland and to include within the frontiers of the new state Prussian and Austrian Poland. The Germans were vividly aware that Prussian Poland contained the military defenses of Berlin and the Austrians were not likely to forget that their share of Poland contained Cracow and the military approaches upon Vienna. Denmark, again, had been promised the province of Schleswig, torn from her in 1864, and whose population still contained a large pro-

portion of Danes. In that province was also the German naval base of Kiel; through it ran the Kiel Canal. The loss of that province would destroy the control of the Baltic by the German fleet, capture their naval base, render vulnerable Hamburg and Wilhelmshaven, and make possible an attack upon the Elbe from Danish soil. It was clear that such objectives as these would rob Germany of all strategic frontiers of the slightest value.

Formal pledges had also been given to Italy which undoubtedly included the Trentino and in all probability Trieste and the Austrian Adriatic provinces. The Trentino was the military door to the valley of the Inn and Vienna, the key to the Austrian defensive and offensive position on the south. Trieste was Austria's only commercial gateway to the sea, her only possible outlet unless she obtained control of the Balkans. A new and enlarged Serbia had many times been promised, and a map, published in 1917 by the Serbian minister at London with semi-official sanction, included in the new state Macedonia, Albania, Novi-Bazar, the Austrian provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the southern Slav and Croatian provinces of both Austria and Hungary. This state would then occupy the remainder of the Adriatic shore not ceded to Italy and would intervene between the new Italian possessions around Trieste and the Austrian crown estates in the Tyrol. Two considerable and presumably powerful states would have been created between Austria, Hungary,

and the sea. In the north unofficial hopes had been held out of an independent Bohemia which would thus rob the Hapsburg crown of its largest and wealthiest possession. There would be left of Austria the provinces of Upper and Lower Austria and the crown lands of the Tyrol, the so-called German provinces. From one of the largest states in Europe, she would have been reduced to one of the smallest, with a population not exceeding ten millions of souls.

Nor was this all. Hungary should cede to Serbia the Slavic provinces in the south and should deliver Transylvania, almost one-third the area of the Hungarian dominion, to the Rumanians, who would thus sit astride the Carpathians with the keys of the Danube in their hands. Only the Magyar portions of Hungary would remain, shorn of their natural defenses, robbed of the control of the great river, exposed in the middle of the Hungarian plain to the hostile states, all larger than they, which would now surround them. They, too, would be permanently cut off from the sea. They would lose their seacoast on the Adriatic and the provinces leading to it, and with it their commercial future as they had hitherto seen it. The Balkans would be delivered over to Serbia, Rumania, and Greece. Bulgaria would lose to Rumania her control of the Danube; to Serbia she would sacrifice Macedonia; and not improbably to Russia, according to the original plans, the seacoast of the Black Sea, in order to provide the Russians with the land approaches on Constantinople.

The whole Turkish Empire would be destroyed and dismembered and the Turks ejected from Europe. The Greeks unquestionably expected to receive Saloniki, the greater part of Thrace, and perhaps the Ionian Isles. The French had been promised Syria; Arabia had already been made independent; Armenia was to become an autonomous state. Russia was meant to receive Constantinople and the control of the straits. The Turk should hide his diminished head in Anatolia, the eastern portion of which would also be sacrificed to the Russians.

Such a rearrangement and reconstruction of Europe, such provisions for the safety of democracy, the peoples of the Central Empires no doubt regarded as tantamount to the extinction of their political and international independence, to the dissolution of the German, Austrian, and Turkish Empires. The mere fact that a territory would be left in northern Europe called Germany, shorn of all its defenses, and a small area still to be called Austria, and another bearing the name Hungary, both robbed of their military defenses and their commercial approaches to the world's highways, did not conceal from them that the Allies planned to accomplish what they had always feared most.

There was little chance that the people of the Central Empires would agree with the Right Honorable Mr. Masterman, member of the British Cabinet, that these terms erred too much in their favor. It was not likely that the solidarity of the Central Empires during and after the war

was to be shaken and a movement there created in favor of such a diplomatic and political program as this. Far from its being probable that the Allies could expect internal aid in the Central Empires for their own conquest and subjection, the war was reducing, if not entirely demolishing, the old political, racial, and historical jealousies and traditions. It was uniting as never before the people of Austria and Hungary, welding them into a single unit, making them aware as never before of common interests and common aims. The German Empire, long regarded by considerable sections of the German people as an international expedient by no means desirable, was fast becoming the bulwark of literal German independence, and the heterogeneous conglomerate of governments and peoples called Austria-Hungary was beginning to show something of the solidarity and common action to be expected of a state whose people regard its continued existence as a matter of course. It is unfortunately true that those same considerations which proved the necessity to the Allies for these objectives demonstrated to the people of the Central Empires the impossibility of such concessions.

XVII

FAILURE ON THE WEST FRONT

LIKE victory, success and failure are not positive but relative terms, and depend, not upon what is achieved, but upon its relation to what was expected. The gaining of ground, the performance of brilliant exploits, do not mean victory; they must produce results of importance in relation to the objectives of the war. The mere fact, therefore, that the Allies resisted German attacks in the west and occupied considerable areas of ground did not necessarily prove that they were winning. The capture of a few miles of front a few miles deep, or even as at Cambrai several square miles of territory, involved inconvenience to the Germans rather than the danger of defeat in the war. Not even the capture of a whole section of the German army, causing an entire shift of the German line and the death of perhaps hundreds of thousands of men, would necessarily be victory. No, victory must mean not only the defeat of the German army, but the evacuation as well of France, Belgium, and Alsace-Lorraine. Hundreds of successful assaults and raids, any number of tank expeditions,

the killing of any number of Germans would still be failure unless they resulted in the driving of the German army out of conquered territory. This was the true objective of the campaigns on the West Front, because the Allies early concluded that the war could end only after the transfer of the offensive position from Germany to France.

Moreover, they concluded, the war must end with the crushing of the German army rather than with its defeat. The necessary objective was the weakening of a Germany already too strong, the breaking up of a German military machine already too powerful, the decentralization of an administrative machinery already too capable for the peace and safety of Europe. The stronger position in the hands of the weaker country, the equalizing of the military equation by robbing Germany of part of her striking force, were necessary conditions of real victory in Europe. Naturally, they were not to be secured by negotiations around a table. Inasmuch as the war had made it impossible to trust the Germans not to use a power already in their hands, it must be taken from them.

If Germany was thus to be beaten, it seemed to the Allies easiest to do it in France. After the first few weeks of the war the experts judged that a trench line was inevitable anywhere, that it would not improbably be everywhere as difficult of assault as the trench line in France and not improbably more so, in case it should be drawn through a country possessed of natural advantages for the defense. In France the two armies

were compelled to create their trenches under conditions substantially similar, which conferred here a slight advantage on the Germans and there a similar advantage on the Allies, but which gave neither so striking a superiority as the mountain positions of Italy bestowed upon the Austrians. Then, too, if the French and British were to bear the burden of the war it could be done with a maximum of ease and a minimum of cost in France. The armies would be nearest to their bases of supplies; the railroad lines were already laid to the front; the British had only the Channel to cross, a factor of importance where food, coal, munitions, and everything else must be transported. The short haul for the railroads was also of consequence in a war where the strain upon transportation was sure to be great and the wear and tear likely to require the periodic replacement of the equipment. Fighting the war in France would prevent waste of time and material in building a new plant elsewhere and would utilize to the maximum the preparations which the French had already made.

Nor was it to be forgotten that after the loss of northern France in the first weeks of the war the British and French people were scarcely likely to tolerate a war not conducted for the liberation of France itself. A purely defensive campaign in France and an offensive campaign elsewhere would hardly commend itself to the two nations, and, in the first year of the war, the difficulty in England was rather that of stimulating

public interest to prosecute the war to the maximum rather than a utilization of strength already exerted. It is a simple matter for those who sit at desks to lay down objectives for great wars involving immense effort on the part of millions of men. They only too easily forget that the men who fight must themselves attach some value to the objectives and that it is therefore not always within the control of leaders to choose those which may be from a military point of view most desirable. Both for the French and the English people the objective of the war became necessarily the one to which both attached the most importance, and for that public opinion demanded that the war should be fought and to that end the campaign directed. Why should they shed their blood in the Trentino or at Saloniki, before Constantinople or on the Danube, when the Germans were committing unmentionable atrocities on the plains of France? Great bodies of men are not moved by logic nor yet stirred by distant objectives, which they but dimly comprehend and whose relation to the task upon which they have set their hearts is not at all clear.

There were, again, strong doubts of the expediency of an offensive against Austria. It was probable that an army adequate for such an assault could not be spared from the army of defense in France without seriously increasing the danger of a German victory there. Primarily, however, it was inexpedient because the direction of the main assault against Austria-Hungary and the



THE WEST FRONT, MARCH 1918

Balkans would be the best method to strengthen their alliance with Germany, and one of the principal hopes entertained at the beginning of the war in London and Paris was that it might be brought to an end by detaching Austria-Hungary and the Balkans from Germany. Certainly victory might be made thorough and complete by detaching them from the alliance. The war was to be directed against Germany. The diplomatists should aim thoroughly to convince all of Germany's allies that it was directed in no sense against them. They were involved because they had allied themselves with her and that alliance, they were told, might cost them dear. If they should desert it, their reward would be equally striking. If the war, therefore, was to be fought primarily against the German army it must be fought in France.

The Allies had also declared with vehemence that the war was defensive, fought for the liberation of France and England from the German menace. How could they convincingly campaign in the Balkans or along the Black Sea, at Constantinople or in Mesopotamia, deliver in any one of those places the main assault, and maintain, with the expectation of carrying conviction, that the war was purely defensive? Would not those very campaigns prove to Germany's allies that the war was offensive, intended for conquest, and meant primarily to open the Black Sea and to dominate the Balkans? If the argument of a defensive war was to stand, the true campaign lay in France.

But the decision to conduct the main operations in the west involved necessarily a frontal attack upon the German trench line, whose left rested upon the mountains and whose right rested upon the sea, a position which could not be outflanked, and which must be taken by frontal assault upon German dispositions expressly chosen because of their assumed effectiveness against precisely such a type of attack. It was to be, moreover, an offensive undertaken against an army expressly created to defeat without difficulty that particular sort of blow from the very force which must deliver it. The Germans had spent an infinitude of time and of money in acquiring information about the potential resources of the Allies which would make their calculations in regard to the army needed in the first two years infallible. The advantage was already seen to rest entirely with the defense and to be against the offense in the ratio of about six to one. The campaign in France was, therefore, an operation as difficult for the Allies as possible.

It involved a sort of warfare in which the experience of the German army counted most and the inexperience, the comparative disorganization, and the lack of correlation of the Allies created the maximum difficulties and disadvantages. The degree of co-ordination required between the artillery and the infantry in the delivery of an assault was not at first understood and was certainly not possessed by the Allied forces. Only painful experiences and unexpected disasters made clear to them the requirements.

Moreover, an assault necessitated an artillery preparation which could be adequate only after the discharge of an amount of explosives not at first dreamed of. In some of the first offensives undertaken by the British and French, the supply of ammunition supposed to be adequate for several days' assault was discharged in a few hours. The extent of economic preparation required of both nations became at once greater than the existing economic fabric was able to exert. When these difficulties had been surmounted it still remained evident that, although the Allies might penetrate the German trenches for a short distance at almost any time they chose, in almost any part of the line, the gain would always be small, because the infantry could hold a trench permanently only when covered effectively by their own artillery, and because the heavy artillery could not be moved forward over rough ground at any such speed as the infantry themselves could advance. To gain a few hundred yards was easy; to go forward a mile was very difficult; to hold a gain of several miles was almost insuperable, if the Germans attempted stout resistance.

To understand why the Allies undertook and maintained an offensive against such apparent odds we must remember the optimism of the first years and the expectation of a prompt victory over Germany won by forces not military. There seem to have been few in France and England who did not believe that economic exhaustion would reach such a point in Germany

within a relatively few months—always a few months in advance—that she would be compelled to surrender. The outbreak of a democratic revolt which would paralyze the German defense was predicted again and again for a period always a few weeks in advance. Few could believe that the German people had really willed the war, were not hoodwinked and deceived by the Kaiser, and that they would not suddenly awaken to the deception. Immense confidence, too, was placed in the original calculations of the General Staff. It was thought that Germany could not possess sufficient troops to conduct a war simultaneously on both fronts; effective defense must be impossible on one front, if not on both. The majority, too, believed that the numerical superiority of the Allies made mathematically certain the gradual attrition of the German army to a point where adequate resistance would become impossible. Hard, slow progress was, therefore, to be expected for a while, heartbreaking campaigns against stout resistance, and then a grand breaking through the lines and the evacuation of the whole district. The Allies were utterly unable to believe that the entire strength of France and Great Britain was being met by the Germans with anything less than the major part of their military strength.

What now has been the result? Of this there was and is no doubt—it is failure. It would be idle to claim that the Allies did not take territory, that brilliant exploits were not performed, that crushing defeats were not inflicted upon the

German army, which prevented it from obtaining this or that immediate objective; but the total result was none the less—failure. The objective of the Allies was to defeat the whole German army in such manner as to break its strength and cause it to evacuate France, Belgium, and Alsace-Lorraine. They expected, in addition, to deliver in France so serious an assault that an adequate offensive would be impossible for Germany in other fields. None of these objectives were attained. No one can read the history of the war and still believe that the Germans were unable to campaign simultaneously on two fronts with effect. It is entirely obvious that the calculation in regard to the efficiency of the German army was wrong. If the Allied mathematics had been correct and their premises as infallible as they believed them, the result would have been as conclusive as they expected it to be. The most evident error lay in the belief about the rapidity with which the Germans were being killed, but the most serious was the supposition that an adequate war in France could protect the Allies on all other fronts. The one answer to the German campaigns against Russia, Serbia, Rumania, and Italy was a still greater offensive on the West Front. In each case failure was immediate, complete. The definitive character of the German victory over the Russian, Serbian, and Rumanian armies has scarcely been surpassed in history, and the presence of French and British armies in Italy to-day is the admission by the Allies of the erroneous character of their

previous strategy. They are already fighting in Italy to save the trench line in France.

The expediency of the continuation of the offensive on the West Front was also to be determined by the cost of those achievements to the Allies rather than by their cost to the Germans. Was the progress made toward the general objective of the war worth the price which it was necessary for the Allies to pay for it? How far did such a prodigal expenditure of material and such a sacrifice of men carry the Allies in three years and a half toward the expulsion of the Germans from France, Belgium, and Alsace-Lorraine? Could the Allies afford to buy the rest of the territory at the same price? If they must consume a proportionate amount of time in expelling the Germans from the rest of the occupied territory, how long would it take, assuming that the Germans continued to resist? Could the Allies themselves maintain the war as long without a degree of exhaustion which would in itself make victory worthless? It cannot be too often said that victory is relative and not positive, won when the objectives are obtained, lost when they are still to be achieved.

Suppose now that the Allies did continue the war on the West Front in the manner in which they had been fighting, that they did succeed in expelling the Germans from France, Belgium, and Alsace-Lorraine and could afford to pay the price, could they have thus won the war? The answer depends entirely on the sort of victory they were determined to have. Un-

fortunately, the conclusive character of that achievement was certain to be determined not by the value of the West Front to the Allies themselves in the future, but by its value to the Germans during the war. Could Germany lose the war on the West Front and not be defeated? It seemed a strange but important question. Naturally, the assumption upon which the Allies had fought with such pertinacity was that their victory in France would win the war, because a defeat in the west would be so serious for the Germans. But the latter had already concluded that it was not as important for them to win in the west as for the Allies. To them, the value of the West Front was the corollary of the fact that their objectives lay primarily in the east, in the creation of the Pan-Germanic Confederation, in the domination of Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, Turkey, and Asia Minor, and, if possible, the economic conquest of Russia. None of these were primarily to be achieved on the West Front nor necessarily to be lost there. So long as the possession of France was not as important to the Germans as to the Allies, its loss would, therefore, not be as vital to them as it would to the Allies. The price paid for it, therefore, would be unequal. If for the Allies its purchase was a necessary preliminary to a just peace, it was for the Germans merely a military advantage which could be sacrificed without losing the main objective of the war. For such losses the Germans could compensate themselves elsewhere; the Allies could not. The

offensive position in the west was vital to the latter because upon its possession depended the adequacy of their future defense. It was desirable for the former because conclusive of a domination of Europe dependent upon other strategic, economic, and political factors. The expulsion of the Germans from France, Belgium, and Alsace-Lorraine was, therefore, not likely to win victory for the Allies as they had first defined it. Only on one supposition could victory in the west be final—the complete destruction and capitulation of the German army.

The conclusive character and importance of victory on the West Front for the Allies was also to be determined by its price to them. It must not involve the creation of an amount of material greater than the productive capacity of Great Britain, France, and the United States could manufacture without too great a strain. It must not involve the sacrifice of men to a degree which would seriously weaken their future economic power. It must not involve an expenditure of effort so great as to leave them unable to utilize the victory after it was won. Therefore, although any victory on the West Front might win the immediate objective of the war so far as France and Belgium were concerned, nothing short of the destruction of the entire German army could end the war as a whole in favor of the Allies. And it must find the Allied armies still strong enough to undertake without exhaustion an invasion of Germany and the capture of Berlin. It was not to be forgotten

that Italy, Russia, Greece, Japan, and other nations had been enlisted among the Allies, all of whom had received diplomatic promises of territory to be gained at the end of the war. A victory on the West Front alone would not of itself win anything for the minor members of the Allied coalition. Even for France and Great Britain it could be final only under certain conditions.

As months became years, the conviction steadily grew in many quarters that the original strategic conception of the war in the west had been the result of error after error in calculations, and that its consequences were the postponement of victory, if not the risk of the loss of the war.

XVIII

CARDINAL MILITARY ERRORS

IT is easy to criticize and prophesy *after* the event, simple to indicate each fallacy and demonstrate errors in calculation. None the less, it is important to enumerate what seem to be the reasons for the critical military situation in which the Allies found themselves at the beginning of 1918. Fundamentally, the difficulty was due as much to the theory of victory on the West Front as to any single calculation, and to the fact that the original strategy of the Allies was opposed to the first German strategy of victory. This did lay immense stress upon the victory in France, but was dictated by a situation which concerned in the main an attack by France and Russia only, when a British army was not thought conceivably effective, and the general diplomatic success of the Allies in isolating Germany was discounted. That the events during the war radically altered the problem of victory, the Germans promptly decided, but the Allies did not change their strategy to meet the newer conditions and the German strategy which was evolved from them.

There was nothing in the logic of victory in France to meet the new German strategy intended to clear the way for a crushing assault upon the French rear, nothing, indeed, in the general conduct of the war which assumed that an attack upon the rear of the trench line was possible. Still less did the conduct of the war on the West Front deal with the German strategy of defeat, with the German economic defensive, with the Russian Revolution, with the disaster in Italy. True, the importance of the possession of France, Belgium, and Alsace-Lorraine to the Allies was not less in 1917 after the Russian Revolution had taken place, but greater. At the same time, the military problem of attaining them by a frontal attack had not altered and the cost of such an assault had become necessarily greater. Since the collapse of the Russian army, no simultaneous offensive on both fronts was possible, and the German victories in the east, the collapse of Serbia, Rumania, and Russia, made possible a concentration of the German army in the west which vastly increased the price the Allies would have to pay for a victory there. Indeed, the original price was calculated upon the reduction of the size of the German army of defense, by their need to hold the Russians in check in Poland, by the expected extent of attrition, and by the need of defense against Italy. Though all of these factors, whose importance few will question, were removed seriatim from the equation, the Allies still insisted that the war must proceed on the West Front,

that victory could be won there, and could not be won elsewhere. Yet it should have been obvious that the safety of the offensive concentrated on the West Front depended upon the Italian army which was guarding its rear in Switzerland and in Italy itself.

It seems possible, therefore, to maintain that the Allied defense was still primarily concerned, until direct assistance was sent to Italy in November, 1917, with the first German notion of victory, and not with the second German strategy, and continued to oppose a strategy, therefore, which the Germans themselves abandoned in the second year of the war. It did not provide adequate opposition to the new German attack at those very points where the danger was greatest—Serbia, Rumania, Poland, and Italy. It left open the road for the execution of the real German offensive by which they expected to win the war. It was a cardinal error of the first dimension. Moreover, the continued prosecution of the offensive in France and the necessary inactivity elsewhere actually assisted the Germans in their execution of their strategy of defeat, their economic defensive, and in their conquest of the Russian Revolution. No doubt such wisdom after the event is cheap, but, if it be wisdom even after the event, it is important to remember.

The participation of Russia in the war involved difficulties and problems long before seen by the Germans, and which it seems incredible that the Allies and the Russians them-

selves should not have better understood. The vast man power of Russia available for the ranks seems to have led the Allies to conclude that the Russian army in this war, like the Russian armies in the past, might be maintained without limit of size, whatever its mortality. The Germans more correctly apprehended the situation, for they held that the proper size of an army under the new conditions would depend not upon the amount of rough material available for privates, but upon the educated men available for officers. The literate class in Russia was small in proportion to the size of its population and, therefore, they concluded that the number of Russian armies which could be put in the field, or better, the number of times the army could be reorganized and put back into the field after decimation or defeat, would be limited to the number of times the corps of officers could be replaced. It would not be established by the size of the population.

It became clear in the first months that the efficiency of an army, however large, depended in this war upon the size and effectiveness of its artillery, and upon the extent and adequacy of the economic fabric behind it. There was obviously in Russia no industrial structure adequate to create and maintain in the field the necessary artillery, nor even the infantry itself. Supplies of food there were, but for munitions and uniforms, for rifles and large guns, the Russians were entirely dependent upon the Allies themselves, who must manufacture for Russia.

The adequacy of the Russian army would, therefore, be measured by the adequacy of the means of transportation *in* Russia, not necessarily *to* Russia, for after the material was once in Russian hands it must still be distributed and placed regularly and continuously upon the battle front. The difficulty of the problem of transportation the French, the British, and the Germans would solve. It would be for the Russian administration insuperable; the railroad lines in Russia were not sufficiently numerous, nor properly located, the reserve of rolling-stock insufficient to meet such extraordinary demands. At the outset of the war the Russian army was without adequate equipment, some of the regiments without any arms at all. The artillery was entirely inadequate in number and in caliber to protect the infantry, and the officers who were to direct it were not sufficiently skilful to provide the protection in barrages which the new warfare required. The troops and officers were alike without adequate training in the new type of assault.

Nevertheless, though all these facts were unquestionably known in Russia, and certainly must have been appreciated in London and Paris, before the war was many weeks old Nicholas campaigned brilliantly against Hindenburg in Poland; Brusiloff was later allowed to direct a great and sustained offensive in the Carpathians, and Nicholas was sent into Asia Minor and Persia against Erzerum. The first campaign was undoubtedly intended to decrease the press-

ure on the West Front. The second was to force the passage of the Carpathians and thus promote the expected dissensions in Hungary. The third was to seize Persia, the Bagdad Railroad, and, if possible, push through to Constantinople. Both of the latter involved for success extensive railroad facilities, which it should have been evident Russia could not well spare for such distant operations, and which ought to have been carefully preserved in order that the continuity of the offensive on the East Front should be assured. All of these expeditions destroyed privates and officers in one frightful welter of blood. Some regiments complained that they were sent into battle with nothing more than sticks in their hands, others with no artillery protection and no machine-guns. Mortality of one-half, two-thirds, and three-fourths of the troops engaged became common. Literally, the Russians attempted to withstand the advance of the Germans with great piles of bodies.

The result was the disorganization of the Russian army from this mortality, the breakdown of the Russian railroad system by such unusual exertions, long before the Revolution was better than a possibility. Indeed, this method of conducting the war contributed enormously to the dissensions among the troops when the Revolution broke out. It is now clear after the event that the true value of the Russian army to the Allies lay in its *potential* aggression in the east. So long as it lay there in its trenches,

capable of an assault, no great offensive could be launched against Italy and the French rear. So long as it was in existence, the new German strategy of victory was impossible; so long as it stood on the defensive, the probability that it could resist the Germans was great. When it undertook the offensive the odds against it became overwhelming. The gain in the east was not worth the risk in the west. Such offensives ought not to have been undertaken until proper artillery protection had been provided and a great reserve of officers trained. Until then a defensive war should have been fought. Meanwhile, the Trans-Siberian could have been strengthened; new railroads built to and through Scandinavia; and the supply of ammunition and material from the Allies outside assured upon which a successful offensive could have been based. Without such preparation a victory by Russia in the field was problematic, the continuity of assault difficult to predicate, a prolonged offensive or a number of assaults almost impossible to deliver, because the transportation system was incapable of maintaining a continuity of supply in such amounts. Defeat became, therefore, possible, exhaustion probable, recovery from either defeat or exhaustion more than doubtful. The Russian armies were allowed to waste themselves in offensives which, even if successful, could not have won the war.

If the plan was to win the war in France, it should have involved a careful defensive everywhere else, that the war might not be lost every-

where while it was being won in France. An offensive in Poland would have dictated a corresponding defensive movement in the west. The Allies, however, believed early in the war that the certain method of victory was a simultaneous offensive on both fronts, and the number of men was large who thought that the reason they did not win the war at first resulted from a lack of proper synchronism of the attacks. That there was any doubt about victory entered the minds of very few. The correctness of certain mathematical calculations about the size of the German army, about the number who could be put in the field, and the number of deaths in the first months of warfare in France was assumed. It is easy now to know that they were incorrect.

The preoccupation of the Allies with the West Front led to the direction of only half-hearted offensives against Constantinople and Austria in the first years of the war. As since explained, they were intended to produce a moral rather than a military effect; but, while possession of Saloniki was obtained, Greece was not converted, nor an army sufficient in size for an assault upon Austria created there. When the invasion of Serbia took place in 1916, the Allied armies in the Balkans were not sufficiently powerful to save her from defeat and extermination. Still more extraordinary were the comments, even in responsible military circles, that the German campaign in Serbia was undertaken in desperation only and had no strategic purpose or result.

It seems hardly possible that the danger to the French rear involved in the loss of Russian strength as early as 1915 was not realized in London and Paris, but no direct measures were undertaken which would make possible the meeting of a German attack upon Rumania at the time when the Allies urged that state to enter the war. Aid to Serbia would have required elaborate preparations at Saloniki or in Albania, the transportation of troops and material, and perhaps the postponement of the offensive in France for a year. So, too, the defense of Rumania required either the opening of the Dardanelles or effective Russian aid. The Russian army was incapable of rendering the latter and the Allies made no effort by adequate overland operations to open the Dardanelles. Rumania, no doubt, was brought into the war to replace, strengthen, and assist Russia, was intended to increase the potential aggression against Germany in the east. *As a potential force*, she was most valuable and would have required the Germans to lengthen their lines materially and to hold them with an adequate force. This would have placed a very real burden upon them, would have occupied a large body of men, precisely as long as the Rumanian army remained undefeated.

But this strong position was sacrificed when the Rumanians were allowed to undertake a great offensive against Transylvania. It at once countenanced charges of their ulterior motives in entering the war and assured Germany of the loyal

adhesion of the Hungarian and Balkan peoples. It exposed the Rumanian army itself, never any too good, to a crushing defeat. Had the latter stayed in the mountains it might be still resisting the German attack with good effect. Of its own volition—and the Allies did not refuse assent—it crossed the Hungarian frontier and put its head into the lion's mouth. No such campaign could have been successful without Russian support of the first quality to protect the rear and without Allied assistance in the Balkans to prevent Bulgaria from crossing the Danube, as Mackensen eventually did, to strike the Rumanian army in flank and rear. It was a sort of campaign advisable only in the last years, or last months even, of a successful war undertaken against a foe already demoralized and retreating, not against a foe just freed in the northeast from a large burden he had hitherto been compelled to carry. Once again no Allied aid was given and none adequate was prepared. Still less did the Allies prevent the undertaking of the campaign itself. So far as is known they urged and requested it. Once again it is demonstrated that no adequate appreciation existed then in Allied councils that the war could be lost in the east; that defeat in the east could rob victory in the west for the Allies of half its triumph, while victory in the east for the Germans would rob defeat for them in the west of most of its terrors. The defeat of Rumania in the winter of 1916 enabled the German offensive to accomplish another significant step in its approach on France.

The strategy of defeat also made excellent progress. The fields of Rumania helped the economic defensive wonderfully. The victory made communication simple and secure with Turkey and Bulgaria, frustrated Allied diplomacy in the Balkans, held Greece faithful, and made improbable any dissensions in Hungary and Austria.

In the spring of 1917, with so much already lost in the east, with the position in the west now approachable by additional German troops freed by the Russian Revolution, the Italians began a campaign against Trieste. It was easily the worst military blunder of the war. It jeopardized at once the whole line in France. While its true secret, like the campaign of the Rumanians against Transylvania, may never be known within our own lifetime, no sign was certainly made in London or Paris of dissent or disapproval. Indeed, the press of both countries trumpeted forth the first advances of the Rumanian and Italian armies as great Allied victories, undertaken in entire accordance with French and British plans for the overwhelming of the Hun. Certainly, something of the onus of these military blunders must eventually fall upon the British and the French.

The position in which the Italians voluntarily placed themselves could scarcely have been more dangerous. The valley of the Po was everywhere dominated along its northern front by mountain positions of vast strength which controlled the historic roads up and down the Po between France and Austria, used so often by

military campaigns in the past. Through the Trentino ran a road over the Brenner Pass into the valley of the River Inn which led down upon Vienna. Another road ran up upon Vienna from eastern Italy and the Isonzo through the mountains. Between the two were numerous passes and shorter roads which connected with one or the other. In 1866, when the major part of the valley of the Po was ceded to the new kingdom of Italy, the Austrians insisted upon retaining the most important of the mountain fastnesses. The offensive position remained in their hands and the defensive position—a very bad defensive at that—was given to the Italians.

The two military posts of greatest importance were the Trentino, which projected like a triangle into the very heart of the Po itself and menaced the whole of Italy, and the boundary between Italy and Austria, the Isonzo, which could be attacked on the rear and its communications cut by an army advancing into the plains from the Trentino. Similarly an Italian army, campaigning against the Trentino, exposed its flanks to the Austrian army operating on the Isonzo. The Italian offensive against the latter line was particularly weak because outflanked by the Julian Alps and exposed in the rear to the Trentino. A defeat before Trieste involved of necessity a long retreat through the plains, with the flank of the army always exposed to attack from successive mountain positions in the Alps to the north until the line of the Adige was reached. A defeat on the Isonzo would imperil at once the whole

Italian army and make possible its annihilation. A simultaneous campaign by the Austro-Germans from the Isonzo and Trentino might cut the Italian army in two and crush its parts separately.

As the military weakness of the position was well known to the Italians, the reasons for undertaking the campaign seem to have been diplomatic and political. The objective of Italy in entering the war was ostensibly the recovery of Italia Irredenta, of the lands, Italian in speech and race, which still remained under Austrian rule. The great popular movement for their recovery swept the Government into the war. The Ministry was apprehensive; the pro-German party was large and active. In order to keep the people quiet and satisfied with the war and the sacrifices it demanded it became essential to provide them with some success in the field, to undertake with the army one of the objectives to which the people themselves attached great importance. It was, moreover, essential that physical possession of Trieste should be assured before the war ended. Its value to Austria as a commercial highway to the ocean was so great that it was entirely unlikely that the Austrians would yield its possession to mere diplomatic pressure. It must be taken in advance. It was easier to attack Trieste where the co-operation of the navy was possible and where the British ships could bring direct munitions, coal, and supplies.

The campaign required for success an adequate



THE ITALIAN FRONT

force in men for such an offensive, an adequate amount of artillery and ammunition, with coal, munitions, food in adequate amounts. There was as well the ability of the French and British to retain the Germans on the West Front and prevent their use of the mountain positions against the Italians, to say nothing of the assumption that the Italians would themselves be able to hold the Trentino, the Julian, and the Carnic Alps as well as the lines in front of Trieste. Unfortunately none of these conditions could be fulfilled. The Italians were not well supplied with adequate artillery, with a sufficient amount of munitions or coal, and the submarine successes made it difficult for Great Britain to spare from the Channel and the Atlantic the ships necessary to provide a continuous stream of supplies through the Mediterranean. There was no certainty whatever that the submarine would not prevent the arrival of supplies without which the operation must fail. Moreover, the Russian army had already collapsed; Serbia and Rumania had been annihilated; and the probability was less than ever that the Germans could be so occupied on the West Front as to be unable to attempt a dangerous offensive from the mountain positions against the Italians. Nor could direct aid be sent from France without giving up the offensive there. Both the French and the British declined to consider this for a moment. It would seem as if no campaign could have been projected for which so many unfavorable circumstances and possibilities existed.

Nevertheless, the Italian army proceeded to campaign against Trieste, worked itself by immense sacrifices into a most vulnerable position at a time when the offensive in France and the work of the submarine did interfere with the continuity of the supply of munitions and coal from Great Britain, and when the Germans were able to throw against them a force greater than ever before. The explanations of the disaster, given at the moment when the news had first to be broken to an anxious world, told of an Italian artillery not large enough in caliber nor well enough provided with ammunition to meet the array of large guns the Austro-Germans massed against it. While it is possible that the Allies preferred to shoulder the blame upon the lack of material rather than to admit to their people that the Italian army had been literally beaten, the explanation threw a lurid suspicion upon the intelligence of the General Staff which attempted an offensive without adequate preparations. Something must also be ascribed to the Allied mathematics which taught that so many Germans were already killed in France that they could not be available for an offensive in Italy. Unfortunately, the Germans arrived, numerous and vigorous, and demonstrated the fallacy of the calculations that they ought to have been dead. The dilemma was most unfortunate; every explanation involved reflections upon the foresight, the information, the judgment, the bravery, or the loyalty of the Italians and to some extent upon the French and British states-

men. If the campaign itself was expedient, it must fail without effective preparations. If the dispositions were correct, the fault must lie with the Italian army. But in view of the well-known vulnerability of the Italian position, it is difficult to see how any campaign could have succeeded, except on the supposition that resistance would be negligible.

In any case the result was a crushing defeat of the Italians on the Isonzo in October, 1917. The Germans and Austrians made the most of the vulnerable position in which the Italians had obligingly placed themselves and forced them to evacuate the whole line at a loss of twenty-five hundred guns, nearly a quarter of a million prisoners, and no one knows how many dead. To be sure, a most difficult retreat was well conducted; the morale of the Italian army remained good; the French and British assistance was promptly started and arrived after no undue delay; but the defense of the Piave, next attempted, also involved a most dangerous operation. The Italians and their allies held a right angle, the corner and the upper side of which were very weak, being practically controlled by immensely strong mountain positions already in the hands of the Austrians, and with the rear and communications menaced by the Trentino. Literally the whole line had to be held impregnable. A defeat on any part of it, especially along the Trentino, would be fatal to the whole Allied forces and involve a catastrophe of the first dimensions. Indeed, the war might be lost in

Italy on the Piave; unfortunately, it could scarcely be won there, since the Allies had already suffered such extremely serious losses of strategic positions elsewhere. Until possession of Italy could be recovered, the rear of the trench line in France was in vital danger and the great German blow through Switzerland became possible. Of course the Germans had much to do before they could attempt that final campaign. Time, men, munitions, would be required in immense amounts, but there could be no doubt that the German High Command had calculated upon all of that. If they won the valley of the Po, the issue of the war itself would be in grave doubt. Even the advent of the United States might not suffice to save it. Not since the battle of the Marne had the Allied line been in as great danger as on the Piave in November and December, 1917. No mere postponement of victory was here involved, but the danger of literal defeat which might involve the loss of Belgian neutrality and of Alsace-Lorraine. For it had already become evident that the most the Germans had left to win in Europe was the maintenance of their offensive position in the west and the foothold upon the Channel which Belgium would afford.

BOOK III

THE WINNING OF THE WAR

XIX

THE CERTAINTY OF VICTORY

NO prophecies and calculations about the war have proved more fallible than those so authoritatively and frequently delivered since its outbreak upon the certainty of victory. It is now possible, in light of the analysis attempted in the foregoing chapters, to view the problem of winning the war in its relation to the various methods so confidently announced by official spokesmen as certain of success. To the incorrectness of these assumptions the postponement of Allied victory has been largely due. There was the original error that the war could be won by the financial and credit structure of the Allies. There was the second fallacy that the sea power and the blockade alone would starve Germany to terms in a few months. The continuation of the war promptly exposed both. There was then the notion that the resources of the Allies could be computed by adding the estimates of total population, the numbers of factories and mines, and the idea that because the material was in existence it was necessarily available on the battle-field. Cousin to this was the

assumption in regard to the insufficiency of German man power to conduct an effective defense in the west and an offense at the same time elsewhere. To these were naturally added the belief that the attrition of the German army was proceeding at an excessive rate. Again and again we were assured that the amount of ammunition and material required to prosecute the war had been scientifically estimated. Again and again we have found that the ratio already determined was incorrect. In all these estimates there was indeed everything except certainty. By none of them could victory be won.

Indeed, the conspicuous failure to achieve victory by their means, the growing fear that a maximum military victory in Europe for the Allies may not be possible on the old scale and in the old way, has led many competent observers of the first rank to conclude that victory can be indubitable only if the Allies can obtain the aid and co-operation of the people of the Central Empires themselves. "The solution of the Central European problem means everything for the Allies," said M. Chéradame in a much-discussed article in November, 1917.[1] "So long as it remains unsolved, victory will be out of reach. On the other hand, when this one point has been settled all the other special war aims of each of the Allies can be fulfilled with ease. . . . Either the Allies will win victory through the destruction of Pan-Germany or else the Germans, thanks to Pan-Germany and its economic and military

[1] *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 120, No. 5, p. 684.

advantages, will reduce all of Europe to slavery." He stated positively that authorities no less well known than Léger, Denis, Haumant, Gauvain, Seton-Watson, Wickham Steed, and Sir Arthur Evans agreed with him that the certainty of victory could only be achieved in this way.[1] By implication these eminent authorities believe a military victory in Europe of sufficient extent impossible.

The confidence of these gentlemen in the infallibility of this solution seems to rest upon the unquestioned potency of the assistance of the people of the Central Empires and the effect of democratic revolts, should they occur. It is vitally important, in view of the considerations developed about the Central Empires in previous chapters, for us now to discuss the relative certainty of such assistance, its relative value, and its relative cogency. The vital thing, indeed, in all these calculations regarding the imponderables lies in the difficulty of determining that they may be relied upon to operate in our favor. If they should aid us, their efficacy will be great, but, unfortunately, they are not as dependable as they are potent.

The previous chapters should have made evident the very strong doubt as to the dependability of the co-operation of any of the peoples of the Central Empires with the Allies for the achieving of the dissolution of Pan-Germany. But it will be well for the moment to assume the certainty of their co-operation and attempt to

[1] *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 120, No. 6, p. 831.

estimate their ability to achieve their purpose. Unfortunately, the idea that the stimulation of such a revolt is a simple matter and its outbreak easy belies all that the Pan-Germanists themselves told us before the war in regard to their plans for its prosecution. They were as well aware of this internal weakness as we can now be, and realized that a necessary war measure would be adequate provision against it. For this reason they emphasized the issue of Serbia at the outbreak of the war. The southern Slavs in Austria, whose loyalty was suspected and upon whose assistance M. Chéradame is depending, are very hostile to Serbian plans of expansion which involve their annexation to Serbia. . What they wish is not absorption into a large Slav monarchy in the south, but independence for themselves as an autonomous state of the Austrian Empire.

But the rulers of the Central Empires certainly did not stop here. A revolt presupposed men who would rise with weapons in their hands to fight. What was simpler than to remove the men and the weapons? Conscription made such a policy easy to execute. The men of the sections whose loyalty was in the least suspected both in Austria-Hungary and in Germany were drafted to the last man capable of the slightest military utility, if not into one branch of the service into another. The regiments were then systematically scattered along the whole battle line, west and east, so that they should be mixed with loyal troops and unable to co-operate with one another. Is it possible that the eminent au-

thorities above enumerated are not aware that there is scarcely an able-bodied male left in those districts? Do they suppose that the women, children, and old men are able to conduct the type of revolt they desire? There, too, was another simple defensive measure: to deprive those districts of arms, of iron, of knives, and of all supplies of food not necessary for immediate sustenance. Without food certainly no body of men could be collected and kept together, and, therefore, no revolt would be possible. Unless everything we know about the intended dispositions of the Austro-Hungarian troops is wrong, effective revolt in those districts was made a physical and material impossibility at the very outbreak of the war.

How, too, are the instigators of such a revolt to reach the people upon whom they are to work? Around the Central Empires has been drawn a military cordon of the utmost tension. Inside and outside are vigilant defenders. Any such *agents provocateurs* must first pass the scrutiny of the German spy system in Allied countries, and, after having successfully performed the Herculean feat of passing the frontier,[1] will then have to subject themselves to the scrutiny of the German spies on the inside, who are not less numerous and ubiquitous than those on the outside. There are then the military authorities, who are very anxious that in those districts no person should live unsupervised, and there are, in addition, the civil authorities and the ordinary

[1] M. Chéradame suggests aeroplanes.

police. The elaborateness of this supervision we well know from those few prisoners who have managed to escape. No sufficient number of Allied agents could conceivably come from outside and remain in those districts except at the cost of a degree of concealment which would almost inevitably frustrate the intention of their mission. The military law of the Central Empires also makes the gathering of any considerable number of people together a criminal offense, and it is difficult, therefore, to imagine how under such circumstances a sufficient body of men could be instigated to a revolt, could then be gathered in one place, provided with weapons, and the outbreak occur with any prospect whatever of success. Is it likely that anything could be done in southern Austria which a single army corps with machine-guns could not exterminate in a single day? There seems to be about such a revolt only one element of certainty—its defeat.

Suppose, too, that the subject people, possessed of this desire to revolt, are able to execute it and to bring down with a crash the Austro-Hungarian Empire and end the war in the interest of the Allies. Let us suppose everything accomplished to the maximum degree. What, then, have they done for themselves? Would they have achieved literal independence? Two things have been made very clear by the development of the nineteenth century. Political independence must to-day have its roots in real economic independence. The nation which ex-

pects to maintain itself, free from all international, diplomatic, and political interference from other European powers must be capable of financing its own development. Not one of these assumed national states in Austria-Hungary would be for a moment able to conduct its own affairs without economic relations with one of the larger powers of a nature which would mortgage its whole economic fabric hopelessly and entirely to them. The new countries would, indeed, not achieve real independence. They would merely exchange one master for another, a master at a distance for one upon the spot. They would also acquire two bitter resident enemies, Germany and Austria, who, however weak in comparison with Great Britain, France, and Italy, would still remain immensely strong in their relation to the new Bohemia, the new Serbia, and the new Rumania. What would the political position, the diplomatic freedom, of such peoples be worth? Can they suppose for a moment that such a condition could be called independence or that they would be necessarily better off than they are now? Will they not be likely to see in the fate of Serbia their own future in case Germany and Austria should ever recover control? If there is a very large and well-informed body of opinion in the Allied states which espouses the views first quoted, there is another large and well-informed body of authorities which thus interprets the sentiments of the Balkan people. Between these two groups of authorities it is difficult to choose, and only one

thing is certain, that one or the other of them is wrong. The difficulty is that we are as yet entirely unable to tell which with the slightest element of certainty.

The most important objection, however, to this solution of the issue of the war lies in its inconsistency with the moral stand taken by the Allies upon the justifiability of the war. The progress, conduct, and end of the war must always be viewed in terms of its origin. We must never forget that it began in aggression and was continued in the brutality of the strategy of defeat. The Allies are fighting a great crusade for international justice; for individual decency and respect; for honesty in international dealings; for the right of the individual to develop himself, however slowly and imperfectly; for the ideals of Christianity as generations have understood them. It is no mere inarticulate striving toward indefinite abstractions called right and freedom. The whole philosophy of the historical, religious, and individual development of Christian Europe lies behind it. For centuries Europe has been agreed that the great object of life is spiritual, but that spirituality is an individual attribute, to be developed by an individual effort and initiative, difficult to attain by individuals in the mass, certainly never to be achieved by force, and perhaps not by co-operative action. Aid to the individual from others in his struggle for spirituality has been found indispensable, and both Church and State have been able to aid and stimulate him. But he

must receive from both aid and not direction, stimulus and not control. The part to be played by Church and State in individual development should be indirect and negative rather than direct and positive. The individual must grow of himself, must develop himself, and can do so only when he is free to choose.

The individualism championed by the Allies is the basis of democracy, the key to intellectuality, the heart of spirituality. It is the faith of Greece, the faith of the Renaissance, of the French Revolution, of the nineteenth century. German collectivism is the old conformity and uniformity of pagan and prehistoric man and looks for its precedent to Egypt, to Assyria, and to Rome. If our study of the history of the world and of civilization previous to the war, if the great conclusions reached by the Germans themselves in their own study previous to the war are correct, the Allies are right and the Germans are wrong: the trend of history has been toward individualism and not toward collectivism. The Allies stand upon the secure moral foundations of Christianity and of the course of civilization as the study of man has interpreted it.

We have seen the history of human civilization as a record of progress in society and in the individual, partly material, but essentially spiritual. Gradually we have seen the idea formulate that the development of the individual lay at its root, that its advance lay in his achievement of freedom from artificial restriction by

families, guilds, towns, kings, and churches. We have long taught the futility of regulation to establish justice and inculcate virtue. Our ancestors revolted against the medieval notion of the imposition of truth from above and against the theory of the necessity of direction of daily life by the intelligent. For this they rejected both empire and Church in the sixteenth century; for this they fought with principalities and powers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; for this they came to America and sought the islands of the sea; for this they cheerfully endured hunger, privation, imprisonment, the rack, and the flaming fagots. And shall we now deny our glorious heritage from these martyrs of the past and accept from Hohenzollern, Hapsburg, and Ottoman the governmental theories of Gregory VII. and Innocent III., of Charlemagne and Charles V., the logic of the Inquisition, the statecraft of Machiavelli? The French and British people are mindful of Jeanne d'Arc and of the Spanish Armada. They cherish the memory of the English civil wars and of the French Revolution. They look back with pride to the Rights of Man and the Citizen and to the Reform Act of 1832. They can never, in view of that heritage, deny the principle of nationality, the liberty of the individual, the equality of democracy, the reign of law.

For the American people in particular the war is a great moral crusade, a disinterested battle for justice and right. The great majority are conscious of but indistinct and distant ends of im-

mediate significance. That our national independence is in reality threatened, that our cherished democracy is literally in danger, they accept because the President, in whose wisdom and impartiality they are coming more and more to possess an almost blind confidence, has assured them in carefully considered utterances of the unassailable truth of those facts. But the demonstration of that truth the majority have thus far been unable to undertake for themselves. They have been and are still moved by a righteous indignation and high moral anger which has in it no admixture whatever of baseness or selfishness. In its impartiality lies its strength; from its subjectivity comes its white-hot intensity; from its impersonality comes its conviction of justice. Never in human history has a great nation willed a war with such magnificent assurance of rectitude and such profound conviction of the imperative necessity of victory for the preservation of civilization. In generations to come the espousal of the cause of Belgium and of France by the American people will of itself decide the issue of the justifiability of the war and condemn the Central Powers for all time for damnable aggression, for lust of conquest, for the commission of unspeakable atrocities.

The Anglo-Saxon has professed his inward conviction of divine justice, truth, and immanence with a shamefaced and invincible diffidence. It has never been our habit to wave our arms in public assemblies and call upon the Deity with vain mouthings to witness our partnership with

Him, to profess a mystical relationship to Him, and claim literal guidance in statecraft and war. But none the less deep and abiding has been our consciousness of the reality of divine assistance, and the national determination to shape our policies and actions in accordance with His law. Our prayers have not been lacking in fervor because we have whispered them in our closets instead of professing them before men. We have attained a sense of rectitude not less powerful in the sight of God because our conviction of our ability correctly to apprehend God's intention finds its expression with no great assurance and with some appreciation of the fallibility and weakness of human understanding. In all diffidence we believe that a Divine Providence does in some way aid the cause of justice, of truth, and of humanity. In all humility we say in our hearts that God fights for us and will give us the victory.

Is it not clear that such a view of the moral issue of the war is utterly inconsistent with our ability to depend upon the assistance of the peoples of the Central Empires in concluding such a peace as will make safe democracy and civilization? We cannot one moment inveigh against the Germans as brutes, pirates, and aggressive enemies, accept literally the stories of atrocities and of submarine horrors, and in the next breath declare them attached to democracy and ready to co-operate with us in its perpetuation. The Allied notion of the degree of victory we require rests upon the culpability of the German nation as a whole. This notion of the peace we must

have and the method by which it is to be achieved seems to assume that the German nation possesses an entirely opposite character. If we go to war with them on the ground that they are brutal and faithless we cannot consistently suppose that we shall win our victory with the aid of qualities in these very men which our own analysis of the moral issue has just denied them. In view of the attitude of the German public toward the *Lusitania*, the atrocities in Belgium, the looting of France, how can we maintain that they are a simple, kindly, and artistic nation who need to be rescued from the oppression of the Hohenzollerns and Hapsburgs?

There is no question so important as this to settle. The degree of victory we must have depends literally upon the trust which can be imposed in the German people themselves. It is not their strength we fear so much as their will to use it for objects we regard as unwarrantable. It is not the strategic positions of which we are afraid so much as the power they place in the hands of men for whom treaties have no sanctity and the laws of war no reality. If they can be trusted in the future, why could we not trust them in the past? If they have proved themselves faithless in the past, how shall we trust them in the future? To divide the German people into two parts and to say that the Kaiser, the officials, and the military class are responsible for the war, guilty of its atrocities, and should be punished for their crimes; to treat the remainder of the nation as

their unwitting or unwilling dupes—is merely to rephrase the problem. We must still explain how and why these dupes are still fighting with unquestionable energy in the midst of privation to perpetuate the very oppression which we assume they dislike and reprobate.

It is also idle to draw a moral line between Germany and her allies, to treat the latter as innocent and therefore harmless. Such a distinction rests upon diplomatic expediency rather than upon evidences of moral superiority. The Allies are attempting to fight the war by means of the old formula, to conquer Germany with the aid of the Germans, to separate Austria from Hungary by the old antipathies, to paralyze their military efforts by internal revolt. The anxiety to shoulder the moral guilt upon the Germans grows not from a conviction of the innocence of their allies, but of their usefulness; not from a desire to acquit them, but from a determination to stimulate them to disloyalty. To do this we must deny their complicity in the war. But again we have merely shifted our ground and created a new problem equally difficult to solve. Why have they so long remained accomplices after the fact, if the contrary impulses in those countries are as powerful as we deem them to be? Why did they co-operate at all? Our calculation is no more dependable because we have introduced two new assumptions into it. It is still to be solved: we are still dealing with the imponderables which are not certain. Unfortunately, we arrive at the dilemma that if the German people

are hoodwinked, they lack intelligence; that if the Austrians are honestly their allies, they lack humanity. On the contrary, if the Kaiser finds support in the honest conviction of the vast majority of the German people, we may conclude them intelligent, but we must also admit that they possess a culpability for the war equal to his. If we suppose that the Austrians, the Hungarians, and the Bulgarians co-operate only because they must, do we not assume an ability of the Germans and the Austrians to exert upon them a forcible pressure which the war itself would make impossible? If they co-operate without compulsion, they then must also bear their share in the onus of guilt.

Unfortunately, the difficulty remains exceedingly great so long as any element of uncertainty persists. Unless we know positively that the German and Austrian people are not responsible for the war, unless we can be definitely assured that the Hungarians have yielded only to compulsion, we cannot base our entire calculation in regard to the dispositions necessary to make us safe in the future upon their innocence, and assume their dependability and their honest democratic convictions. Let him who doubts read something of the sermons preached by the German clergy during the war. Let him read the manifestos signed by scientists of international repute. Let him talk with a few Germans or Austrians. Let him remember that the intellectual class has been educated upon Pan-Germanist history, literature, and philosophy for more than

a generation. The certainty of victory cannot be predicated upon by no means unassailable conclusions about imponderables, themselves by their very nature open to a variety of interpretations. If we must depend upon the assistance of the Austro-Hungarians to win the war, the war is irrevocably lost. No certainty nor safety can emerge from it. It may be well for us to remember that the ingratitude of Austria on one famous occasion astonished a cynical world. If we premise her ingratitude and disloyalty to the Germans, we shall scarcely be wise to rely upon her gratitude and loyalty toward ourselves.

Nothing could be more dangerous for the Allies in the future than such a victory. If we reorganize Europe upon the basis of a decentralization of Central Europe created by the people themselves, we shall then put ourselves irremediably into their hands. The new settlement, upon which our safety is to depend, can at any moment be destroyed by their will to overthrow it, and we shall be entirely incapable by diplomatic, political, or military opposition to prevent it. If we defeat them by the simple expedient of stimulating disloyalty, is it not immediately obvious that we ourselves may lose our victory at any moment when they choose to resume loyal co-operation with one another? We could not more completely put ourselves into their hands; we could not build upon a more sandy formation, or erect a structure of future security more frail and unstable. We shall put

ourselves into the hands of a people whose morality and trustworthiness we have seen hitherto every reason to doubt, whose ambitions we have had every reason to suspect are hostile to our safety, whose allegiance has apparently never wavered to a government we detest and fear.

If such a settlement is possible, how can it conceivably be permanent? Is it not evident that if such were the characteristics of the people of the Central Empires, the war could not have broken out, could not have been prosecuted; that the danger to democracy and to civilization would not exist which we have so many times affirmed with vehemence. Such a solution denies the justifiability and expediency of the war. It disavows the imperative necessity of victory. It implies that a military victory is impossible and that we are reduced to compromising with the foe. It even proclaims our readiness to treat with him on the basis of his views regarding the justice of the outbreak of the war, the merciful manner in which it has been prosecuted, and the formal renunciation of our previous convictions about both. Our moral surrender will be complete; our moral defense sacrificed; our spiritual professions stultified. Such a victory will be a thousand times worse than defeat in the field. It will provide no guarantee whatever for the future which would possess the slightest validity beyond that which the people of the Central Empires themselves saw fit to recognize. Our security would last as long as they permitted;

it would end when they chose; for it would rest upon factors not within our own control. If this be the solution of the war, defeat is certain and the complete domination of Europe by Germany can be only a question of time.

XX

DEFEAT THROUGH VICTORY

TO those who decline to predicate the assistance of the German people or to regard their adoption of democracy as other than a hypocritical subterfuge, who realize that the sea power unaided is not able to win a maximum victory against land power, a military victory seems indispensable. It is of prime importance for us to determine as accurately as we may what such a victory now involves and to reach some conclusions in regard to its probability. Is it likely that the needs and objectives of the military campaign can be adequately enough foreseen to enable us to assume a sweeping military victory? Can we compute its cost in men and resources? Can we pay it? The interest of the United States in these issues is immediate because in all probability we must pay that price ourselves, the effort which it involves we must ourselves exert, and the question of whether we can and will make it is one to be decided calmly, purposefully, and with full knowledge of the consequences of the decision, of the type and extent of action it will involve.

To attain the objectives announced by the Allies—the complete political and administrative reorganization of Central Europe—such a victory must be sweeping indeed. Nothing less will suffice than the reconquest of all territory now occupied by the Germans, the invasion of Germany itself, the capture of Berlin, the abdication of the Kaiser, the dictation at Potsdam of peace on any terms the Allies can agree upon. The enormous extent of the territory to be reconquered, the strength of its strategic defenses, the size and efficiency of the German army, will be the measure of the cost we must pay. The number of years necessary will depend not upon the force the Allies exert, but upon the German resistance. Double and treble the present rate of progress in France, the weakening of the German defense, and the loss of German morale will still make inevitable a war many years long. Nor must we forget that the Russians may release their German prisoners and thus add a million seasoned troops to the present army. The Russian Revolution may also solve the German economic problem. The cost of victory will depend not upon the extent of our resources, but upon the efficiency of the German defense. If we estimate at half the expenditure of this last year the number of men to be sacrificed to buy back so much territory, the amount of ammunition indispensable, the amount of clothing to be manufactured and of food to be placed in the armies' mouths, the result will be staggering to contemplate.

Assuming, however, that such a victory is possible, it can scarcely be expedient. The old optimism of the first years of the war held that there could be no price which the Allies could not easily afford to pay for such a maximum victory. Were unlimited resources exhaustible? Would not a man power beyond all possible needs suffice? The change in the German strategy of victory, the adoption of the policy hitherto described as the strategy of defeat and the economic defensive have made it entirely possible that the Allies may win a maximum victory in the field at the cost of all that victory has sought to preserve.[1] Like the fabled apples of antiquity, victory would turn to ashes in our mouths.

There is a limit to the French and British man power which can be sacrificed in the fighting of the war without sapping the future economic strength of those countries to a greater degree than their power of recuperation can restore. The French are already dangerously near that limit, and Great Britain has certainly in the field the maximum of her man power. There is a similar limit to the productivity of the Allies. Already the reserve stores of coal, iron, wool, and other indispensable raw materials for the prosecution of the war have been exhausted, not only in the Allied countries, but throughout the world. The raw materials to be spent in the

[1] Such seems to be Lord Lansdowne's true opinion. M. Chéradame seems even to doubt the possibility of maximum victory in the field.

further prosecution of the war must be produced by the Allied countries as well as manufactured by them. The supply certainly will not be without limit. For a time a country may turn its entire efforts to the prosecution of a war and may then be able to produce in quantities far beyond any calculation hitherto foreseen, but its power to produce is none the less limited. Men cannot work indefinitely three shifts a day.

Nor is it possible, while so vast an amount of iron and raw material is being spent upon the prosecution of the war itself, to replace the rolling stock of the Allied railway systems, already badly depleted in Great Britain, France, and the United States. A third vast demand is also made upon these raw materials for ship-building. If the material goes into ships the amount available for guns and for ammunition is that much less. If it goes into railroads it cannot go into ships. The limit is already reached in all the Allied countries to which these three programs can be simultaneously pushed forward. Indeed, it is already doubtful whether the three can simultaneously proceed to the extent which the prosecution of an offensive by the Allies makes indispensable. The larger the army in France the greater the burden on the ships, the railroads, the factories, the mines, and the fewer are the available laborers. Meanwhile, the permanent plant of the community—the houses, streets, road-beds, bridges—has been undergoing an unusual strain and receiving rather less than the usual repair. It must not be forgotten that a

very great section of the community annually devotes its entire labor to the replacing of the plant which has worn out by the wear and tear of living. There is a length of time beyond which this repair cannot be postponed without seriously complicating the problem of the continuation of the war and the reconstruction of the world after peace has been signed.

Great Britain and the United States, and in large measure France, have thus far financed the war by traditional taxes and loans. They have bought from private concerns and paid a profit and are paying wages or allowances to the men in the army. The length of time these nations can thus finance the war is by no means unlimited, and the effort which they can thus conceivably exert in its prosecution is also very decidedly circumscribed. Vast accumulations of capital, great banking systems, and credit structures are here of little moment except as media of exchange. The essential element is the ability of the nation to produce. More than that the state cannot have and to that the loans and taxes are limited. After the subsistence of the nation at home has been subtracted, the residuum can be spent or confiscated or conscripted. But if the amount of material which the state wishes to devote to the prosecution of the war becomes more than this amount, it cannot be had, not because the credit of the nation is not good, but because the material with which the war itself must be prosecuted is not in existence. No amount of credit, no flotation of bonds, can be

pushed beyond the power of the nation to produce what is needed within the time available for its production.

It is at present hardly expedient, in view of the all but certain loss of Russian man power and resources to the Allies and their entirely possible addition to the Germans, to assume a very pronounced inequality of men and of resources in favor of the Allies. The ratio between the offensive and the defensive is at present placed at not less than six to one, and it is a very grave question indeed whether the Allies can exert six times as much strength as the Germans, can produce six times as much munitions for the number of years necessary to clear the entire conquered territory of Germans, to invade Germany itself, and take Berlin. If the cost of the prosecution of the war during the last year by the Allies is any indication at all of its cost in the future, a maximum military victory can be had only by a destruction of the man power and economic resources of France and Great Britain which would leave them in the future so weak as to be unable to use the victory they had won. For the United States such losses will be positively less significant, but the future safety of the United States depends upon the continued strength of Great Britain and France in Europe. It is not to our interest to allow them thus to weaken themselves nor can it be expedient for them. Their positive inferiority in numbers and in area, compared with the Central Empires, is already so great,

their recuperative power comparatively so much less, that any loss for them is relatively more serious than it can be for the Central Empires. If they should be thus weakened by the prosecution of the war, the Central Powers would become dominant in Europe, whatever their fortunes in the field. Indeed, a military defeat for the Allies would be less serious, if it left them still strong in men and with resources unimpaired, than such a victory. France and Great Britain must emerge from the war powerful, united, and solvent, by whatever name the result is described. It is entirely possible for the Allies to lose the war by winning it at a certain price.

Nor is it by any means certain that a military victory would destroy the strength of Central Europe and the danger of its predominance which the Allies so greatly fear. Neither its true basis nor its greatest strength lies in those factors which armies can affect or destroy. The dangers are economic and administrative rather than military. Once we assume that the German people themselves are honestly ambitious to expand, to increase their dominion in Africa and their power upon the sea, the aggressive power of the army becomes by no means the most dangerous element in Pan-Germanism. Its real strength lies in the new methods of communication by railroad, telegraph, and steamship; in the new economics of nationalization; in the new co-operative finance and in the new applied science. The annihilation of distance and of time by the new devices for communication have

made the efficient administration of such great areas as Germany and Austria-Hungary for the first time feasible, and has for the first time in history made their strength available. The railroad again has made economic unity between them a fact, the interchange of goods a possibility, and their association in one tariff union expedient. It is in the new industrial chemistry, in physics, in biology, that German supremacy really lies. Less capable of original ideas than the British or the French, certainly outdistanced by the Americans in useful inventions, the Germans have proved themselves better able to develop and commercially utilize the inventions of other races than those races themselves. An American invented the aeroplane, but the Germans found out how to use it. The submarine is an American invention, but a German weapon. Chemistry was discovered by the British and was utilized by the Germans. These bases of German strength and prosperity are unassailable by armies, nor can they be destroyed by new political combinations or by paper treaties of peace.

Still less will a military defeat, however sweeping, change an existing consensus of opinion among the peoples of Central Europe in regard to the desirability of independence, of unity, and of mutual co-operation. If they do vote to support the Government and to co-operate for ends upon which they do agree, the strength of all the armies of the world, winning innumerable victories in the field and leading to the signature of humiliating treaties and to the adoption

of constitutional expedients, will be unavailing to destroy and weaken that willingness to exert the national strength for aggressive ends. If the Allies are right that such a spirit is not dominant in the people of the Central Empires, no military victory is needed to achieve Allied safety. If they are wrong in their analysis, no military victory can render them permanently safe from it.

Still less can armies accomplish the spiritual and moral regeneration of the Central Empires. In the long run, that alone can make democracy secure. Some will object to such a contention on the score of its too great regard for mercy; others will cavil because its obvious prudence and expediency remove its merit as a moral appeal. If the view espoused of the moral responsibility of the peoples of the Central Empires as a whole be correct, the greatest future danger from them lies in their moral attitude rather than in their military prowess or economic assets. Those are but the tools of the brain. No victory can be constructive which is couched in terms or phrases which aggravate rather than diminish the danger from this moral attitude. Many in the Allied countries view the catastrophe in Italy with feelings almost of physical suffering because of the fear that it postpones or even renders more remote the infliction upon the Germans of that physical chastisement so many feel their deeds deserve. We have not yet been able to throw off the heritage of the flesh and the ills to which it is heir, to resist

at first our impulse to retaliate with suffering for suffering, to demand our pound of flesh and an eye for an eye. Even the wisest and greatest of men have found it difficult to remember that the Scriptures say, "Vengeance is mine." It is natural for us to forget that men, still less nations, have not been commonly converted or led to true repentance by physical abuse or suffering. A military victory inflicts physical punishment, and a cry for the crushing of Germany is an attempt to secure her moral reform through her physical degradation. Leaving one side the question of whether such a demand is un-Christian, inconsistent with the true object of the Allied crusade, it is still inexpedient because a thousand times proved unavailing to achieve its ultimate objective. Such military and physical punishment leads to convictions of injured innocence, to claims of the ulterior purpose of the "conquerors." It is more likely to convince the vanquished of the justifiability of their own cause in the war than it is to lead them to repent the methods by which they conducted it. It commonly results in new wars.

It will not be necessary for us to change our estimate of German brutality, to declare that the great stain of atrocities is wiped out and forgotten, to profess an entire willingness to trust the Germans in the future, or to believe ourselves capable as yet of loving them in all sincerity and honesty. We must, on the contrary, maintain our moral reprobation of the beginning of the war and of its conduct long

after it is over. It is our most powerful and effective weapon against them, the one method by which they may be convinced of the enormity of their sin. In our desire to educate them, to reach them by brotherly love and by spiritual appeals, there must never be any doubt left of the reality of the crime nor of the personnel of its perpetrators. But if we base our demand for victory upon high moral indignation over German crimes, we cannot consistently abandon that spiritual attitude when we come to define the terms of peace. We cannot couch them in the traditional language of aggression and of the old diplomacy—*noblesse oblige.* We should conduct ourselves with moderation and humanity, display at the close of the war a disinterestedness which shall convince them that we have in all truth not pursued the war for vindictive, revengeful, covetous, and selfish motives. We cannot charge them with brutality, retaliate with conquest, and expect their moral regeneration. Spiritual truth has never been beaten into murderers and drunkards with clubs, nor into nations by military conquest, by the partition of their territory and the vindictive proscription of their leaders. If the magnificent *élan* with which the Allies entered the war, the splendor of the moral crusade which they have pursued, are to bear true fruits in Allied countries and in Germany, the war must end by the display on the part of the Allied peoples themselves of moderation, of disinterestedness, and of fairness.

We entered the war for the safety of democracy and we must not end it with terms imposed upon the German people which belie the sincerity of our own professions. To force democracy upon them is so entirely undemocratic, so contrary to all our own theoretical beliefs, that such a method of conquest will most surely defeat its own ends. The Allied nations have fought the war on the highest possible moral plane. There they must end it. They must not aim at a victory open to charges of revenge for past wrongs, of commercial greed, or of selfish aggrandizement. They must not bring forth peace clad in the traditional expedients of secret diplomacy, of aggression, and of conquest, long familiar to the Germans in past ages, and expect that sort of peace to be accepted with rejoicing. Still less will it be permanent. Permanent peace must rest upon the conversion of the people of the Central Empires. But they must repent of their own free will. Their spiritual regeneration they alone can accomplish. Thus have we preached in our defense of the war. Shall we deny our Lord now that the end is approaching and victory in sight?

There will be those who will insist that the Germans deserve no such treatment, and they will be right. Not their deserts, but our own humanity exacts from us in the interest of civilization magnanimity and moderation. We must not by our own act destroy the structure for whose perpetuation we have shed so much blood and spent so much treasure. Nor is it

necessary. *Still less is it expedient for the Allies to abandon international realities, exhaust their own strength, and deny the literal truth of their own moral professions merely to win in Europe objectives which are no longer of moment.* The control of the world is no longer to be decided in Europe; it rests no longer in the hands of European coalitions. The Allies cannot to-day lose international status by a defeat in Europe. Even if it were possible for them to win in Europe a maximum victory of the old type, it is no longer expedient, because the world has changed. The old victory can never again have the old effect, whether won by the Allies or by the Germans. Neither can win what they intended or lose what they most feared.

XXI

THE OLD EUROPE AND THE NEW

IF we look solely at the European situation and view it in the light of the old diplomacy and strategical geography, it is difficult to see how the Allies can win the war. No certainty of victory can be predicated, and there can be little doubt that the achievement of victory in the older sense and with the older objectives will require a greater effort than it is expedient for them to exert. Such a victory would be tantamount to defeat in the greater objectives. Let us not, however, leap hastily to the conclusion that the war is therefore lost. It is by no means true that the safety of democracy in the world to-day rests upon a balance of power primarily European. One of the greatest difficulties thus far in the prosecution of the war has been the assumption that victory must possess certain traditional characteristics, be achieved in certain traditional ways and in certain definite places. At the first the Allies assumed that the past could be restored, Germany punished, safety assured only by the old methods and by the old machinery, in existence at the beginning

of the war and consecrated by centuries of usage. It is very hard for many now to face the growing conviction that the war is not to be won in the old way nor by the attainment of the old objectives. More and more men are coming to realize in the Allied countries that in the old sense of victory Germany is winning the war and has already achieved so much as to make problematical the attainment by the Allies of the older type of victory which they started out to win.

In those first anguished moments when it seemed as if democracy and morality were about to be trodden under foot and the achievements of civilization destroyed, the Allies, as was natural, recalled the one formula from the past which gave them a remedy for the situation that confronted them. A weak Germany and a strong Russia would solve their problem. What was simpler than to weaken the one and to strengthen the other? Promptly they started out to apply the magic formula and at once were compelled to phrase democratic ideals in the policies and terminology of the old diplomacy. They described a peace which should include democracy and internationalism in the language of the older expedients and of the older alliances. They sketched the restoration of the old France, of the old particularistic Germany, and of feudalistic Austria. When the Russian Revolution took place, they cried out that it was more necessary than ever that Germany should be weakened and divided, Russia re-

organized and strengthened. How might it be done? men asked. Once more they replied with the old formula. We must conquer Germany with the aid of the Germans themselves, just as was done in the Reformation, in the Thirty Years' War, in the Napoleonic period. We must set Germany and Austria to loggerheads and return to the policies of Olmütz and the War of 1866. We must protect ourselves against the aggressive strength of these nations by creating buffer states under Allied patronage; we can and must revive the Napoleonic Duchy of Warsaw, the Denmark of 1852, the Napoleonic Republic of Illyria. Austria must be broken up and destroyed by the old method attempted against Maria Theresa, by a concerted revolt of the subject people, by a breach between Austria and Hungary. Once more, just as at the beginning of the Thirty Years' War, we hear that an independent Bohemia must be created.

Let us not be blind to the fact that these are the expedients by which secret diplomacy in the past instituted and attempted to perpetuate aggression and conquest. They speak the language of Richelieu and Louis XIV., of Napoleon and Metternich, of Canning and Wellington. They anticipate another defeat of the Armada, a second Jena, another treaty of Westphalia. Unfortunately, they depend upon the old expedient of fighting the devil with fire. They are not democratic methods nor yet imbued with the premises of liberty. They speak the language of tyranny and revive the devices of

autocracy. They involve the old statecraft and the old diplomacy, the old farcical international law, and the restoration of the old boundary feuds. Such a victory would be entirely inconsistent with the moral stand upon the origin of the war and with the professions of the Allies about democracy and the future of civilization. It was inevitable at the very outset of the war that the images of the past should have been vivid in the European mind and the ideals of the future as yet faint, that the expedients by which Germany and Austria had been curbed in the past should seem infallible, and the newer methods, based upon the logic of the future, weak and despicable. There was in such a dependence upon the past nothing blameworthy, for the reality of aggression and of conquest, the principles of autocracy and of greed, were no longer facts in Allied minds.

Let us candidly admit the magnitude of German achievements during the war, not in the least to arouse our admiration for their perpetrators, but to appraise justly the task before us and to confirm our apprehensions and fears. There are already many who neither love the Germans nor fear them. We need more who will not underestimate the Germans merely because they despise them. It must be owned that if the old formula of victory is infallible, the Germans have already won the war. They hold in their hands the keys to Europe, Belgium, Alsace-Lorraine, the Trentino and the Italian passes, the great roads and passes of the Bal-

kans, the Danube, and the passes of the Carpathians, the military frontiers and approaches between Germany and Poland. They are masters of the Black Sea and of Constantinople. They hold in proud possession the lands and entrances to the Baltic. Everywhere they have fought and continue to fight upon enemy soil, with the enemies' resources, and with the aid of a subject population. Despite some shifts and changes of position on the West Front, their line still holds practically as they drew it after the battle of the Marne. In the east, they have swept all before them. Poland has been overrun and destroyed; the Russian army defeated and disorganized; Rumania occupied in one of the most rapid and successful campaigns in the history of warfare; Serbia reduced to ashes; and now in Italy a great victory already registered and a position occupied from which still more important achievements are possible. Let us not stultify ourselves by denying the consequence of such campaigns.

Is it possible for the Allies by a military victory of any size or type to restore the old Europe, to invoke successfully the old formula which they have already so many times pronounced, of a weak and disunited Germany at odds with Austria, held in check by a strong Russia, allied with France and Great Britain? It is not too much to say that such a victory is literally impossible. The old Europe cannot be restored or maintained because the old Europe is already destroyed. Whatever may happen, the old bal-

ance of power is no more. Germany will remain too strong for the formula; Russia too weak. Whether or not a democratic revolt takes place in Germany, it is from all points of view probable that she will remain sufficiently united for purposes of defense. It is safe to predict that she has been conquered for the last time with the aid of Germans. The South Germans will not again assist in the conquest of Prussia, nor Austria-Hungary and Germany be found on opposite sides of the battle-field. For half a century a great campaign has been conducted in schools, churches, universities, lecture bureaus, newspapers, novels, histories, to demonstrate how fatal to Germany in the past has been this co-operation of Germans with the foreigners and to render it forever impossible. The work has been done with German thoroughness, if without any great or scrupulous regard for truth. Certainly the solidarity of Mittel-Europa will serve all defensive purposes, however deficient it may prove as the problems of the future crowd upon the new entity.

No one event has so fundamentally changed Europe and the world as the Russian Revolution. It intensifies and magnifies all other alterations in strategic dispositions. The hostility of the old dynasty to the new Germany was the very basis of the balance of power, for it wielded not too capably the potential strength of one hundred and eighty millions of people and the economic resources of an area twice as large as the rest of Europe. Its very potentiality

furnished the necessary counterpoise in strength in Europe to the rapid growth of Central Europe in population and to its even more astounding economic development. Russia's location on the vulnerable eastern frontier of Germany, its possession of Warsaw, its menace in the Black Sea to the Danube and the Balkans, made it feasible to plan an assault upon the new Pan-Germanism with some prospect of success. Russia not only had long dreamed of the possession of Constantinople, but she already held a strategic position to which Constantinople could be added, and which she had the necessary strength to defend against a united, well-organized, and militant Germany and Austria-Hungary. By Russia alone could the extension of the Pan-Germanic Confederation into the Balkans and Asia Minor be prevented. By Russia alone could the Balkans be organized as states hostile to Pan-Germanism because she alone possessed natural interests of race and economic association with them. Without Russian aid, the creation of the Pan-Germanic league was long ago conceded to be inevitable.

Russia, moreover, would be a dependable ally for France and Great Britain. The dynasty had for two centuries cherished the policy of securing an exit for Russia from the Baltic or Black Sea into the open ocean or at least into the Mediterranean. Czars had plotted and schemed, sent millions to death, stooped to murder and vulgar intrigue to accomplish so much as had been achieved toward the great

end. Then as the number and strength of possible foes seemed to be diminishing and the ambition of centuries seemed about to be fulfilled, there was hatched and developed the one scheme which might not improbably postpone for a century or two the goal of endeavor. The loyalty of the dynasty to the western powers, none too well assured since 1890, became after 1907 unshakable. The war destroyed the army; the Revolution destroyed the Russian administrative fabric, inaugurated a reign of chaos in industry and agriculture, and swept away the policies and alliances of the monarchy. The old balance of power in Europe fell with a crash. The equipoise to a possible Pan-Germany was destroyed, the obstacle in its path removed, its one redoubtable foe in future done to death. Without Russia Constantinople cannot be held, even if won, or the Balkans protected against a united Germany and Austria-Hungary knocking at the gates. Without Russia the territorial settlement promised by the Allies can neither be won nor maintained. It has indeed become literally inexpedient. It assumed the continued existence of elements in the situation which have disappeared.

The old Europe cannot be restored because it was in part based upon factors not controlled by armies nor to be created by victories in the field. The prime weakness of Germany and Austria in the past was the lack of facilities of transportation and communication adequate for the trade and administration of so large an

area, inhabited by so many people. Both were countries too large for their facilities of communication, too unwieldy to be governed as single entities; communication was too slow to insure efficient co-operation between their parts. In such a soil the old antipathies and hatreds were long nourished and were slow to disappear. The railroad, Bismarck saw, solved the problem of unity. It made possible the successful administration of Germany as a whole; it made profitable overland trade between the German states; the new science solved the difficulties of industry; the new machinery provided work for people hitherto condemned to unprofitable agriculture on worn-out fields. So, too, the railroad and the telegraph made it possible to enlist the full strength of the population in the army. The new science put weapons into their hands in sufficient quantities. The size of the population became a real asset and ceased to be a liability. The railroads, the new education, the new communications, the newspapers, the new profit within the tariff union, created a new community of feeling, a consensus of opinion about the desirability of the new state, which had never existed in the past and which would be the all-important element assuring the continuity and perpetuation of this new-found unity and co-operation. There had always been in Germany the elements of great strength; they had merely needed to be organized, unified, and combined.

So in Austria and in Hungary the old hatred

of the Germans, of the Magyars, and of the Slavs for one another, based upon the old antipathies, have been weakened in large measure by the economics of nationalization, by the work of the railroads, by the new science, by travel and by immigration, by the profits of the tariff union. The old consciousness of difference has been less keen; the old racial lines are less real and now represent a movement for local autonomy rather than for national independence. The old Germany and Austria were weak because divided not only by political and administrative lines, but by time and space, by the difficulty of communication, and by the relics of feudalism. The old weakness of Germany, upon which for so many generations the international status of France and Great Britain depended, can never be restored; the work of the nineteenth century cannot be undone. The sort of weakness which the old formula predicated will never again exist. The sort of disunion which the old formula assumed in Austria-Hungary is no longer probable.

It is equally impossible for the Allies themselves to restore the sort of position they once held in Europe. The Italians indeed have no love for the sort of position they used to hold, but with the French and the English there is still a longing for the old predominance they once cherished and for which the names of Napoleon and of Nelson, of Austerlitz and of Trafalgar, stand.

France, between 1814 and 1870, held a position

in Europe by no means dependent upon her territorial dispositions or her international alliances. Compared with other states, her population was great and her area wide, her fields rich and her industrial organization strong. The Revolution had freed her from the shackles of feudalism at a time when Central Europe and Italy still groaned under its fetters. The great administrative and legal reconstruction of the Napoleonic régime had brought a solution of the problem of adequate administration at a time when all other continental states were hampered and weakened in international policy by the incompetence of their administrative and executive machinery. France possessed also a national unity far more complete than other countries had, if we except England, a consensus of opinion of the desirability of its continuance which no other country but England possessed. The campaigns of Napoleon had given her prestige as the greatest military nation, and from that long quarter of a century of conquest and domination had come an *élan*, a national pride, a consciousness of superiority, which Frenchmen treasured.

Unquestionably the old France can never return. Her relatively greater strength, due to her earlier freedom from the feudalistic régime, has been destroyed during the nineteenth century by the complete freedom of all European communities (except in the Balkans) from the shackles of the past. The industrial monopoly of machinery which France and Great Britain then shared is now common to all European

communities. Scientific agriculture has made possible the cultivation of fields in Europe which could not compete with the fertile French areas in 1814. The railroads have brought into the market transatlantic areas which have driven out of cultivation the French fields themselves. No longer has France so great an administrative handicap over other European nations. Bismarck, Beust, Andrassy, Cavour, have reorganized the rest of Europe. France is no longer the best organized and therefore the most powerful nation, no longer the wealthiest because the most efficient. While the national unity of France was extraordinary in 1814, it was in 1914 by no means exceptional. In 1870 French military prestige suffered a humiliation which has not yet been forgotten or forgiven. The old unassailable France, secure within her great frontiers, assured of her military strength and her administrative competence, conscious of the heritage of the eighteenth century and her traditions of superiority over the rest of Europe—this France is gone forever. The Second Empire can no more be restored than the Old Régime. The old ascendancy of France was not primarily political, military, or diplomatic, but cultural, literary, social, economic. It was not positive, but relative—French achievement compared with that of other nations. No military conquest can restore that ascendancy in Europe, for it rested upon elements which armies only partially created and which the nineteenth century itself has destroyed. The new imperial

France, consecrated by the war, will hold a loftier and prouder place in history, but it will be a new France, not the old.

Similarly, the older England has been merged into the Greater Britain and the predominance of 1814 lost in the process of transformation from kingdom to empire. The reality behind the magic words Trafalgar and Waterloo was the great economic monopoly which the invention of machinery gave to England and which the outbreak of the Napoleonic wars enabled her to keep as an exclusive possession for nearly a quarter of a century. For that long period she was the only nation able to manufacture on a peace basis. It gave her a monopoly of the world's market for manufactured goods and laid the foundation of her great industrial fabric and her present accumulation of capital. Her predominance lay next in the fact that her merchant marine was practically the only one of consequence upon the sea. After the downfall of the American clipper ships, it remained for nearly a generation unchallenged in its supremacy and control of the world's transportation. She had also for many years a practical control of the source of supply of the great staples then imported into Europe—cotton, tobacco, indigo, sugar, tea, coffee, known at that time as "the colonial goods." Bulky freight was not at that time commonly transported across the ocean, and in the only kind of foreign trade pursued in Europe at a profit the English possessed not only the ships, but control of the source of sup-

ply. They, too, had solved the administrative problem with which Central Europe was then struggling. They, too, had rid themselves, far earlier than France, of the vestiges of feudalism. They, too, had tasted the blessings of peace and the importance of intellectual endeavor. They, too, had long known national unity, administrative competence, and a consciousness of security.

The supremacy of the British navy rested not alone upon seamanship and ability of the first quality, not only upon the victories of Nelson and the achievements of Blake, but at this time in almost equal degree upon the paramount importance of the transport of bulky goods by water. Before the days of the railroad, overland transportation imposed an almost insuperable barrier in the ways of profitable trade. Water transportation was then all important, and a nation which controlled as completely as England did the water and all of its ways possessed naturally a pre-eminence and a predominance in the interests of other nations which can never return, now that the railroad has made possible the transport of bulky goods overland. The navy's supremacy was also assured by the fact that war-ships were then built of wood and calked with tar and pitch. The main source of naval supplies for Europe lay in the Baltic, and the English had long seen the importance of controlling it. Once, therefore, the fleets of their rivals were destroyed, it was impossible to rebuild them as long as the English fleet itself controlled access to the main source of supply.

This predominance of England is gone forever. No longer does she possess a monopoly of machinery, still less of the opportunity to use it; there is no longer a monopoly of the material from which navies are built nor of the source of supply of goods used in foreign trade. Not only her navy, but her merchant marine now finds upon the sea powerful rivals. The old prestige of the England of 1814 and of Waterloo spoke in the language of the world's financial capital, of the industrial revolution, and of wooden ships. It was destroyed long ago by the extension of science and invention throughout the world, by the use of steel, and can never return. The coming prestige of the new British Empire, organized during the war, will more than take its place, but it cannot restore it. The old Europe is gone—no military victory can revive it—and with it the older Britain.

Possession of the old strategic dispositions can no longer confer the former conclusive results or assure the old degree of military control. To be sure, Belgium and Alsace-Lorraine still control France and still hold the roads to Germany. The Italian passes are still potent factors in military campaigns, and it would be useless to contravene the value of Constantinople or the importance of Warsaw, but never again can the possession of these objectives lead to the same international results. Never again can the war be won or lost solely in Belgium. It is not that the military terrain there is altered, but that all the administrative, economic, and social fac-

tors which formerly controlled the value of the military dispositions can never be what once they were. We must predicate the same sort of Germans there used to be, the same sort of a France and an Austria, the economic incompetence of Central Europe, before the interchange of territorial entities between them can restore the old relationships or have the old importance. Even a maximum military victory, resulting in the list of territorial concessions which the Allies have presumed would follow from the revolt in Austria-Hungary and Germany, would be devoid of the effect which the old formulas assumed, because every other factor in the situation is fundamentally altered. The certainty of victory can no longer be predicted in terms of the old formula either for the Allies or for the Germans. It is not the territory the Germans hold which makes them formidable; it is their will and their ability to use it. It is not the army which we must fear, but the spirit behind it. It is not the domination of Germany and Austria-Hungary by an autocratic, militaristic régime which need terrify us, but the fear that the people themselves approve of the general object of the war and the method of its prosecution. It is against this new spirit of aggression in the Central European peoples that we must guard. The old weapons have broken in our hands and the old barriers have been thrown down. We must look for safety to new weapons, to new strategic dispositions, to new forces and formulas.

XXII

THE POSITIVE ASSURANCE OF GERMAN DEFEAT

A NEW world has grown into existence outside Europe of which Europe is but a part. Pan-Germanism planned its domination; the Allies invited its co-operation upon terms of equality. The Allies have already won. They have lost Europe and won the world. And shall not the world control Europe? If the Allies can no longer by the old formula restore the Europe that was, still less can the Central Empires by the old strategic dispositions prevent the control of the world by the new internationalism that has come into being. If the Allies must admit that force cannot destroy the new economic and political unity of Central Europe created by the railroad and telegraph, the new science and the labor of half a century, so, too, must the Germans learn that the new internationalism is more potent than armies and no less real than Germany itself. It, too, rests upon the new means of communication and the new science. It, too, is a natural growth of natural forces, the results of which neither armies nor navies can undo. If the population of Germany and Austria-

Hungary has grown by leaps and bounds, so has that of the United States, of South America, and of Australia. If the industrial structure of the new Germany is vast and complex, so, too, is that of the United States. If Mittel-Europa is an economic reality and a new international force created during the last generation, so, too, are South America and Japan. If German unity is the result of the political union of existing forces, so, too, is the British Empire. The one is no less new, no less real, and it may be more potent than the other. Everywhere around the new Germany, blind in its own conceit, rise realities, rank upon rank, row upon row, all of them proof against principalities and powers, proof against armies and ruthlessness, invulnerable in their united might, relentless in their purposeful antagonism to the ideas of Kultur and of autocracy.

The war is won. The Allies have merely to recognize the potency of the new internationalism and shape their future plans and campaigns in accordance with the dispositions which it dictates, in the fashion best to utilize the vast forces it provides. We shall not need to win victory in the old way. We have merely to recognize that new forces have already presented us with a victory far more extensive and unquestionably more likely to endure, a hundred, fold less vulnerable and exposed to assault, a thousandfold more desirable. It is the work of the war itself, of the nineteenth century, of civilization and democracy in their own defense,

themselves more potent than French armies and British fleets. In the strict sense of the word the *preservation* of democracy is impossible. The Allies cannot accomplish it by any victory, for the war has already transformed it. We cannot perpetuate and defend the old democracy, for it is already dead. The old concepts of civilization cannot be protected; the war itself has already destroyed them and substituted a broader and nobler ideal. International law, the old regard for treaties at the moment the war broke out, cannot be restored. A new notion of both has been created by the war itself beyond the power of the contending forces to alter. Just as the statesmanship of Viscount Grey was sure to fail because it rested upon the old diplomacy and the old assumptions, so the statesmanship of Woodrow Wilson cannot fail because it is the expression of the new internationalism. Its purposes are securely founded in the new morality, in the new consciousness that Europe is not the world, but a part of it, and that the equality of democracy extends to nations as well as to individuals.

What, then, can the Allies lose by defeat? What at most can the Germans win by victory? An absolute balance of power in Europe, always iniquitous, never strong, never ethical, always an undemocratic method of settling the disputes of Europe and of the world, proclaiming a domination of the world always offensive. The Allies may lose a domination of Europe which could no longer carry with it the control of the

globe. Even if the Germans win predominance in Europe, they cannot by its means extort control of the world's trade nor dictate to South America, Asia, and Africa.

But they will not win predominance in Europe. They can no longer by the old European dispositions imperil the safety of England and France in the sense that once they might have. Europe is no longer to be controlled by European arrangements alone, but by the international situation as a whole. No longer will world affairs turn upon the relation of the strategic position of Belgium to that of Alsace-Lorraine. The strategic dispositions of the world arena must now be considered, the interests of nations other than European powers. The new alignment and strategic dispositions in Europe itself will be in all probability dependent upon non-European facts. Nothing can any longer be won in Europe alone. Nothing won in Europe can of itself decisively affect the international situation.

The Allies have won already because France and Belgium are safe, because France, Great Britain, and Italy are now merely the European members of a vast democratic alliance which includes the British Empire, the United States, the larger South American nations, and Japan. Internationalism is safe because the Allies already control the new international fabric which will certainly, by reason of its very existence, readjust the European balance and impose upon the powers of Europe a new morality, a new re-

gard for the equality of nations, a new respect for law. The war has brought into existence a new international grouping, based upon the world itself as an entity, upon the acceptance of the independence of the non-European world, upon the equality of its members, upon the interest of Asia, Africa, and America in the solution of European problems. It has long been recognized that Europe possessed vital interests in the settlement of problems in other parts of the globe. It had yet to be made clear that the other sections of the globe possessed interest in the decisions made in Europe and that they proposed no longer blindly to accept what the Europeans dictated. The safety of the world, the safety of democracy and of internationalism, no longer rest upon purely European dispositions. They can no longer be permanently threatened by victories won in Europe, nor by any European coalition, however large.

Indeed, if we study the force and potency of the new internationalism, the great forces which the war itself has brought into the field, those still greater forces of which the war has secured recognition, it is difficult to imagine how the Allies can lose the war or the Germans win it. The war has brought a formal recognition of the reality of internationalism: the fact that the world is not controlled by Europe and is not going to be, that the world ought not in the past to have been controlled by Europe and its own selfish interests, and will no longer be so ruled in the future. This fact the Allies are

powerless to change by any victory in Europe. They can no longer restore the old international system that was. Neither can the Germans by any victory whatever in Europe preserve the old internationalism and the old assumed domination of Europe over the rest of the world. A real international democracy had been created by the development of Asia, Africa, and America during the nineteenth century. It is a fact indisputable and indubitable. The new members of the international concert are the veritable equals of the older European powers, their military and naval strength in some cases more vast, their strategic position of the very first consequence, their economic resources incalculably greater. For a time, no doubt, they will not of themselves entirely control the situation, but the moment can only be postponed when they will become as potent, if not more potent, than the European powers combined.

The grave sin of the Central Empires against democracy lies in their refusal to recognize this new international equality, this new international independence of the rest of the world of Europe. The great achievement of the Allies is their willingness and readiness to accept it, to invite the co-operation of the new states, to organize their forces, to admit them to the European councils on a footing of equality, to recognize the extent and significance of their interest in the European situation, their right to a voice in the decision of European questions, their duty in the safeguarding of civilization. It is in this

very real intellectual, economic, administrative equality of the United States, Canada, Australia, South Africa, Japan, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, that the new internationalism has its root. Reality must invariably exist before theory can become fact. International equality must be based upon international reality.

Once it was true that Europe possessed the physical and economic force to dominate the world. Once the European nations might meet around the council board and partition nations and continents in the remote confines of the globe. It is no longer true. The physical force of Europe combined is still great, but it is no longer sufficient to control the Western and Eastern Hemispheres. Their independence is a reality and the war has forced upon European powers a recognition of its existence and upon those nations themselves the fallacy of their isolation, the extent and variety of their interests in Europe.

Indeed, the world and Europe had merely to become aware of the reality of internationalism. For a generation the one fact which had prevented its recognition had been the closeness of the balance of power in Europe. Attempts had indeed been made by Great Britain and by France to extend the international area, to invite and secure the co-operation of the self-governing colonies of Great Britain, of the United States, and of Japan. The resistance came, as a matter of fact, not from Europe, but from without, not from the old members, but from the new. The

United States sent representatives to several European conferences, notably to that of Algeciras, but entirely refused to join in the discussions or to sign the documents there agreed upon as a participant in full equality with the older nations, for fear that such action might involve the recognition of the authority of a similar European conference in the Western Hemisphere. It seemed at that time to American statesmen scarcely probable that the United States would be able in the least to modify the decisions of the European nations in regard to dispositions in Europe or Africa, and that, on the contrary, it was certain that the European nations in conference assembled would be able, once the right itself was recognized, to dictate to the United States and South America regarding dispositions in the Western Hemisphere which might not be to the interest of the resident nations to accept. Was the United States to recognize the authority of a European conclave which might at no distant moment become dominated by Germany? Were the South American nations to recognize a political interest of Europe in South America? For the same reason Japan refused to participate in European councils as more than a spectator or to sign the documents agreed upon as anything more than a witness. The great slogan in Asia has come in recent years to be Asia for the Asiatics, the abolition of political concessions to European nations, the restriction of their influence in Asia, and, if possible, its limitation and conclusion. It was

improbable that the vote of Japan in Europe could be an equivalent for the influence thus implied of the Europeans in Asia. So long as Asia and America, therefore, refused to enter on equal terms an international council, internationalism was impossible.

But the war has demonstrated the entire fallacy of the belief that the United States or Japan or any other nation was isolated in the world and dependent for its prosperity and safety solely upon what happened within its own borders. It has brought them all to the realization of their unity of interest with the European nations in what takes place in Europe. The collapse of Russia completely destroyed the delicate balance of power in Europe. The war itself has made the old co-operation of the European powers with one another outside Europe impossible. So far as the control of the world by Europe had had any reality, it had rested upon the willingness of the European nations to undertake concerted action in Asia and Africa, whenever a revolt took place in either against the imposition of the European decision. If they should disagree, they would disagree at home. They would decide who should control outside Europe by their own struggles within, and should then loyally unite (as in China) to impose that decision on the alien. The Russian Revolution forever made that impossible. The deep line now drawn by the war between the Allies and the new Central Europe forbids such co-operation. Indeed, Great Britain, France,

and Italy have been glad to call in the British Empire, the United States, South America, and Japan to redress the international balance destroyed by the war and the Russian Revolution. And now that the creation of Mittel-Europa has become possible, it is to the interest of all non-European nations to prevent the control of Europe by such a European coalition. It became immediately necessary for the United States to enter upon the war in its own defense, to insist upon the creation of a new internationalism, upon the renunciation by Europe of the old tradition of the rule of the world by Europe itself, upon a repudiation of the old European council of six who sat around a mahogany table and settled the affairs of the hemispheres.

So, too, international law has become a reality. The old law was nothing better than the decisions of the prize courts and the dicta of the diplomats of a few European powers, made for their own convenience and primarily concerned with their relations to one another. It depended for its sanction upon its imposition upon the rest of the world by Europe itself, for it was not in a true sense international law, but a law made for the rest of the world by those nations who saw fit to arrogate to themselves the control of it. Such a law has disappeared forever. A new international law has come into existence, based upon the principle of the association of many nations, really sovereign, veritably equal. It is international in the strictest and truest sense and was in large measure foreseen by the theorists

who have hitherto written on international law. Fortunately, therefore, a great store of principles is ready for its use. It rests upon the new proposition that Europe is not the world, but only a part of it, that democracy is international, and that the rule of law possesses no exclusively European sanction. The rights of small nations could never be predicated on the basis of treaties signed with relation to the European situation alone: there could be there no sanction which European nations themselves could not disturb. The creation and recognition of the new internationalism make a sanction for European treaties never before possible, based upon new elements in the world and upon world politics, which the European nations are of themselves unable to alter.

It is idle to predict any particular form of international organization, name an extended code of international law, or create any international executive or legislature. The immense gains already registered are enough for the work of one generation. The reality of internationalism has become recognized by the whole world; a new sanction for international arrangements is already created; the illogical and indefensible domination of the world by Europe is ended; the old international executive and legislative council of six powers has disappeared; the old ethics is no more. Surely such achievements are sufficiently sweeping and satisfactory. The rest is a matter of convenience and expediency, a mere question of time.

POSITIVE ASSURANCE OF GERMAN DEFEAT

The positive assurance of German defeat lies in the fact that the German strategy of victory is solely European and assumes the possibility of a decision of international issues through a European solution. Let us admit for the sake of argument that it is infallible so far as the old balance of power and the old European situation are concerned. Let us even go so far as to recognize that Germany may possibly secure a dominant position in Europe in the old sense. It will still be true that no solution has been achieved of the vital international objectives of Pan-Germanism nor a domination of Europe in the old sense. Neither the international situation nor the European situation itself is what it once was. The influence of Europe in the world has decreased; the influence of the world in Europe is now for the first time recognized. A German victory would, therefore, be unable to achieve anything of great moment. In the long run an international coalition of nations upon the broad basis of common humanity and equality, an international democracy among nations of various continents, will be sure to prevail over the selfish interests of any one group in any one continent, however strong, however well organized. Pan-Germanism is an absurdity and an intellectual insult to the intelligence of the world. It rests upon the old fallacy, the isolation of Europe; it denies the new truths, the unity of the world, the equality of the continents, the democracy of nations. German polity is a thing of the past, not of the future. It

assails and demolishes a straw man. It will be in the long run beaten and demolished by the new colossus of internationalism whose existence the Germans do not yet seem to realize.

The moral isolation of Germany in a democratic world is the measure of her defeat, of its extent, and of its duration. The great bonds of association in the world are neither military, political, nor economic, but moral. The greatest forces are the convictions which actuate great masses of men. On the side of the Allies fight the moral forces of the world. They are the champions of democracy and internationalism, of liberty, freedom, and Christianity. The Germans have sold their international birthright for a mess of pottage. The morality of the world is not that of Germany. Bureaucratic and militaristic administration has its home only in the Central Empires. The German notion of international law has been repudiated with disgust by the rest of humanity. Anarchy on the sea has been denounced with vehemence. The German view of history, the German notion of daily life, the German idea of expediency, the German ideal of Kultur have been repudiated by every nation in the world outside the Central Empires. Here lies the assurance of German defeat, the assurance of Allied victory.

Nor can a coalition solely European like Mittel-Europa ever beget in the nations of America, Asia, and Africa that same confidence in its impartiality and disinterested policies as the alliance of the British Empire, France, and

Italy. The Allies are of themselves a truly international alliance: their European members are already outvoted and restrained by the existing non-European members; their interests can never be exclusively European; those of the Central Empires can never be anything else. The notions of expediency and of desirability among the Atlantic Powers must always accord with those of the non-European members because the alliance is itself non-European in character. The notions of expediency which the Central Empires can offer its allies in other parts of the world will ever be primarily European. Here lies the significance of the intense moral reprobation of Germany by all countries outside the ring of the Central Empires, which makes her future international position almost resemble isolation. The physical location of the Central Empires, plus the difficulty created by their methods of government and administration, the dislike of their premises of statecraft, the frank disapprobation of ruthlessness, erect something like an insurmountable barrier between them and the rest of the world. The victory of the Allies is not only assured, but permanent. It rests upon forces international in character, upon associations primarily non-European, upon interests significantly moral. It rests upon realities which neither armies nor navies can assail, which war cannot destroy nor victory create.

The Atlantic Powers, now allied for the prosecution of the war, cannot, however, too promptly

and conclusively repudiate any fictitious and unreal internationalism which proposes to institute councils, courts, and executives in which the Central Powers shall take their seats as equals immediately on the ending of the war. In the long run, no doubt, a true international council will receive on equal footing all independent nations of all continents, and until that moment we shall not have achieved theoretical perfection. But for a time, perhaps for a long time, the new internationalism must exclude the Central Empires. The new league of nations can accept only powers whose word can be depended upon, whose observation of agreements solemnly made can be counted upon. It is a league of nations not only equal in right, but equal in trust. None can be accepted as members who have officially denied the reality of international honor, who have gloried in the breach of solemn treaties, who have announced their sufficiency as lawgivers for themselves and for the rest of the world. The international counterpoise to the Central Powers, by which their ruthless acts may be nullified and controlled, must rigidly exclude them from its councils and refuse to be trapped by specious pleas of equality and of theoretical international right. The essence of internationalism is law, honesty, trustworthiness. Excluded from the new league, the Central Empires are foiled and defeated and victory for the Allies assured. The moral law is inexorable. There must be no paltering between victory and the defeat of the Central Empires, no hesitation

about their exclusion from the new fellowship of nations until such time as by general consent their trustworthiness has been demonstrated and their sincere repentance proved. No defeat could be more complete, none as humiliating, none as permanent. Such a measure is entirely consistent with the high moral stand taken by the Allies; indeed, our moral judgment exacts it from us.

There be those who will insist that the new internationalism worse belies its name than the old, but they will be wrong. The old internationalism was dominated beyond hope by the six European powers, whose decisions had been and were still commonly actuated by European interests, of which all non-European nations were only nominal members without real voice on issues of consequence. We shall substitute for it a league from which some European powers will be excluded, but whose basis will be for the first time international, because not exclusively European, in which decisions respecting the non-European powers may be decided on their merits, and in which the European interests of the non-European members will for the first time receive adequate attention. We shall still be short of theoretical perfection, but an anomalous and fictitious internationalism behind which the two European coalitions masqueraded will have been changed for a veritable league of nations, still incomplete and imperfect, but based at last upon alignments and dispositions intercontinental and intra-national, upon an open

proclamation of the sanctity and obligation of international law, not as a case law of the European admiralty courts, but as a consistent body of principles. We shall exchange fictions for realities, diplomacy for law, expediency for justice, bargaining for impartiality. Let us not cavil because all realities cannot at once be comprehended, nor because some nations have thoroughly outlawed themselves by public denials of the expediency and reality of international relationship. That, too, is a reality, to be dealt with as such.

XXIII

THE INVINCIBLE ENTENTE

THE future of democracy and of civilization will be safe, whatever happens in Europe, so long as close co-operation and friendly understanding continue among the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and the principal South American nations. If the understanding can be extended to Japan the coalition will be infinitely more powerful. If that can eventually not be continued upon a basis mutually agreeable, the coalition will not be seriously weakened. Nothing resembling an alliance in the old sense is needed, no treaty or written constitution, no executive or legislative sessions are imperative. No nation need abate one jot of its sovereignty or sacrifice a tittle of its freedom of action. Nothing more is essential than that they shall act in concert where their interests are mutual, and that they shall bear with one another's difficulties in those relationships where the mutuality of interest is not yet entirely clear.

The offensive and defensive position of the

Atlantic Powers[1] is commanding and invincible. They include the strong Atlantic nations of Europe, easily capable of self-defense once their true strategic frontiers are assured them. They already hold in their hands the control of the Channel, of the North Sea, of the Atlantic approaches to Europe, of the entire Mediterranean, and the route around Africa. The American members of the coalition control with ease and finality the entire Western Hemisphere. The French colonial empire, the great British possessions in Egypt, the South African Union, control the African continent. Thus the three strong Atlantic nations of Europe, Great Britain, France, and Italy, would associate themselves with the whole of the Western Hemisphere, with the continent of Africa, with the continent of Australia, with one of the most important states in Asia, India, and with the bulk of the great positions on the ocean waterways. Such vast areas of land, such millions of people, such extraordinary resources, have never before been combined within the memory of man. It is not too much to predict that such an entente will be literally invincible, its defensive position unassailable, and its offensive strength great beyond all possibility of need.

Nor is it to be forgotten that its component parts will not be the nations who entered into this war, but the nations who propose to win it.

[1] This name is at once more comprehensive and descriptive than the term "the Allies" and contrasts better with "the Central Powers," "the Central Empires."

There will be a new British Empire, coherently organized for the first time, with a central executive and a central legislature capable of effective action. If the federation of the British Isles themselves can be perfected, the work of the present Imperial Parliament restricted to England and Wales, and Home Rule instituted in Scotland and in Ireland, the most difficult issues of local government and administration will have been solved, and in particular the much-mooted question of Irish Home Rule will be settled beyond a peradventure. Ireland would then hold to the Imperial council precisely the same position that England itself would have and would have with England no direct administrative or legislative connection whatever. The financial, administrative, and legislative assistance which the Irish people may for some decades require before their government can be placed upon a self-sustaining basis, they would receive from the Imperial administration and legislature, in which not only England, but also Scotland and the great self-governing dominions would sit. So, too, would the problems of India be solved. No doubt that great country would become an integral part of the British Empire with its own representatives in the Imperial council and legislature, receiving such military and administrative aid as it required from the Empire as a whole and not from England, owing still its allegiance to the crown, but receiving no longer práctical government from the island of Great Britain itself. Thus, too, would be

solved the relations, long difficult, between the dominions themselves with one another and with the mother country. If the war has in all probability created a new European unit in the Central Empires, it has beyond all doubt created a new international unit in the British Empire, capable of a degree of co-operation never feasible before, resting upon a completeness of understanding and loyalty never even thought possible in past decades by the majority of conservative statesmen. If the solidarity of Central Europe is a possibility, the solidarity of the British Empire is beyond all question a fact. If the creation of the one by the war and by the collapse of Russia has strikingly altered the diplomatic and international situation in Europe itself, the creation of the other by the war has none the less erected in the international situation a more than capable counterpoise. The magic performed once by Bismarck in the case of the German Empire, where the assurance of continuous and friendly co-operation between a number of hitherto suspicious units erected at once a new international power, has been repeated. The gain in strength and in cohesion of the British Empire will be no less conspicuous and no less potent.

All of these entities will stand forth at the close of the war far different in administrative and commercial organization than when they entered it. In 1914 the administrative co-operation of Germany was far more complete and effective than in any of the Allied states,

the industrial administration far better organized and more competent. Superiority in both gave the German army immense power in the first years of the war and still makes it unduly formidable. But the war itself is erasing with finality that superiority. At its end the Atlantic Powers will have attained an administrative efficiency and an industrial co-operation which will equal, if it does not surpass, that of Germany, and which will easily be superior to anything of which Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, or Russia may be capable for three generations. This is a fact of the utmost consequence, a safeguard for democracy in the future which defeat could not alter.

The new entente will consist, moreover, entirely of states highly developed in administration and industry. There will be among them no laggards, no dead weights, no millstones to hang around the necks of the leaders. The Central Empires consist at present of one state of extraordinary capacity in administration and industry, of another state far less capable in both, of a third state—Hungary—far below Austria in her industrial and administrative competence. Their allies, the Balkans, Turkey, and, if it be possible, Russia, are among the least competent and capable of all European and Western nations, states which must develop for a generation before they can exert a military, industrial, or administrative force of importance in the international arena. To compare with them, the Atlantic Powers possess already the

powerful administrative entities of Great Britain, France, Italy, the United States, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Canada, South Africa, Australia. These are already highly developed, all of them of greater economic importance than Austria-Hungary, and even the least capable of the South American nations administratively better organized than the Balkan states and with a future more thoroughly assured. The Atlantic Powers is the co-operation of equals; the Central Empires consist of equals and slaves.

In the hands of the Atlantic Powers will be absolutely the greatest aggregation of capital hitherto accumulated by the civilized nations of the world. Before the war Great Britain, France, and the United States possessed the great accumulations of wealth. They will still possess them at its close. Whatever their expenses or losses, whatever the gain to Germany by plunder, by rapine, or by indemnities, nothing can change that great fact that the world's capital and the world's financial fabric are owned and controlled by the new allies. The whole financial structure of international trade has long centered at London. There, too, has been the control of the world's insurance and brokerage business, the center of the world's banking and of the world's exchange. The world has long been accustomed to deal in pounds, shillings, and pence through English banking firms, and China, South America, Africa will not soon learn new habits. Germany herself is a debtor country, and even should the fighting of the war and the cleverness of

German financiers perform the astounding miracle of confiscating this vast indebtedness, for it is hardly conceivable that the Germans might really pay it, the Central Empires will still remain fundamentally a debtor state. Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, Turkey, Russia, all of them are not only legally, but economically debtor states, not possessed of the necessary capital for their own development, and not probably able to become possessed of it within a generation. All of them derived their capital investment from the new allies and are at present debtors in vast amounts to Great Britain, France, and the United States, and, unless they repudiate it with that lack of morality which they have so recently displayed, they will be compelled to pay vast sums in the future to the new associates, exceeding far any indemnity which they might consider imposing upon them.

The economic strength of the new entente will be astounding. It will control a literal monopoly of the world's supply of cotton, rubber, and wool. The bulk of the copper deposits at present known are within its areas; the greater part of the coffee used is grown upon its land. In its domains will be three out of four of the truly great established industrial fabrics of the world; four out of five of the world's great agricultural areas; all of the world's great meat-raising areas. These are at present the only ones which can profitably compete on a natural economic basis. Within the entente, too, are vast areas which can be developed in North and South Africa, fertile,

perfect in climate, adjacent to the great European markets.

The entente will also control the majority of the world's great deposits of iron, coal, and the other valuable minerals. They possess already three out of four of the world's considerable industrial plants capable of making steel and steel products; two out of three of the world's shipbuilding plants, each much larger than that of Germany. It must not be forgotten that the world is in time of peace a living organism, whose vital parts are economic, industrial, and financial, social, rather than military and administrative. In the last resort the strength of an alliance depends upon its industrial area and its industrial development, and between the two ententes—that of Central Europe, of the Atlantic Powers—there can be literally no comparison whatever. In the long run the latter must prevail. Only one thing can prevent it, a failure to co-operate, the creation of misunderstandings.

It is a remarkable and will be a significant fact that the new entente is economically self-sufficing even in a world primarily interdependent. It is no longer economically possible for a single nation to be self-sufficing. All nations depend for their profit upon the interchange of commodities over a wide area, upon the use of raw materials which they do not themselves possess, and upon the sale to other countries of more manufactured goods or raw materials than they can themselves consume. The Central Empires will not be less dependent upon such a

type of trade than will the new entente, but the latter will be able to carry it on profitably between its own members. It can itself use all it produces, it can produce all it needs. It possesses within its own area the raw materials indispensable for manufacture and for life. It can produce in its own industrial organizations all of the luxuries, all of the necessities. Not so the Central Empires. They will be completely dependent upon the new entente for a supply of wool, for it is not possible to make clothing out of all wool that grows on the backs of sheep. The great wool-growing areas are apparently created by nature and are somewhere near the sea. The Central Empires do not possess even one. The world's great supply of rubber, again, will not be within their reach nor of any territory they can touch. Cotton is not at present grown within the area of the new Pan-Germany, although it is possible that in Mesopotamia a sufficient supply may in time be produced. The free nitrates are in the hands of the new allies, but the Germans may be able to produce enough from the air to rid themselves of that monopoly. Coffee, it may be, they can secure. Tea they certainly can provide overland from Asia. Copper is a more difficult problem, but it is possible that it can be met. These great problems will require solution by the Central Empires. They are already solved for the Allies. In the reality of the solution lies commercial prosperity and the economic future of any nation or alliance. That of the Allies is

assured, that of the Central Empires is yet to be attained. Nor can any victory in Europe attain it. But no defeat which the Allies may suffer in Europe can destroy their domination of the world's economic fabric.

The strategic unity of the new entente is assured by the Atlantic Ocean and not by territorial dispositions in Europe. It will possess a minimum of territory accessible to the German army, a maximum of strength with which to defend it. Its resources in men will surpass those of the Central Empires, its economic resources necessary for the prosecution of war will be greatly in excess of its possible enemies. Its own vital dispositions, on the contrary, will be upon the sea, will be defensible with ease, and will not be open to any attack by the truly powerful arm of the Central Empires, their army. The contact of its members with each other can in no sense be destroyed by any measures which a militant Germany may undertake in Europe. In the sea power will be its one connecting link and its indispensable factor. We shall have in the future, it is possible, a military power based upon Central Europe and a sea power based upon the Atlantic.

Indisputably in the hands of the new entente, beyond the power of any German offensive to destroy, will be the control of the world's communications. Never has sea power been as important as to-day. To be sure, the Germans are right that, so far as military operations in Europe are concerned, its old potency was destroyed

by the railroad and telegraph. No longer will it be possible for navies directly to affect the issue of campaigns in Central Europe. No longer will campaigns be fought in places which navies can reach. Never again will the sea power control Europe of itself. As the area of trade in the world has expanded, as the very continents themselves have become countries and the interchange of the world's goods proceeded until each country expects to utilize those of all countries and to exchange its own goods with all countries in return, so the sea power as a means of communication between continents has achieved an importance which it never possessed as the means of communication between European nations. That it could possess only so long as the overland communication in Europe was more difficult than the roundabout communication by sea, but the railroads can never make less necessary sea communication between North America and Europe, between Europe and Asia, or Europe and Africa. The control of the sea, therefore, is immensely more important than ever before. The new entente will control it absolutely. The old weaknesses of the sea power will no longer exist; a new strength has been introduced into its dispositions and a new importance has been vested in them. However strong the Central Empires may be upon land, their weakness upon the sea is indisputable. No victory in Europe can ever change it short of the destruction of France and the invasion and conquest of England itself.

A great deal of nonsense has been written about the freedom of the seas, about the internationalization of the seas. It is for the most part nothing but German propaganda and aims at the destruction of British sea power and the ascendency of Germany. It means the destruction of the old dispositions on the sea and the substitution for them of new created in the interest of the Central Empires. No such freedom of the seas, no such internationalization, can be tolerated. The sea power of Great Britain will be in no sense diminished by the war nor by the new entente. It will be on the contrary perpetuated and strengthened. Far from wishing to change its present dispositions, the new allies will strengthen and improve them by the addition of their own navies and merchant marines and by the addition of their positions on the land. The completeness of the new sea power will internationalize it not by fiat nor with any intent to destroy and weaken the merchant marine, fleet, or strategic position of any member of the new entente, but by the fact that the Atlantic Powers combine the great sea powers of the world through the new understanding created by the war. The completeness of the control will be invincible and astounding. Not only will the great merchant fleets and navies of the world be brought together into one harmonious whole, but the strategic waterways, the great ports, the land positions of any value to the sea power, and in addition the sources of supply of the materials which the

world wishes to reach by sea—all will be in the control of the new entente. The sea power will be internationalized by the fact that its dispositions will be for the first time truly intercontinental and intra-national, and will hence have a truly international sanction.

The old sea power was vulnerable because its basis was too narrow. England stood alone as an island power, dependent upon her fleet, and seeking protection for the great ocean waterways she controlled in island positions for the most part difficult to reach by land power. She was thus unaided by land power and fearful ever to depend upon its continued assistance. The greatest difficulty which her statesmen had to meet was the fact that her dependence for food and raw material upon the outside world necessarily forced upon her in the old days a close relationship with the land powers of Europe which for other reasons she would have preferred not to create. Land power was the enemy of sea power, yet the tragic fact of England's economic weakness forced the sea power continually to create alliances and arrangements with land powers which the sea power alone could not defend. A really independent policy was difficult to pursue. The burden to be carried by the sea power was already extremely heavy. The only strong position in England's hands was the Channel, and her great chain of dependencies was exceedingly vulnerable and depended in each case upon the strength of its weakest link. It thus seemed possible to the

Germans that the breaking of the link in the Channel, or even the necessary concentration of the English fleet in the North Sea in order to thwart Germany, would effectively destroy the reality of England's ocean empire and therefore throw the sea power into Germany's hands. One victory alone in the North Sea might suffice to change all dispositions in the oceans of the world. It could under the old régime be prevented only by an alliance between England, France, and Russia, by an alliance of the sea power with land power which forced upon the sea power many burdens which the sea power itself could not carry.

The new entente will bear them with ease because the old burden forced upon the sea power by its land position and by the weakness of the strategic dispositions of a sea power dependent upon the sea alone will now be corrected. Great Britain's position in the Mediterranean was previously dependent upon Gibraltar, Malta, and Suez; but Gibraltar could be reached by land and the Suez Canal destroyed by an army. Now Gibraltar will be protected by Morocco on the African shore. Naples, Sicily, Bizerta will sustain the position at Malta and render it invulnerable. The Italians in Tripoli will protect the Suez Canal and Egypt. So throughout the world the land positions from which the sea power's control could have been assailed are now in the hands of her new allies. The Channel, the North Sea, the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean, the Gulf of Mexico,

the Pacific will all be definitively in the hands of the new allies. The road from one ocean to another is theirs; the Suez Canal, the Panama Canal in particular, the two gateways of oceans, are owned by them. The Cape of Good Hope, Cape Horn, the Falkland Islands, Argentina, Chile will assure the control of the passages around Africa and South America. Singapore is the key of the Indian Ocean and of the China Sea. The Philippines and Hong-Kong control the approaches from the Pacific to China, while the crossing of the Pacific is controlled by islands in the possession of the United States or Great Britain. If Japan maintains its friendly understanding with the present Allies their position in the Pacific will be invulnerable beyond a doubt.

Nor can the Germans in any way assail these dispositions with success. The German fleet itself will of course now secure complete control of the Baltic, the Black Sea, Constantinople, and, it may be, with the Austrians at Saloniki, the Ægean. But they are easily denied access to the great ocean highways. England itself, the French coast, Belgium, and the harbors of Holland will not be in their hands. The German fleet will be behind the great barrier and incapable of breaking through it, for navigation around the British Isles is too perilous to be attempted on a great scale or in all weathers. The Austrian, German, and Russian fleets in the eastern Mediterranean, if such there come to be, will also be held by the vast strength of

the combined British, French, and Italian positions around Sicily and the neck of the Mediterranean. Always Germany will be hampered by the inability to operate from a base on the open ocean, from the necessity always of passing to it through waterways controlled by its enemies beyond a peradventure. If powerful fleets should be sent forth by Central Europe, they would always be operating away from their base without the possibility of an assurance of a return to it. They would have delivered themselves over into the hands of their enemies, should they concentrate against them. When they should arrive at the great objective which they wished to assail, they would there find waiting for them not merely a British fleet, but the resident fleets of the United States, of South American nations, the Italian and French fleets in the Mediterranean, the Japanese fleet in the Pacific. Nor is it to be supposed that the Central Empires can ever contest the control of the sea from any land position which they may win in the present war. They cannot continue to live in the world in prosperity without access to the sea, nor can they obtain that access without in some way or other coming to terms with the present entente. The Allies possess something of the utmost importance which the Germans must have. For it they will pay and must be made to pay with the one thing the Allies need: the assurance of the safety in Europe of the European members of the entente.

The homogeneity of the new entente will be

not less conspicuous than its strength. All its members are already democratic governments, not merely in name, but in fact. Moreover, they understand the words democracy, liberty, and law in the same sense. Behind them lies something approaching a unity of tradition; in them all predominates the Anglo-Saxon tradition of government and law, the British form of government in the British Empire and in France, American presidential government in North and South America. Upon international law, upon international ethics, upon the sanctity of international agreement, they are at one. There can be in an administrative and governmental sense no discord among the associates; no misunderstanding should arise from their failure to speak a language mutually understood. The strength with which this invests the new entente can scarcely be overestimated. The old European alliances were based upon territorial lines, strategic locations, and common hatreds rather than upon common beliefs and common objectives. They were framed for aggression rather than for defense, or at the least for defense against the sort of aggression which the new entente definitely reprobates and disowns. Never consistent, scarcely ever with a common basis of ideals or policies, hardly ever possessing common notions of law and administrative expediency, it was always difficult to predicate common action beyond a minimum point. The members of the alliance themselves commonly distrusted one another only in less

degree than their enemies. The Russian Revolution, destroying the old diplomatic possibilities and the old strategic formula, has made possible at last a real international alliance upon the basis of democracy and of internationalism among nations possessed of interests truly mutual, of common ideals already in existence, of common aims whose continuance is possible to predicate.

So long as Great Britain and France were aligned with Russia, there was always an unnatural element in the Entente. Its basis was hostility to Germany rather than common interests and ideals which its members wished to promote. Russia and Great Britain were at swords' points in Asia; France and Great Britain feared the advent of Russia in the Mediterranean scarcely less than that of Germany in the North Sea. They are both well rid of the old Russia and of the old diplomacy which her existence fostered and made necessary. Whatever the outcome of the Russian Revolution, whatever it takes from the Allies or adds to the Germans, it has made feasible an international alliance which can be consistent with itself, truly democratic. If the newer Russia should be able to reorganize upon the basis of a real democracy and renounce the old ambitions of the dynasty, it could then be joyfully received by the present Allies into association. Whatever happens, the old inconsistency is gone. England and France as democratic nations, allied for the safety of civilization with the worst

autocracy of Europe, was an inconsistency which lent color to the Pan-Germanic interpretation of history and gave verity to charges of self-interest and aggression. So long as dynastic Russia remained a member of the coalition the old Allies could not be truly disinterested, could never whole-heartedly throw against Germany their full strength and inflict upon the Central Empires the greatest measure of defeat of which they were capable. Upon that the Pan-Germans have always definitely counted. As they saw Europe, with Russia on one side of Germany, vast in its millions and in its potential resources, and on the other side an England and France always growing relatively less powerful in their relation to the Central Empires and to Russia, there was a distinct point beyond which it was not to French and British interest to allow Germany to be weakened. She was their own fundamental defense against Russia. Russia was again the only nation in Europe able to profit decidedly from a maximum Allied victory. The most that could be won by Great Britain and France was the strengthening of the defensive position they already held. Only Russia could add to her resources or to her territory. For long years there was incredulity in Berlin over the cession to Russia of Constantinople. Indeed, they believed that Great Britain and France were more than likely to prefer an extension of Austrian influence in the Balkans than of Russian. The fetters upon the hands of democracy have now been struck away. If

it is possible for the Allies to win a maximum victory, they will not be restrained in their use of it by any fears of aggrandizing the old Russia.

It must also be remembered that the cohesive power of Central Europe is defensive, diplomatic, and political rather than administrative, economic, and social. The fear of Russia was also the most potent weapon of the leaders in securing that co-operation and cohesion, the real evidence which they could show of a necessity for militarism and secret diplomacy. It will after the war perhaps remain true that the international unity of Central Europe lies rather in the fear of outside interference than in a similarity of purposes and ideas in regard to internal affairs. Co-operation among its members in a war for defense is easy to predicate. It will be difficult in time of peace when the local divergencies and old jealousies and antipathies, now set free by the Russian Revolution and the results of the war itself, may find plenty of time and opportunity in which to develop. If the strength of the Allies is greater in peace than in war, that of the Central Empires will be infinitely less in peace than it is at present. So long as Russia existed, the unity of the Central Empires was unassailable in peace as in war. So long as this war endures in all probability the solidarity of Mittel-Europa is assured, but let peace once come and the cement of fear will be removed. Victory will bring into relief the democratic forces, never strong enough to effect

unity during war, but amply powerful enough, once independence seems assured, to undertake reforms which may alter in significant ways the administrative constitution of the Central Empires and not improbably rob them of the greater part of their offensive strength. It is this distinction between the defensive and the offensive strength of the Central Empires which so many people fail to remember. Because their unity cannot be predicated upon certain social and local issues, many jump to the conclusion that their unity in time of war is equally assailable, while those who find that their unity stands the test of war forget that it may not stand the test of peace. Impermeable to defeat, victory may destroy it.

XXIV

THE LOGIC OF VICTORY ON THE WEST FRONT

THE British and the French very early concluded victory not worth having without the possession of Belgium, Alsace-Lorraine, and an indemnity for the destruction already accomplished in French territory. Neither believed peace possible unless they themselves had physical possession of this territory at the end of the war. To be forced to ransom it by the sacrifice of colonies in Africa would be distasteful in the extreme, even if expedient. Neither believed that the Germans would surrender them for even the whole French colonial empire in Africa. Hence the military effort of Great Britain and France was almost certain to be expended on the West Front because nowhere else had either prime objectives to achieve which a military campaign was needed to attain. Victory on the West Front must win for them all other objectives, but defeat there would, so far as they were concerned, mean the loss of the war. Such logic was inexorable, and for this reason every rod of ground gained has in France seemed to be an achievement. If the Germans must be

slowly pushed out of France by main force, every step won was a victory. If they could be continuously expelled, however slowly, the certainty of victory was clear. If the General Staff could indicate certain definite gains of territory desired and could then attain them, the expulsion of Germans from France was only a question of time, of munitions, and of men. Such premises made the war on the West Front all-important and every other military operation necessarily subordinate and unimportant. Victory could only be won there, because defeat there and victory elsewhere would be tantamount to British and to French defeat everywhere.

Germany held at the outbreak of the war what was called the offensive position in Europe. Between Germany and France there were two great avenues of approach, the one on the north through Belgium, the other on the east of France through Alsace and Lorraine. Both furnished broad areas in which armies might operate with comparative ease, but of the two Belgium was broader and simpler. Through both German armies had successfully reached Paris; through both French armies had successfully invaded Germany. Throughout the history of the two countries they had fought each other for the possession of these strategic gateways. The importance to other countries of the position and attitude of France and Germany to each other gave these roads between them international significance. The more north-

ern, Belgium, had also great importance for England. It contained Antwerp, the River Scheldt, and the harbor of Ostend. From Holland and Belgium the invasion of England had been considered feasible; from the French coast it had many times been proved impossible because the rough sea and the contrary winds made difficult the crossing of the Channel. In the military sense, therefore, the English frontier began at Liège. After the Channel was passed the invasion became a fact and the battle for England began at once; the defense was over; the approaches lost. Alsace-Lorraine was the stronger of the two positions so far as an assault by France upon Germany was concerned. It placed the French upon the Rhine ready to operate at once against southern Germany. From it they might pass down the Danube and assault Vienna or cross the Rhine and march northeast into Prussia. The interrelation of the two strategic points was also important: Alsace outflanked Belgium in some circumstances and was itself outflanked by Belgium in others; everything depended upon the possession of both by the same country. If not in the same hands, they tended to neutralize each other, though the neutrality of Belgium did not prevent the use by France of Alsace-Lorraine against Germany.

This offensive position was won by France in the seventeenth century under Louis XIV., was used by Napoleon to conquer Europe, and was retained by France in 1814, despite the very

clear concept in the minds of the English, the Prussians, and the Russians of the danger of leaving it in her hands. Talleyrand, however, made it clear that to deprive her of Alsace would mean the continuation of the war. That, the allies in 1814 did not desire. They preferred to rely upon the well-known incapacity of Louis XVIII., Charles X., and of all other members of the legitimate royal family to hinder France from making use of the offensive position. They also concluded that the attempt to frame a new Government would occupy the French for many years to come. And so it proved. Not until the middle of the century, when Napoleon III. had revived the Empire, did it become clear that a man sat upon the French throne, able to use this offensive position—and willing.

When, therefore, the Franco-Prussian War resulted in the demand by Prussia for the cession of Alsace-Lorraine, the other European countries were on the whole glad to see France lose it. The stronger country (as they supposed) lost the stronger position, which fell into the hands of the weaker country, Prussia, whose humiliation at the hands of Austria two decades earlier had been pitiable. It was not thought that Prussia could use it. Then came the great *coup d'état* of Bismarck, the creation of the German Empire. The territories of many states, whose resources individually were negligible, whose political strength as then organized was despicable, were suddenly combined into a single state. Their resources became collectively formidable, the political

power of the new entity great, and its diplomatic influence astonishing, especially when wielded by so powerful and irresponsible an executive as Bismarck had created in the Chancellorship. The whole strategic position in Europe had been altered in a night and the powers saw that the transfer of Alsace-Lorraine had at once made the new world power dangerous.

The neutrality of Belgium had been altered by this stroke. In 1870 it had been more than easy for Bismarck to promise to forego military invasion; such an assault on Paris would have been the height of military folly so long as the French were in possession of Alsace. They could have assailed the flank of the German invading force with terrific effect. They could have waited until it had passed and have thrown themselves upon its rear. They could have made a direct assault upon Cologne or upon southern Germany and have effected the conquest of either while the Germans themselves were fighting before Paris. Returning as victors, they would have unquestionably crushed the Germans on the plains of northern France. Still less did France desire to use Belgium in 1870. In Lorraine she held a far better position, for both defense and offense, the rear protected by Belgium, whose neutrality was far more useful to her than its military occupation could have been. She stood already upon the banks of the Rhine, while in Belgium she was still far away. In 1870 the neutrality of Belgium was a fact which neither of the combatants wished to challenge,

and the violation of which would have cost both dear.

But the moment Alsace fell into German hands the neutrality of Belgium ceased to be a fact. The Germans might invade it with flank and rear protected by Alsace, and might therefore place themselves at once upon both of France's strategic frontiers, especially if they were sufficiently prompt to pass through Belgium and enter France itself before the French army could mobilize. The situation covered by the old treaty of 1839 was altered by this change in the ownership of Alsace, and was declared, therefore, in Germany to have relieved the Germans from the necessity of keeping it. In fact, while the new situation was different from the old, the issue raised was precisely that to which the treaty of 1839 was intended to apply—the use of Belgium as a military road between France and Germany.

Since 1870 the position of France has been dangerous in the extreme. She was, at the outbreak of this war, vulnerable on both fronts, and practically unable to insure an effective defense. Both of these fronts were, moreover, in the hands of a European entity very much larger and stronger than France herself. This was true in 1871; it was even more true in 1914. Germany had grown in population until it had nearly double the man power of France, and its army was obviously double any force France could possibly put into the field even if every man were put in the trenches. The

weaker power saw its two strategic defenses in the hands of a power decisively superior in strength and possessed of the will to strike. Aggression by France against Germany was impossible; it could not be undertaken with the slightest prospects of success. In a war against France alone, Germany could scarcely fail. All was made more serious by the rapid growth of German population and by the practically stationary population of France. Decade by decade in the future this disparity would grow even greater and the danger of France become consequently more serious.

To consider the ending of the war without the cession of Alsace-Lorraine and Belgium, the Allies realized at the outset, was formally to recognize the domination of Europe by Germany, to consent to their own defeat before it became a fact.

The mere size and economic strength of Mittel-Europa with two such strategic positions in its hands would alone outweigh France and England in the European balance. Both would be robbed of any real chance of adequate defense against future aggression. To fail to reconquer the lost provinces meant that England and France would become in Europe proper powers of the second rank only in potential force, unable to veto what Germany might demand diplomatically because without the strength in the last resort to resist by arms. Italy and Spain were both too weak, too badly placed with relation to the field of war in France, to be able

to restore the European balance. If Germany should retain Belgium and Alsace-Lorraine—it might be that the retention of Alsace alone would suffice—there could be no European balance of power. Germany would by reason of fact, by the possession of the offensive position, by size of population, by the extent of her economic power, dominate the continent.

For the United States, Alsace-Lorraine in French hands, Belgium neutral, and the strength of the British sea power unimpaired are scarcely less essential than for Great Britain and France. These are our first line of defense. Once past them, the Germans are within our defenses and the battle for the country itself begins. The isolation of this country from Europe is a fallacy now exploded. That an army of great size can be transported across the ocean and maintained adequately has been demonstrated. The United States itself is about to undertake such an operation. Our coast is difficult to defend, easy to approach. A thousand miles lies vulnerable to a landing army anywhere. The Panama Canal may easily be captured. The West Indies, New Orleans, Galveston are entirely defenseless. The Philippines and Hawaii would be easily lost. A dominant Germany able to deal with Great Britain and France[1] can easily threaten the United States and compel our submission. Conquest of this country even

[1] This provision is vital and must never be forgotten. It is the essential common interest we possess with France and Great Britain against Germany: all three nations are indispensable to one another.

so great a power as the Germans like to dream of could scarcely attempt with success. Still less could even such a Germany hope to retain control. But the international position of the United States in a world dominated by Germany, because dominant in Europe, would be singularly unfortunate.

It must not be forgotten that the most valuable privilege of the United States is the right to approach Europe by sea. There are our greatest markets and sources of supply; there are our most valuable customers and our most necessary allies. The approach to the outside world through the English Channel is not more essential to the Germans than the approach of the United States through the Channel to England, France, Germany, and Russia. We are as definitely outside the European trade area as any nation can be and our ability to approach it is essential. A dominant Germany in Europe, possessed of Alsace-Lorraine, controlling Belgium, with a fleet challenging the English domination of the Channel, could easily threaten, if not control, the effective approaches of the United States to the commerce of Europe.

We shall fight our own battle in France, not that of the Allies. Our objectives are the same as theirs. For us and for them, it is essential to destroy German control of France, Alsace-Lorraine, and Belgium now and forever. Their possession is the essential prerequisite of peace, because, without the control of the offensive position in the west, France and Great Britain

cannot maintain an adequate defensive against Germany. The effective fact in the neutrality of Belgium is the possession by France of Alsace-Lorraine. So long as the Germans remain in Alsace, Belgian neutrality can never be assured, because the German army can always, if it wishes, safely enter Belgium. It must be made perilous for the Germans to enter Belgium.

It must also remain perilous for the German fleet to operate in the English Channel. The sea power of Great Britain must not be impaired. In her hands it is not dangerous to other nations. England is an island and must import by sea her food and raw materials. She is, therefore, too dependent upon the sea power to dare to abuse it. Its defensive purposes are too significant to be risked by any offensive which the British could undertake. They could never win as much by it as they might lose. Nor is Great Britain able to undertake aggression upon the continent. For centuries there has been no English standing army in times of peace; since the Hundred Years' War, it has been an English maxim that it was inexpedient to hold outside England territory which force was needed to retain. Germany, on the other hand, is a military nation which has always regarded as its prime line of defense a great army. She can annex territory; she can conquer territory; she does possess the means of extending her dominion in Europe even in times of peace. For her, therefore, to add to such power the sea would put into her hands a weapon capable of

offensive use against others. She is not dependent, as England is, upon the sea power, and would, therefore, not be restrained to a purely defensive use of it. Nor shall we forget the excellence of British stewardship of the sea in the past, the real freedom of the seas in time of peace, the effective policing of the sea which Great Britain has carried out for three hundred years, which has made the freedom of the seas almost synonymous with British rule. Until the Germans rose to object to it, every nation was as dependent upon the use of the seas as Germany, but none objected. Shall we transfer this stewardship to Germany after what the war has shown us of German trustworthiness, of the German spirit of mercy and loving-kindness?

The British sea power will be the essential European force behind Belgium and Alsace-Lorraine in the defense of France and of Europe against German domination. It alone, combined with a new strategic position for France and Italy, can prevent Germany from overrunning the whole continent, now that Russia is lost. Here is the essential first-line defense of the United States. That lost, we are at once thrown back upon our own frontier, upon our own coast. The Russian Revolution has changed the strategic position of the United States and has located our military and naval frontier in Europe.

XXV

THE TRUE MILITARY OBJECTIVE

HOWEVER invincible we may believe the co-operation of the Atlantic Powers to be, however certain the future of democracy and of civilization in their hands, we must never forget that there are still objectives to be won in the field, some of them imperative, others eminently desirable. But it will be idle for us to plan the continuation of the war on the basis of a maximum victory which requires either internal assistance from the Central Empires or a military exertion so great as practically to exhaust and destroy the European members of the new international coalition. The very keystone of defense in the future will be the continued strength and solvency of England, France, and Italy. We must again proceed on the assumption that the German army will continue to possess effective offensive strength; that its efficiency and its morale will not be diminished or impaired by the continuation of the war; that somehow or other the necessary raw material to prosecute the war will be found within the Central Empires; that somehow or other the

food question will be solved, at least to that point which will prevent any interference with the continuation of the war. The loyalty of the German people to their Government we must also predicate, and beside it place the solidarity of the Central Empires and of their allies. If we postulate that Scandinavia, Holland, and Denmark will not aid Germany, we shall make an assumption which facts scarcely warrant. However firmly we may believe that Russia will not actively aid the Central Empires nor yet accord economic assistance, we shall be most wise to act on the belief that she will do both. As for the submarine, we must assume its continued activity and the continuation of at least the present ratio of losses. Not only the logic of the war itself, but also what seemed to be before the war broke out the best available information, leads to the conclusion that these assumptions are probably correct.

We must consider and admit the weakness of the campaign on the West Front. The West Front itself possessed no military or strategic relation to the other fields of war. Victory there could not forestall defeat elsewhere, nor could the armies operating there receive more than indirect aid from their own allies. Still less had the West Front and its military position any immediate relation to the majority of the Allied objectives. Disaster there could only defeat Germany if the operations should involve so large a part of the German army that defeat would demoralize and disorganize their whole

military system. Hence the logic of the concentration of more and more men in France—the Allies wished to draw the German army there in order that it might be beaten. But the finality of the campaign in the west also presupposed the continued power of the Russian army in Poland and in the Balkans. Once the latter was disorganized, a crushing defeat of the Germans in France could at the most secure the objectives in Belgium and Alsace-Lorraine. Of themselves these will not result in the control of the Italian passes, still less rearrange the Balkans, expel the Turk, erect a new Poland, and take from Germany the Kiel Canal.

The collapse of Russia made the victory which the Allies originally determined to win not only impossible, but inexpedient, and most certainly incapable of the expected effect. There is no use for us to hide our heads like the ostrich and deny the facts. The plan for maximum victory assumed the revival of the old formula, the weakening of Germany and the strengthening of Russia. The various territorial dispositions to accomplish both depended literally upon the continued power and dependability of Russia. In her existence, too, lay the safety and efficiency of the device of a revolt in the Central Empires. The premise of the Allied settlement in the Baltic, again, was necessarily a strong Russia, hostile to Germany, and forcing, consequently, the neutrality of Sweden, Denmark, and Norway. Upon such foundation a kingdom of Poland might have been based and

the Kiel Canal given to Denmark. But to erect a kingdom of Poland now, with the idea that it would form an effective buffer state between Germany and a nation which seems at present to be only too anxious to co-operate with her, would merely sacrifice the Poles to no end. We should not be their friends, but their deceivers.

Similarly, upon the strength and existence of Russia depended the Allied settlement in the Balkans. It rested upon a Russia, hostile to the Central Empires, and, with the Black Sea and Constantinople in its hands, able to make the destruction of the Turkish Empire a reality. Italy could then be placed in control of the western Balkans. Austria-Hungary could be disrupted by her own people. An enlarged Serbia could then annex the Slavic peoples of Austria-Hungary and the greater part of Macedonia and Bulgaria; a new Rumania could then be placed across the Danube; the Greeks might be given Thrace. But all those peoples combined could surely not defend themselves against resident powers as strong as Germany and Austria (unless both were reduced indeed) without instant aid from a resident ally equally powerful. The collapse of Russia, therefore, makes the expediency of such territorial dispositions in eastern Europe and in the Balkans exceedingly doubtful for the Allies. They are at best no more than methods of strengthening Russia and of weakening the Central Empires, depend upon the operation of the old formula, and require factors now gone forever.

THE TRUE MILITARY OBJECTIVE

The reorganization of eastern Europe can no longer be the objective of the continuation of the war. The Allies will at once achieve a unity of purpose by a change of viewpoint from the European to the international arena. The Atlantic as the effective unit of the new powers will end the differences of opinion between them as to the necessary objectives. Those which they will now espouse are truly and entirely defensive and can never be anything else. They will immeasurably strengthen the moral case of the Allies and will remove elements in the situation hitherto inharmonious with it. The dispositions growing out of the relations of Russia with Great Britain and France were always inconsistent with the case of democracy and with the moral stand upon which the Allies entered the war, and were, therefore, an assistance to the campaign of the Central Empires with their own people and a source of division among people of the Allied nations.

With the creation of the entente of the Atlantic Powers, the strategic position of their European members ceased to depend either for safety or international status upon their territorial positions in Europe alone. France and Great Britain, the only western members of the old European Entente, were formerly dependent for defense against Germany upon their own strength and territorial power in Europe. Inasmuch as both were limited in area and population, since neither had possession of Belgium or Alsace-Lorraine—the defensive frontiers of

both—it was long ago clear that their real defense was the existence and strength of Russia. They must, however, by their own man power hold the western frontier till Russian aid could arrive in the east. Now they are the European members of an Atlantic coalition, thoroughly united and centralized, with supremacy on the seas. Its forces can and will operate on the same battle-line. The front to be defended is relatively short compared with its vast man power and economic resources. France and Great Britain will be no longer dependent upon their own man power against Germany. No longer will the Italians be entirely dependent upon their own army for defense against Austria. The armies of the United States, of the British Empire, and of South America are and will be available. Can it be supposed for a moment that this is not a defense immensely stronger than the old? The European allies have exchanged a relatively incapable and ill-developed country, never dependable, poorly governed, ill-organized, for partners more than its equal in man power, immensely superior in administrative and economic strength, beyond all comparison the moral superiors of the Russian people. Have the Allies then lost the war? Is it conceivable that after such achievements the war should be regarded as lost, that their inability now to make certain dispositions whose whole value consisted in their relation to Russia should be counted defeat? They have lost an ally who was both a burden and a constant peril. They

have gained allies whose assistance is thoroughly adequate and dependable. The defensive position of Great Britain, France, and Italy is now stronger than it has been in decades, stronger perhaps than it has ever been.

If they will be in future dependent upon assistance from America, they were helpless in the past without Russian aid. If the new friends must cross the Atlantic, the old ally must assemble an army from great areas of land, and must consume far more time before aid could be rendered than will the new. The dependence of Great Britain and France upon outside assistance for their primary defense against Germany is, therefore, not a new fact. They will not be in greater danger than before, but in less, because their new allies are immensely more capable and powerful than the old. The old sea power was vulnerable because dependent upon European supplies of food, wool, and iron. It could always be reached by land power because the latter could always cut off its supplies. It must, therefore, ally itself with continental powers adequate to protect its European supplies by European land power alone. Herein lay the prime necessity from Great Britain's point of view for a military balance of power in Europe. Her apprehensions of the overweening military power of the Central Empires is the traditional fear of isolation. But Great Britain, France, and Italy need no longer by military dispositions in Europe create an economic defensive in the old sense. They will in the future,

as during the war, draw their food and raw materials from the non-European supplies of their own allies located in other continents, invulnerable to attack by any European land power, however considerable. At the risk of tiresome iteration, Great Britain, France, and Italy, allied firmly with the United States, the British Empire, South America, and Africa, are less vulnerable now to the offensive strength of the new Central Empires, assuming them at the maximum of what they claim, than they were in the past generation to the old Germany and Austria-Hungary. They need not more protection now than before, but less. They have not more military objectives to win, but fewer, and they are, if anything, less imperative.

The true defensive and offensive weapon of the Atlantic Powers is not armies, but sea power. If the Central Empires have achieved military supremacy over purely European armies, the new coalition controls the sea with a grip which the Central Powers will be unable to loosen. Moreover, their position is invulnerable to assault because with it comes not merely supremacy in battle fleets and possession of the bulk of the world's merchant marine, but in addition the truly stupendous advantages of the land positions complementary to the old keys to the waterways and control of the sources of supply which sea power aims to reach. Everywhere the new alliance controls not only the communications of the Central Empires with the outside world, but the outside world itself, access to

which alone renders those communications valuable. The German fleet is valueless. If it should by chance defeat the British fleet, it could not destroy the new sea power, because it could not to-day by sea power alone bring to terms America and Asia. For any access to the world's trade at all, for not only the right to use the seas, but for the privilege of access to the sources of supply, they can be and must be forced to pay. They will navigate the seas in future on their good behavior—in Europe. To think to control the Central Empires by means of the assistance of their own people is to put ourselves into their hands, because they and not we control the keys to the situation. But by the sea power, we may expect and compel their good behavior. They cannot for long dispense with rubber, cotton, wool, and copper, of which the Atlantic Powers will possess an all but absolute monopoly. Here is a weapon, within our own control, whose defensive strength will be entirely adequate. It can and will in the long run protect even the European members of the new coalition from any armies the Central Empires can put into the field. But it can never of itself undertake offensive measures against such a European coalition and extort concessions from them *in Europe*, nor can it by itself end this war.

The war must go on in Europe and must be fought there by the armies of the Atlantic Powers until the maximum security for its European members is achieved. The true objective of the war now lies in the assurance of the nat-

ural strategic frontiers of France and Italy in Belgium, Alsace-Lorraine, Switzerland, the Trentino, the Isonzo, which will make adequate defense against even the Central Empires relatively simple for the European strength of those powers alone. So much we must have. Here, too, are the military frontiers of the United States and of the British Empire. Once Germany achieves the conquest of France, she becomes an Atlantic Power herself, is freed from her present bonds, and may then with her armies and navies undertake the domination of the world with expectation of success. The continued independence and integrity of France and Great Britain is the key to the defense of democracy and of civilization.

So long as the peoples of the Central Empires cannot be trusted, these frontiers and the supremacy of the sea must remain in the hands of the coalition of the Atlantic Powers. The one sustains the other; singly each is vulnerable; combined they will be irresistible for offense, impregnable for defense. The neutrality of Belgium is assured by the military possession of Alsace-Lorraine by France; the neutrality of Switzerland is guaranteed by the French in Alsace-Lorraine and the Italians in the Trentino; the French rear is defended and the control of the Mediterranean assured by the Trentino and Trieste in Italian hands. In all probability the possession of the Persian Gulf, the control of the Syrian coast and of the new kingdom of Arabia will be necessary to protect the Suez

Canal from possible land assaults from Mesopotamia. The retention of the islands of Rhodes, Cyprus, and Crete will become highly desirable in order to protect the Mediterranean approaches of the Suez Canal. Austria would no doubt secure her long-coveted port at Saloniki and would open by canal water connections with the Danube system which would solve her difficulties of outlet. She could, therefore, well afford to sacrifice the Adriatic.

Four things are essential. We must not so fight the war in the endeavor to extend our victory in Europe nor even to attain physical possession of these desirable frontiers at the expense of the physical, economic, and financial exhaustion of France, Great Britain, and Italy. Upon the continued power, prosperity, and solvency of these nations the strength and existence of the coalition of the Atlantic Powers literally depend. To gain Belgium and Alsace-Lorraine by the decimation of French and British man power would be to insure defeat, to throw away the secure defense which the Atlantic Powers can always organize in time, and destroy the defensive and aggressive position of the sea power against Central Europe. No other defeat can be dangerous; none other conclusive. By it alone can the Central Empires win more than the empty prize of the control of undeveloped eastern Europe. In the second place, the war must end with the Allied navies intact and their merchant marines still numerically superior to anything the Central Empires can build. A

second Trafalgar could not to-day precipitate a second Waterloo. It might fatally weaken the British fleet and sacrifice to no end the control of the Channel and the consequent guarantee of Dutch neutrality against the new Germany, positions vital to the defensive of the new sea power against the Central Empires. Otherwise, the assurance of future safety will be precarious indeed.

We must, in the third place, not allow the Central Empires to acquire a foothold on the Atlantic proper, whether in Africa, in South America, or elsewhere, from which a fleet, breaking through the cordon in the Channel, might be maintained while it contested the supremacy of the ocean at the same moment the armies of the Central Empires began a new offensive in Europe to destroy the territorial base of the Atlantic nations on the continent. To buy territorial security in Europe at the price of Morocco, the Congo, or Venezuela would be a fatal blunder. Once Russia became either weak or undependable, no territorial rearrangement of eastern Europe could oppose the domination of the Central Powers and the whole was lost. Serbia, unfortunately, cannot be restored, partly because the Austrians have left too small a fragment of its people alive to make possible the slightest effective resistance to them in future, partly because the new Serbia depended upon the creation of the new Rumania, the expulsion of the Turk from Europe, and, above all, upon Russia at Constantinople and in the eastern

Balkans, undiminished in strength and influence. To purchase such a rearrangement at the risk of the decimation of France, the loss of the British fleet, or territorial concessions in Africa, would be to tie ourselves to the chariot wheels of a new conqueror.

In the fourth place, the isolation of the Central Powers must be maintained after the war by the perpetuation of the present coalition of the Atlantic Powers. It will be inexpedient to create any league of nations, any international court or council, to which the Central Powers would be admitted on terms of equality. So long as they remain united, no international body can be better than a convenient method by which the two coalitions may discuss mooted issues and reach an agreement.

No crushing of the Austro-German army or extirpation of militarism is feasible or imperative. If the western Allies were in future to protect themselves on the basis of their European strength alone in a world still dominated by the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance, it would be perhaps imperative to destroy the German army to make possible the military domination of Europe by the French and the Russians. If the aim of the war was to free Austria-Hungary from the heavy hand of the army and bureaucracy so as to liberate the true impulses of the people for democracy, nothing short of a destruction of militarism could achieve it. If the territorial reorganization of southern and eastern Europe through a federation of new autonomous

states was to be permanent, the organized military force of Germany and Austria must be utterly destroyed during the war. But none of those aims seem now possible; the collapse of Russia makes such a maximum victory in the field unduly costly to attain and not improbably futile to achieve any such results. So long as the peoples of the Central Empires co-operate of their own volition, no military victory can prevent them from instituting in the long run such form of government as they see fit. To interfere with the domestic administration of a united Germany and a loyal Austria-Hungary will require not merely victory, but conquest, maintained for a generation by military occupation of both countries.

A relatively limited victory in France or in Italy is all that is either necessary or expedient. The prime consideration dictating the time of this final offensive is the fact that the Allies are not now prepared to exert their full force nor able to predicate with certainty the maintenance of the armies already in France. The British and French must hold out until the United States can come to their aid. At all costs they must still be able to co-operate with full strength in delivering the final blow. The British and French armies must, therefore, not be wasted in offensives which cannot be finally effective until the United States is ready. It would seem wiser to undertake purposefully a purely defensive war for perhaps some years. The present offensives seem to play the German

game; they are too costly of men and of munitions; the Allied position in Italy on the Piave is exceedingly dangerous and invites defeat. At the sacrifice of some little territory the Allies can withdraw to an absolutely secure line running from Milan along the Apennines to the Adriatic, which can be defended with absolute assurance and at a minimum cost. After all, Milan is the key to France, and so long as the Allies hold it the rear is safe. A few miles of territory here or there in Italy and in France are of no great importance now and on no account must the Allies give the Germans a chance to defeat them. No objective which they can possibly win in Italy is worth a moment's risk of a defeat. To be sure, we shall not give up Italy for lost, but we must realize and not minimize the strength of the German position, the elaborateness of their calculations, the additional power which the collapse of Russia puts in their hands, and admit that an impregnable defensive is now the essential thing.

We must play for time. We must organize victory with deliberation, calmness, thorough calculation, with an impartial and objective study of all dispositions and requirements, with a whole-hearted and sincere renunciation of all dispositions not imperative to win. There is absolutely no hurry. The Germans cannot win more than we allow them to have in the west; they already have won more than we can probably take away from them in the east. True, the Allies cannot neglect the value of time, but five

or ten years can be provided for on a defensive basis, and in the mean time an irresistible offense can be organized; but it cannot be done in a moment, and it cannot be extemporized. Above all, it cannot be done on the basis of the past erroneous calculations and assumptions, the treatment of uncertainties as certainties, of the imponderables as dependables.

Time, too, and this defensive will put great problems upon the German machine. It works best under stress; it is capably organized for defense, and is not so good at the work of peace. To utilize the strength of Central Europe is a tremendous task, and meanwhile the blockade may put a greater strain upon the German economic fabric than it can endure for so many years. If we are willing to pay for victory, we ought certainly to be willing to pay with a little patience. In France along the trench line the utmost conservation of men and of material should obtain. It is imperative that the French army should be taken out of the trenches as completely and as soon as possible. It has thus far borne the brunt of the war, and its losses have been fully as great as France can afford to bear, if she is to retain her proper strength after the war. The men themselves are war-worn, nervous, and weary; to leave them longer with any responsibility for the defense is to risk the destruction of France and make successful the German strategy of defeat. Six months' complete rest would recreate the French army. Without a strong France, defense on the conti-

nent by the European members of the new Atlantic Powers cannot be predicated.

Nor must the Allies move until the American army is fully ready to meet every emergency and every contingency. To attempt a campaign a moment sooner is to sacrifice the British and French armies and to immolate the American army before it is able to defend itself. The necessary material for a great offensive is not yet to be had; the ships to bring it to the front are not yet available; the food reserve of the Atlantic nations has been sadly depleted by the war; the strain upon their economic fabrics has been very great. If the offensive for the time being can be abandoned and a purely defensive war fought with a minimum expenditure of material, it will greatly increase the chances of victory and the ease with which the Allied countries themselves can continue the war. Part of the labor at present going into the creation of guns and munitions can then be turned into the creation of ships, the raising of food, the reconstruction of the industrial fabric in general, and the replacing of the railroad cars and engines worn out by the war. The economic fabric of the Allied nations must be rebuilt before they go on with the war. That means a defensive war for perhaps two years. They could then proceed with entire confidence that everything had been foreseen. New herds of cattle, adequate reserves of grain could have been created; the railroad systems of all countries could have been put into excellent shape

and an adequate number of ships built. All could easily be done if the strain at present on the raw material and the factories were relieved by the abandoning of the great offensive.

There are also immediate problems to meet. Twenty-five hundred large guns were lost in Italy, and to replace them will require the entire output of the Allied countries for a year. The ship-building program in the United States has also been badly delayed, perhaps through no one's fault, but certainly with definite consequence. The partial destruction of Halifax, one of the important shipping-points in Canada, the burning of several munition factories in the United States, the destruction of great supplies of grain and of munitions by fire, were also very serious losses. Even more serious have been the results of the successive blizzards of January and February upon the coal output and upon the transportation system. For weeks ships loaded with indispensable material for France and Italy could not secure coal; the equipment of the railroads began to break down under the strain; and the supplying of the industrial and domestic structure of the country with coal and raw materials and the transportation to the seaboard and shipment of food and manufactured goods have become problems of the first magnitude, which cannot be solved in a moment and which must necessarily delay the effective final preparations. If political opposition to the administration based upon this unprecedented situation should develop on a large scale and result at the

coming election in November in the return of a Republican majority in Congress, an obstacle to the efficient conduct of the war would have been created which might very well prolong the conflict some years or cause an inconclusive peace. If the whole administration could be changed as a result of the election as in England and France, the effect upon the prosecution of the war might conceivably be good, serious as it would be to lose Mr. Wilson's masterly direction of affairs merely to change the bureau chiefs. But to put a Republican Congress in Washington to criticize and hinder the work of a Democratic executive who cannot be removed from office would be calamitous. We are told a new German aircraft program is in contemplation and a new submarine is being turned out. We must defend ourselves against both of these devices before we proceed with the offensive for ending the war. Otherwise our results are only too likely to be as before—inconclusive.

No moral effect upon the peoples of the Allied countries of adverse nature need be feared if an adequate campaign of publicity explaining the purposes of the new strategy to the people can be undertaken. Nor is there any particular reason why it should not be. This campaign certainly concerns no factors not well known to the Germans, nor is it likely that the German spy system does not promptly learn everything of real value to them. If the governments could only frankly explain to their own people the purposes of the operation, anything what-

ever could be undertaken without any effect upon the public morale, but the continuation of past secrecy will make difficult indeed the undertaking of a purely defensive campaign which may mean the sacrifice here and there of some territory in Italy and in France.

What need for doubt that time, forethought, and intelligence can create an Allied offensive which will be irresistible? Why question the superior strength, capacity, and ability of the Atlantic Powers over the Central Empires? Why grieve because the German strategy of victory has already destroyed that straw man, that bogy, the old European balance of power? With all their secret service and mathematical calculations, the Germans never saw that the old balance of power was dead and a new international alliance bound to succeed it which their military dispositions could not assail, which has been cemented by their own methods of conducting the war as it never could have been by forces created by the Allies. Nothing but the great moral campaign against Germany could have created the conviction of the necessity of the new alliance, of the identity of interests of the Allied countries which now animates them all. Indeed, by precipitating the war, the Germans expected to create a new empire. The very dispositions upon which they counted have created one—but it is not theirs.

THE END

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